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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

10 CFR 50.73

April 29, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-92-16
NAPS:WCH
Docket Nos. 50-338
50-339
License Nos. NPF-4
NPF-7


Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 and 2.

Report No. 50-338,339/92-009-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very Truly Yours,


G. E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. M. S. Lesser
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 50-338-339-1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4) MISSED SURVEILLANCE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	4	02	92	009	00	0	4	29	North Anna Unit 2	05000339
										0500011

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10) 95%	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)				
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v-i)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)					
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(t)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME G. E. Kane, Station Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 703 894-2101

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 2, 1992, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 5, an evaluation of surveillance requirements was being performed as a corrective action for missed surveillances reported under LER 50-338,339/92-007-00. During this review, it was determined that a portion of the circuitry in the Containment Purge and Exhaust (CP/E) isolation system had not been adequately tested in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Table 4.3-3, TS 4.6.3.1.2.c, TS 4.9.4 and TS 4.9.9. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

The cause of the event is personnel errors resulting in failure to develop appropriate procedures to satisfy TS surveillance requirements.

This event posed no significant safety implications because subsequent testing of the CP/E channels demonstrated that all circuitry was capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public was not affected at any time due to this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500033892	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		92	009	00	02	OF	04

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On April 2, 1992, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 5, an evaluation of surveillance requirements was being performed as a corrective action for missed surveillances reported under LER 50-338,339/92-007-00. During this review, it was determined that a portion of the the circuitry in the Containment Purge and Exhaust (CP/E) isolation system had not been adequately tested. Technical Specification (TS) Table 4.3-3 "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements" specifies that CP/E radiation monitor (RM) channel functional tests be performed monthly and channel calibration be performed at a refueling frequency. TS 4.6.3.1.2.c requires verification every 18 months that on a CP/E isolation signal, each CP/E valve actuates to its isolation position. During refueling operations, TS 4.9.4 requires that each required containment penetration be verified isolated or tested in accordance with applicable portions of TS 4.6.3.1.2 and TS 4.9.9. TS 4.9.9 specifies that the CP/E isolation system be demonstrated operable within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during core alterations by verifying that CP/E isolation occurs on manual initiation and on a high radiation test signal from the containment gaseous and particulate RM instrumentation channels. The detailed review identified a portion of the CP/E isolation circuitry which was not being tested by its surveillance procedures. Since the entire circuit was not tested as required by a channel calibration and channel functional, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) as a missed TS surveillance.

The channel functional and channel calibration procedures for the RMs ensure that the RMs actuate their appropriate relays on a HI-HI signal. The CP/E actuation is tested by actuating the containment particulate RM. CP/E is then left isolated and contacts are checked on the containment gaseous and containment area RMs. The only portion of the circuit that was not tested was the permanent interconnecting wires that are connected to the RM relay contacts. Since the RM contacts that are checked do not verify continuity of the entire circuit, the CP/E isolation surveillances have been missed.

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

The RM channels ensure that radiation levels are continuously measured and automatic actuations are initiated if radiation trip level setpoints are exceeded. The CP/E isolation system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The operability of this system restricts the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment. This event posed no significant safety implications because subsequent testing of the CP/E channels demonstrated that all circuitry was capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public was not affected at any time due to this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	0 0 9	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3.0 Cause of the Event

The cause of the event is personnel error resulting in failure to develop appropriate procedures to satisfy the surveillance requirements.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

The Operations Shift Supervisor was immediately notified that a portion of the CP/E circuitry had not been tested, and the appropriate Action Statement of TS 3.6.3.1 was entered for Unit 1. Therefore, each affected penetration was verified isolated by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position. Unit 2 was in mode 5 when the missed surveillances were discovered, and these LCOs were not applicable.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

CP/E isolation tests (PT-91.1) were revised to test the entire circuitry and the tests were successfully performed on both units.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

In accordance with the Action Plan of LER 50-338,339/92-007-00 an additional review of other complex instrumentation/electrical surveillance requirements will be performed to verify TS surveillance requirements are fully met.

7.0 Similar Events

LER 50-338,339/90-009-03 described an event where full response time testing of the Source Range Neutron Flux Reactor Trip preamplifiers, the Power Range Neutron Detector isolation amplifiers and the Overtemperature Delta Temperature Reactor Trip lag and lead/lag cards was not performed due to incorrect TS interpretation.

LER 50-339/91-001-00 documents an event where a set of contacts and associated wiring on the control room bench board switch for the Train A power operated relief valve (PORV) over pressure control circuitry had not been tested as required by TS surveillance requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b. The cause of the event was the incorrect interpretation of TS 4.4.3.2.1.b. Previous interpretations did not require testing of the contacts and associated wiring for the PORV control circuitry.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3) 0 4 OF 0 4
		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 0 9	VERSION NUMBER 0 0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

7.0 Similar Events (continued)

LER 50-338,339/92-007-00 documents missed surveillances of RCP bus undervoltage/underfrequency circuitry and SI input to reactor trip.

8.0 Additional Information

None.