



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-424/95-30 and 50-425/95-30

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Facility Name: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Inspection Conducted: November 27 - December 1, 1995

Inspector: R. P. Carrion 15 Dec '95  
Date Signed  
 R. P. Carrion, Radiation Specialist

Approved by: T. R. Decker 12/15/95  
Date Signed  
 T. R. Decker, Acting Branch Chief  
 Plant Support Branch  
 Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of the organization of the Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group; training and qualifications of chemistry technicians; plant water chemistry; process and effluent radiation monitors; the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS); the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP); radioactive materials handling and transportation procedures, documentation packages, and volume reduction of solid radwaste.

Results:

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

The licensee's organization and staffing levels of its Chemistry Department and Radwaste Shipping Unit satisfied Technical Specification (TS) requirements. (Paragraph 2)

The licensee's training program was effective in maintaining a high skill level among the Chemistry technicians and was considered to be a strength. (Paragraph 3)

The licensee had maintained an effective over-all chemistry program to inhibit degradation due to corrosion/erosion of components of both the primary and secondary systems. (Paragraph 4)

The licensee's programs for maintaining the calibration and availability of the plant's process and effluent radiation monitors in a high state and preparing gaseous waste release permits (including sample collection and analysis) were being effectively implemented and regulatory requirements were satisfied. (Paragraph 5)

The licensee's PASS was capable of fulfilling its intended sampling function and the licensee's technicians were well-trained to operate the system. (Paragraph 6)

The licensee had an effective program in place to collect radiological environmental samples. (Paragraph 7)

The licensee's radwaste shipping documentation was thorough and in compliance with the applicable regulations. Associated procedures were well-written. The licensee had made a good effort to reduce radwaste. (Paragraph 8)

The concerns presented in Information Notice (IN) 94-81 were not an issue at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. (Paragraph 9)

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*B. Allen, Chemistry Supervisor
- \*J. B. Beasley, Plant General Manager
- \*W. Burmeister, Manager, Engineering Support
- \*C. L. Christiansen, Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- M. Kurtzman, Supervisor, Health Physics (HP) and Chemistry Training
- \*R. L. LeGrand, Manager, Health Physics and Chemistry
- A. Parton, Superintendent of Chemistry
- \*F. Scoggins, Nuclear Specialist/HP
- \*M. Sheibani, NSAC Supervisor
- \*S. Sundaram, Senior Nuclear Specialist
- \*C. Tippins, Nuclear Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.

#### Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- \*C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector
- P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector
- M. Widmann, Resident Inspector

\*Attended exit interview

### 2. Organization and Staffing (84750 and 86750)

Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 describes the licensee's organization.

The inspector reviewed and discussed the licensee's chemistry and radwaste shipping organizations with licensee representatives. The Chemistry Department was unchanged from the previous review of its structure. (Refer to Inspection Reports (IRs) 50-424, 425/95-23.) The radwaste shipping organization had also remained unchanged, i.e., one individual, a Nuclear Specialist/HP, who requested support from other plant groups as required to accomplish his work.

Based on these findings, the inspector concluded that the licensee's organization was stable and in compliance with the TSs.

No violations or deviations were identified.

### 3. Training and Qualification (84750)

TS 6.3 requires, in part, the licensee to maintain a training program for the plant staff to assure that the minimum education and experience requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.8, Rev. 2 are met or exceeded before a person can be considered to be qualified to perform his duties independently.

Enclosure

The inspector interviewed the cognizant licensee Technical Training instructor about the Training/Qualification Program, specifically in the area as related to Chemistry technicians. The program used at the plant was a performance-based systems approach. It was structured such that a newly-hired technician entered a period which combined General Employee Training (GET) and "Basic Training," which included the more fundamental training commitments from the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), NRC, etc. (such as Chemistry Fundamentals, Nuclear Physics Fundamentals, and Balance of Plant Systems) and was generally prerequisite for more advanced training (such as Corrosion Chemistry, Sampling, and Process Instrumentation), which was presented as part of "Intermediate Training." The Intermediate Training was task-oriented and performance-based, consisting of formal training courses and On-The-Job Training (OJT). A formal training course was generally held in the licensee's training center and typically consisted of lectures, demonstrations, self-paced study, or laboratory exercises. OJT was normally held in the plant using Job Performance Measures (JPMs) to measure task proficiency. A Qualification Signoff Criteria Checklist had to be signed off for an individual to be considered qualified to work independently on the subject material. The new technician was expected to be qualified within approximately two years of being hired. Depending upon level of education and experience, a new technician trainee may be exempted from parts of the Intermediate Training Program. Although exemptions could be granted on a case-by-case basis, they were rarely used. Upon becoming a qualified technician, Continuing Training (which was virtually anything outside of Intermediate Training, such as lessons learned from plant and industry operating experience, addressing observed problems, and refreshing seldom-used skills) was scheduled several times each year.

