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DUKE POWER

December 19, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station Unit
Docket Nos. 5-269, -270, -287
Licensee Event Report 269/95-07

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 269/95-07, concerning the past inoperability of the Low Pressure Injection System.

This report will be supplemented to address root cause and other LER content requirements after further investigation is complete.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (A).

Very truly yours,

for Joe M Davis
J. W. Hampton

/fts

Attachment

cc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter
Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

Mr. L. A. Wiens
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D.C. 20555

INPO Records Center
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-5957

Mr. P. E. Harmon
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

200073

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NRC FORM 366 (4-98) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 04/30/98
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit One	05000 269	1 of 1

TITLE (4)
Low Pressure Injection System Technically Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												05000
12	06	95	95	-	07	-	00	12	19	95		05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below and
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	X	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	in Text, NRC Form
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
	AREA CODE	
L. V. Wilkie, Safety Review Manager	(803)	885-3518

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
F	BI	V	F130	YES							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO		02	05	96

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

* DATE: November 6, 1995 Unit Status: Refueling Shutdown

During testing, the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) flow to the 1A Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Cooler would not increase from approximately 2500 gpm to 5100 gpm as required. The key which locks the 1LPSW-254 (1A LPI Cooler Outlet Block Valve) valve stem to the valve operator was found out of the keyway, allowing the butterfly valve to partially close.

On December 6, 1995, it was determined that flow induced vibration caused the key to come out and the butterfly valve to partially close. Therefore, Engineering concluded that the valve could not be assured to operate under all the design basis conditions. Due to the potential for reduced LPSW flow to the 1A LPI cooler, the 1A LPI train was declared technically inoperable from December 3, 1992 to November 6, 1995. Assuming a single failure of the 1B LPI train along with the failure mode associated with valve 1LPSW-254, heat removal from the LPI coolers could have been degraded following a design basis loss of coolant accident. The degraded heat removal from the LPI coolers would not have interrupted LPI flow to the core or resulted in challenges to the containment design pressure. However, the degraded LPI cooler heat removal capacity could have resulted in exceeding the environmental qualification (EQ) limits on containment temperature and pressure. The impact of the degraded containment heat removal on equipment qualification is still under evaluation.

The valve was modified to prevent the key from vibrating out of the keyway. This report will be supplemented to address root cause and other LER content requirements after further investigation is complete.