UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

December 4, 1995

Mr. Robert E. Denton
Vice President - Nuclear Energy
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, MD 20657-4702

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW RESULTS

Dear Mr. Denton:

On November 9, 1995, Region I performed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, covering the period May 14, 1995 to October 28, 1995. The PPR process consisted of a review of inspection findings, significant events, and other information that relates to the integrated performance of your site. The purpose of this process was to assess nuclear plant performance for trends, and to plan future inspection activities. This process will be performed about every six months so that two PPR assessments will be performed during the approximate 17-month Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) cycle.

From this review, we noted generally good performance of the plant and personnel. Operator responses to the unexpected trip of a steam generator feed pump at Unit 1 and loss of circulating water pumps at Unit 2 were timely and appropriate. During the period of sustained hot weather, engineering activities supporting operations, following an increase in circulating water inlet temperatures, were found to be comprehensive. Detailed planning and close interdepartmental coordination were also effective in preventing a plant trip during a Unit 2 power reduction in response to a faulty control element assembly position indicator that was complicated by a failure of a main turbine control valve.

The establishment of a Trip Prevention Program to improve site awareness and performance of activities that potentially affect safe and reliable plant operation was recognized. However, several recent incidents have occurred that indicate that results from this effort have not been fully realized when performing maintenance activities. These incidents include loss of five of six circulating water pumps due to a loose metal panel falling on electrical buswork, seizing of an auxiliary feedwater pump due to improper alignment during overhaul, and incorrectly setting constant level oilers on several safety related pumps. Additionally, recurring foreign materials exclusion control problems persist as was evident during preventive maintenance activities on the station blackout diesel. Continued management attention is warranted in strengthening aspects of the maintenance program.

Engineering performance continued to be strong throughout this period. Evaluations and analyses conducted were comprehensive and conservative; demonstrating sound engineering judgement. In particular, the operating

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experience review group consistently conducted thorough root cause analyses for a variety of incidents. Strong support for the new diesel generator project was evident by the quality test procedures, prompt problem resolution, and close management involvement. However, isolated instances of untimely and incomplete communications between operations personnel and engineering were noted. For example, an operability determination for cork-filled expansion joints did not contain adequate technical bases and operators did not promptly recognize a degraded condition of a safety-related valve.

Continued reductions in overall personnel radiation exposure have demonstrated that improvements in the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program have been largely effective. However, several human performance deficiencies in posting and controlling entries into high radiation areas were noted.

A lack of clear administrative controls has contributed to a breakdown in implementing the site access authorization program and in controlling contractor activities for a recently installed Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Communication short-comings between the security organization and site management contributed to weaknesses in carrying out the site access authorization program. The misapplication of regulatory guidance by a contractor resulted in the IDS vulnerabilities not being readily identified. We acknowledge that you have recognized these weaknesses and are planning definitive corrective actions. We will review the effectiveness of these actions in the future.

Enclosure 1 provides the schedule and basis for the NRC inspections of your facility planned through October 1996. We will inform you of any changes required to the attached inspection schedule. The routine resident inspection effort is not included in this schedule.

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Lawrence T. Doerflein at 610-337-5378.

Sincerely,



Richard W. Cooper, II, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-317
50-318

Enclosure: Planned Inspections

cc w/encl:
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CALVERT CLIFFS
PLANNED NRC INSPECTIONS

NOVEMBER 1995 - OCTOBER 1996

RI = Regional Initiative
CO = Core Inspection (NRC program inspections, except resident core activities)

PROCEDURE NO.	TITLE	DATE
	OPERATIONS	
NUREG 1021	Initial Operator Examinations	11/27/95
CO 40500	Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Basis: Core Inspection Program	06/17/96
	MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE	
RI 62705	Balance-of-Plant Maintenance Basis: Management Directed Initiative-Degraded components in risk-significant BOP systems resulted in several plant trips	02/26/96 & 03/11/96
CO 73753	Inservice Inspection, Unit 1 Basis: Core Inspection Program	03/18/96
	ENGINEERING	
CO 37550	Engineering (Visit #2) Basis: Core Inspection Program	07/15/96
CO 37550	Engineering (Visit #3) Basis: Core Inspection Program	08/12/96
	PLANT SUPPORT	
CO 84750	Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring-Confirmatory Measurements (HP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	01/22/96
CO 84750	Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring (HP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	03/11/96

RI 81070/81078	Physical Security (S) Basis: Management Directed Initiative-Followup to Identified Problems in Access Authorization Program/IDS	04/08/96
CO 83750	Occupational Radiation Exposure (Outage) (HP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	04/08/96
CO 81700	Physical Security Program (Visit #2 - Threat Assessment) (S) Basis: Core Inspection Program	05/13/96
CO 83750	Radiological Controls - Unit 1&2 (HP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	06/10/96
RI 64150	Postfire Safe Shutdown Basis: Management Directed Initiative-Followup to BGE self assessment of area in response to NRC and BGE identified deficiencies	06/17/96
CO 82701	Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (EP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	07/17/96
CO 83750	Radiological Controls - Units 1&2 (HP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	08/26/96
CO 64704	Fire Protection Program (FP) Basis: Core Inspection Program	09/21/96