The inspector reviewed three Training Lesson Plans, CH-LP-41100-03, Rev. 3, "Radioactive Effluents," approved June 29, 1994; CH-LP-41300-00, Rev. 0, "Post Accident Sampling System," approved February 20, 1991; and CH-LP-41301-01, Rev. 1, "Operation of the Post Accident Sampling System," approved January 10, 1991. The plans were very detailed and included learning objectives, enabling objectives, a list of materials to be supplied by the instructor, etc. Furthermore, the inspector reviewed Job Performance Measures associated with the Training Lesson Plans and found them to be of similar high quality. The inspector also reviewed the tests associated with the class material presented in the first two referenced lesson plans and found both of them to be a challenging, good test of the material presented. The questions for a given examination were chosen randomly from a computerized bank of prepared questions.

The inspector requested to review the training/qualification records of two chemistry technicians and found them to be easily retrievable and current.

The inspector concluded that the training program was effective in developing and maintaining a high skill level among the Chemistry technicians. The inspector identified training as a strength.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 4. Plant Water Chemistry (84750)

During the inspection, both units were operating at one hundred percent power. Unit 1 was in its sixth fuel cycle, with its next refueling outage scheduled for March 1996, and Unit 2 was in its fifth fuel cycle, with its next refueling outage scheduled for autumn 1996. During the upcoming Unit 1 outage, the Containment Spray Additive System is scheduled to be converted from an active system using sodium hydroxide to a passive system using trisodium phosphate. This action would reduce the number of valves in the system. (There had been evidence that some of the sodium hydroxide had been introduced into the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) when the valves were cycled.)

##### a. Primary Water Chemistry TS-Required Parameters

The inspector reviewed the plant chemistry controls and operational controls affecting primary plant water chemistry. TS 3/4.4.7 specifies that the concentrations of dissolved oxygen (DO), chloride, and fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) be maintained below 0.10 parts per million (ppm), 0.15 ppm, and 0.15 ppm, respectively. TS 3/4.4.8 specifies that the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less than or equal to 1.0 microcuries per gram ( $\mu\text{Ci/g}$ ) Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) whenever the reactor is critical or the average temperature is greater than 500°F.

Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed daily summaries for both units which correlated reactor power output to chloride, fluoride, and dissolved oxygen concentrations, and specific activity of the reactor coolant. The arbitrarily-chosen period of October 1, 1995 through November 30, 1995 was reviewed. The parameters were determined to have been maintained well below TS limits. Typical values for DO, chloride, and fluoride were less than two parts per billion (ppb), less than one ppb, and less than three ppb, respectively, for Unit 1 and less than two ppb, two ppb, and less than three ppb, respectively, for Unit 2. The inspector also reviewed graphical summaries for both units which correlated reactor power output to specific activity of the reactor coolant for the same period. Typical DEI values at steady-state conditions were  $4.0\text{E-}4$   $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  for Unit 1 and  $9.0\text{E-}4$   $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  for Unit 2. Unit 2 was believed to have a pinhole leak in one fuel pin, while Unit 1 had not shown any evidence of leaking fuel.

The inspector concluded that the Primary Water Chemistry was maintained well within the TS requirements.

##### b. Secondary Water Chemistry

TS 6.7.4.c requires the licensee to establish, implement, maintain, and audit a Secondary Water Chemistry Program to inhibit steam generator (SG) tube degradation.

The inspector discussed the licensee's program to evaluate its impact on the condition of the SGs. The licensee had used an All-Volatile

Treatment (AVT) of hydrazine and ammonia on both units since the plant began operation. Both units are operating at a feedwater hydrazine concentration of 150 ppb, while a pH of approximately 10 was maintained. The iron concentration was determined via corrosion product monitors and was approximately 1.8 ppb in the feedwater. The ammonia concentration was approximately 8 ppm in the feedwater and 4 ppm in the blowdown.

In addition to general system chemistry, the licensee had been emphasizing "crevice" chemistry, in which very localized conditions may give rise to the phenomenon of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). The licensee had done "hideout return" evaluations to determine the inventory of crevice contaminants of the SGs. Sodium appeared to be a key parameter in the development of IGSCC and the licensee had been trying to control it through the use of a sodium/chloride molar ratio regimen. Three years ago, the licensee maintained the ratio at approximately 2.5:1.0. However, as additional plant and industrial experience was gained, this ratio had been reduced to less than 0.5:1.0 by reducing the sodium via the demineralizer system. Industry-wide, the ratio can be commonly controlled by the addition of ammonium chloride, thereby raising the chloride value of the denominator of the ratio, and reducing the overall value of the ratio. However, this technique had not been employed at Plant Vogtle. The licensee's SG vendor was finalizing a safety evaluation for this technique in plants which have Model F SGs, such as Plant Vogtle. The licensee's chemistry program planned to incorporate the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) "Recommendations of Molar Ratio Control" (EPRI-TR-104811-VI) in early 1996. The monthly average of SG sodium concentrations had been generally maintained at values approximately 0.3 ppb for both units for the previous two years. In addition, autoclaves had been installed in both units to monitor real time Electrochemical Potential (ECP) of the feedwater, which generally shows a good correlation to SG corrosion. This system was expected to be started up during the first quarter of 1996.

The licensee was also evaluating a new technology, electrodeionization (EDI), which combined reverse osmosis and ion exchange to remove ammonia and contaminants as well as to regenerate the demineralizer resins. This technology would effectively reduce the annual generation volume of spent resin (and its associated disposal costs).

Based on these findings, the inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented an effective over-all chemistry program to maintain the components of both the primary and secondary systems and was proactive in making system improvements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 5. Process and Effluent Monitors (84750)

TS 3/4.3.3.1 defines the operation and surveillance requirements for monitors of radioactive (or potentially radioactive) streams. This instrumentation is provided to monitor and control the releases of radioactive materials during normal and abnormal plant conditions as well as in effluents during effluent releases. The alarm/trip setpoints for the effluent monitors are calculated in accordance with the procedures in the Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20. The alarm/trip setpoints for the process monitors are specified by the TSs.

### a. Sample Collection

The inspector reviewed selected portions of the procedures used to generate a Gaseous Waste Release Permit (950383.026.075.G, for a Unit 2 Containment Vent, a continuous release) and to obtain a gaseous grab sample. Specifically, the inspector reviewed selected parts of Chemistry Procedure No. 33015-C, Rev. 19, "Obtaining Gaseous Samples for Radioactivity Analysis," approved August 23, 1995, and Chemistry Procedure No. 36020-C, Rev. 10, "Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Release Permit Generation and Data Control - Computer Method," approved August 28, 1994. The inspector observed a licensee technician obtain a gaseous grab sample and return it to the Count Room for analysis and noted that the procedures were followed closely. Proper sampling techniques and health physics practices were employed. The inspector observed a technician close the release of the previous week (950376.026.074.G) and open the referenced release. The inspector noted that the technician was knowledgeable and followed the procedure closely.

### b. Setpoint Calculations

The inspector requested that the setpoint value and pre-release dose calculations referenced in a gaseous and a liquid release permit be calculated manually for verification. The licensee's Senior Nuclear Specialist did the calculations and was able to demonstrate independent verification of the setpoint values and doses of the respective release permits using the methods set forth in the ODCM.

### c. Radiation Monitor Calibrations

The inspector reviewed the calibration records of several monitors, including: 1RE2562A and 1RE2562C (Containment Atmosphere Process Air Monitors); 1RE12442A, 1RE12442B, and 1RE12442C (Plant Vent Effluent Air Monitors); and 1RE0018 (Waste Liquid Effluent Monitor) from Unit 1, as well as the same monitors from Unit 2 plus RE-48000 (the Unit 2 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Monitor). The sources used were properly decay corrected and the optimum operating voltage of the respective monitors was properly determined. The calibrations had been done within the required frequency. No irregularities were identified.

d. Availability of Radiation Monitors

The inspector reviewed records which summarized periods when the radiation monitors were out of service (OOS) for both units for the 1995 calendar to date. The licensee's Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) included fifty channels in Unit 1, fifty-one channels in Unit 2, and seven common channels. The records indicated that the worst month for Unit 1 monitors was July when an availability of 97.5 percent was attained while January proved to be the worst month for Unit 2 when an availability of 94.6 percent was attained. At no time was a monitor/channel out of service for thirty days, which would require inclusion of such information in the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

Based upon the above activities, the inspector concluded that the licensee's programs for maintaining the calibration and availability of the plant's process and effluent radiation monitors in a high state and preparing gaseous waste release permits (including sample collection and analysis) were being effectively implemented and that regulatory requirements were satisfied.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) (84750)

NUREG-0737 requires that the licensee be able to obtain a sample of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. Furthermore, the sample must be promptly obtained and analyzed (within three hours total) under accident conditions without incurring a radiation exposure to any individual in excess of 3 and 18 3/4 rem to the whole body and/or extremities, respectively.

TS 6.7.4.d requires that a program be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples. The PASS should provide these capabilities and should enable the licensee to obtain information critical to the efforts to assess and control the course and effects of an accident.

The inspector reviewed selective portions of procedures 35611-C, Rev. 16, "Remote Operation of the PASS," approved October 1, 1992; 35614-C, Rev. 10, "Operation of the PASS," approved October 1, 1992; and 35620-C, Rev. 9, "Local Operation of the PASS after an Accident," approved April 1, 1992. The inspector determined that the procedure was complete and adequate for the work to be done. The inspector also reviewed flow diagrams of each unit's PASS (1X4DB110 and 2X4DB110) as shown in Section 9.3.2.2.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and discussed the flow paths with the System Engineer. The inspector also reviewed the respective results for the previous two semiannual surveillances for both units. The results of each analyzed parameter satisfied its respective acceptance criteria. The inspector walked down the system, including the local PASS sample panels and the remote PASS panels located in the



Technical Support Center (TSC). Each of the panels was "mimicked" to aid the operator. The inspector noted two Work Order/Work Request tags on the panels located in the TSC, one for the Unit 1 Validyne instrumentation (for temperatures and pressures) and one for the Unit 2 boron analyzer. The inspector also went to the area where the sample would be taken and placed into the shielded carrier (the "pig") for transporting the sample to the laboratory for analysis. The system was clean and well-maintained. The inspector also walked down the transport paths to be used by the cart carrying the "pig" (for Units 1 and 2) to the laboratory where the sample would be analyzed and found it to be clear of obstructions. The inspector also discussed the system's sampling points, flow paths, etc. with the chemistry technician who accompanied the inspector during the walkdown of the PASS and determined that he was knowledgeable about its functions and operation.

The inspector concluded that the PASS was capable of fulfilling its intended sampling function and that licensee personnel were well-trained to operate the system. (Refer to Paragraph 3 for training review.)

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 7. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (84750)

TS 6.7.4.g specifies that the licensee shall conduct a program (contained in the ODCM) to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of the plant. TS 6.8.1.3 requires an Annual Radiological Environmental Surveillance Report to summarize the results of the plant's REMP during the previous calendar year. The REMP shall provide representative measurements of radioactivity in the highest potential exposure pathways and verification of the accuracy of the effluent monitoring program and modeling of environmental exposure pathways. Accumulation of radioactivity in the environment can thereby be measured and trends can be assessed to determine whether the radioactivity resulted from plant operations. The data may also be used to project the potential dose to offsite populations based on the cumulative measurements of any plant-originated radioactivity, as well as to detect unanticipated pathways for the transport of radionuclides through the environment. The Plant Vogtle REMP is designed to detect the effects, if any, of plant operation on environmental radiation levels by monitoring airborne, waterborne, ingestion, and direct radiation pathways in the area surrounding the plant site. It also verifies that the measurable concentrations of radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than expected on the basis of the effluent measurements and the modeling of the environmental exposure pathways. Indicator sampling stations are located where detection of the radiological effects of the plant's operation would be most likely, where the samples collected should provide a significant indication of potential dose to man, and where an adequate comparison of predicted radiological levels might be made with measured levels. Control stations are located where radiological levels are not expected to be significantly influenced by plant operation, i.e., at background locations. An environmental impact assessment of plant operation is made from the radiological measurements of the sampling stations.

Environmental samples were collected and analyzed by personnel from the corporate central laboratory in Smyrna, Georgia. The inspector accompanied the Environmental Analysts on part of their normal weekly rounds to collect samples to observe collection technique and to check the physical condition and operability of the sampling stations. Air samples were taken at five plant indicator stations (#2, #7, #8, #10, and #16) and vegetation samples were collected at two indicator stations (#7 and #15). Many of the sampling stations included co-located thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) (including those of the licensee, the State of Georgia, and/or the NRC) for the detection of direct gamma radiation. The air sampling stations were located such that there would be no interference from tall weeds/vegetation in taking representative samples. The inspector noted that the sampling units were well-maintained, had been calibrated within the required calibration frequency, were in good working order, and that there was no evidence of vandalism (although discussions with the licensee's personnel indicated that vandalism had occasionally occurred). The inspector observed that the samples were properly collected and that the Environmental Analysts used good HP techniques to avoid sample contamination and conducted their work in an efficient, competent manner.

The inspector concluded that the licensee had an effective program in place to collect environmental samples and that licensee personnel were knowledgeable and capable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 8. Transportation of Radioactive Material (86750)

10 CFR 71 established the requirements for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of licensed material. 10 CFR 71.5 required the licensee to comply with the applicable requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189 when transporting licensed material outside of the confines of the plant or other place of use, or when delivering licensed material to a carrier for transport.

##### a. Status of Volume Reduction

The inspector reviewed the licensee's solid radwaste disposal data, as reported in the Radioactive Effluent Release Reports, for the referenced years. The following table summarizes those data for the last four years.

<u>Vogtle Electric Generation Station</u>				
<u>Solid Radwaste Shipments</u>				
	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Number of Waste Disposal Shipments	20	37	40	16
Volume (cubic meters)	68.7	108.5	68.4	51.4
Activity (curies)	596.1	1069.4	223.0	339.4

Discussions with the licensee's responsible Nuclear Specialist responsible for the shipping of radioactive materials about its program for 1995 determined that by the end of the calendar year, six shipments of resin to the disposal site and ten shipments of Dry Active Waste (DAW) to the waste processor were expected to be made. Furthermore, the volume of solid radwaste shipped for the year was projected to be 93.5 cubic meters. While the projected volume exceeded the goal of 75 cubic meters, this was due to the concentrated effort made by the licensee to get all disposable material offsite prior to the threatened closure of the disposal facility. The results of future years were expected to be less than those of the recent past due to continued vigilance in the effort to reduce the generation of radwaste plus the fact that there was no more residual waste being stored temporarily onsite awaiting disposal. In addition, trash cans located in the RCA for radioactively-contaminated waste were being reduced in size in order to make it inconvenient for plant workers to dispose of large quantities of radwaste. (The idea was that they would think ahead and take a minimum of material into their work area.) Furthermore, the use of a dissolvable material made from polyvinyl alcohol for use as protective clothing, shoe covers, bags, and absorbent materials, such as mop heads and rags, was awaiting the results of a study by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). With a favorable response from the EPA, the licensee planned to begin using the material.

The inspector concluded that the licensee continued to make good progress in its effort to further reduce radwaste.

b. Procedures

The inspector reviewed the following selected procedures for completeness and clarity:

- 46004-C, Rev. 12, "Shipment of Radioactive Material," approved October 15, 1995,
- 46017-C, Rev. 15, "Control, Monitoring, and Removal of Materials in Radiation Controlled Areas," approved April 4, 1994,
- 46100-C, Rev. 1, "10 CFR 61 Waste Classification Sampling Program," approved October 15, 1995,
- 46104-C, Rev. 4, "Shipment of Radwaste to a Licensed Waste Processor," approved October 3, 1995, and
- 46105-C, Rev. 5, "Radwaste Disposal and Notification Requirements," approved October 15, 1995.

The inspector determined that the procedures were well-written and very thorough for the intended activity.

c. Shipment Records

10 CFR 71.91 required the licensee to maintain records of each shipment of licensed material for a period of three years after shipment.

The licensee classified shipments into three categories: Radioactive Waste Shipments (RWSs), Radwaste Volume Reduction Shipments (RVRs), and Radioactive Material Shipments (RMSs). RWSs included radioactive material destined to go directly to the disposal facility (dewatered resins and filters, for example); RVRs included items sent to a processor for volume reduction (via incineration and/or compaction) prior to disposal; and RMSs included items such as decontaminated outage and refueling equipment. To verify that the licensee was in compliance with applicable regulations, the inspector reviewed the following shipping records: RWS 95-006, a Low Specific Activity (LSA) shipment of dewatered resin, destined for the disposal facility; and RVR 95-025, an LSA shipment of two Sea-Land containers of DAW destined for processing (incineration and/or compaction) before final disposal. The documentation packages contained thorough documentation about the respective shipments and the above-referenced items. The radiation and contamination survey results were within the 49 CFR requirements and the shipping documents were being maintained as required. The documentation packages included a copy of the instructions provided to the drivers, with respect to the exclusive use status of their shipment and emergency information.

The inspector concluded that the shipping papers for the selected shipments of radioactive materials satisfied regulatory requirements.

d. Loss of Particulate Sample

The inspector reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee in reference to the events which prompted the writing of Deficiency Card 2-95-175 when one (of five) weekly plant vent particulate sample for the month of August 1995 was not in the package shipped to the corporate central laboratory for gross alpha analysis. (Refer to Paragraph 7.h of IRs 50-424, 425/95-23.)

The specific corrective actions recommended to prevent recurrence, which had not been completed by the conclusion of Inspection 95-23 included:

- Revision of Procedure 37040-C to improve the Chain of Custody and to list the samples individually on the radioactive material shipment record so that the number of samples shipped can be accounted for.
- Revision of Procedure 33015-C to clarify the proper handling of the backup filter paper, specifically the length of time which the backup filter paper must be saved.

The inspector reviewed the referenced procedures and determined that they had been revised as recommended in a timely manner to prevent recurrence.

Based on the above reviews and observations, the inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented effective management control programs for packaging, preparation, and transport of radioactive material, despite the referenced incident. The licensee's heightened awareness of the generation of radwaste held the potential to reduce future disposal volumes even more.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Information Notice (IN) 94-81: Accuracy of Bioassay and Environmental Sampling Results (84750)

IN 94-81 raises questions about the reliability of sample results and analyses performed by a bioassay and environmental contractor. The IN urges licensees who may have used the services of the identified contractor within the last few years to consider how the results were used and whether potentially-inaccurate results would have any safety significance. Furthermore, if inaccurate results could cause significant safety concerns, the licensee is urged to consider what actions would be appropriate to confirm their sample results.

The inspector discussed the IN with cognizant licensee personnel. The licensee had not used the services of the identified contractor.

The inspector concluded that the concerns presented in the IN were not an issue at Plant Vogtle.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Exit Interview (84750 and 86750)

The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 1, 1995, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

11. Acronyms and Initialisms

AVT - All-Volatile Treatment  
 CFR - Code of Federal Regulations  
 Ci - curie  
 CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System  
 ° - degrees  
 DAW - Dry Active Waste  
 DEI - Dose Equivalent Iodine  
 DO - Dissolved Oxygen

DOT - Department of Transportation  
ECP - Electrochemical Potential  
EDI - electrodeionization  
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency  
EPRI - Electrical Power Research Institute  
F - Fahrenheit  
FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report  
g - gram  
GET - General Employee Training  
HP - Health Physics  
IGSCC - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking  
IN - Information Notice  
IR - Inspection Report  
JPM - Job Performance Measure  
LSA - Low Specific Activity  
 $\mu$ Ci - micro-Curie (1.0E-6 Ci)  
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
PASS - Post Accident Sampling System  
ODCM - Off-site Dose Calculation Manual  
OJT - On-the-Job Training  
OOS - Out Of Service  
PERMS - Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System  
ppb - parts per billion  
ppm - parts per million  
RCS - Reactor Coolant System  
REMP - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program  
Rev - Revision  
RMS - Radioactive Material Shipment  
RVRS - Radwaste Volume Reduction Shipment  
RWS - Radioactive Waste Shipment  
SG - Steam Generator  
TLD - Thermoluminescent Dosimetry  
TS - Technical Specification  
TSC - Technical Support Center  
VEGP - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant