

Georgia Power Company
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Telephone 205 877-7122

C. K. McCoy
Vice President, Nuclear
Vogtle Project



Georgia Power

The Southern Electric System

April 27, 1992

ELV-03663
000337

Docket No. 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
RHR VALVE INTERLOCKS OUT OF CALIBRATION
DUE TO PROCEDURE INADEQUACY

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which was discovered on April 2, 1992.

Sincerely,

CKM'G
C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS

Enclosure: LER 50-425/1992-003

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000425	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
RHR VALVE INTERLOCKS OUT OF CALIBRATION DUE TO PROCEDURE INADEQUACY

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
04	02	92	92	003	00	04	27	92			05000
											05000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
POWER LEVEL	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)
	0	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
MEHDI SHEIBANI, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE	AREA CODE: 404, NUMBER: 826-3209

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (16)

On April 2, 1992, with the unit defueled, it was discovered that Unit 2 had operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS). A procedure writer had found that the procedures used for calibrating the open permissive interlock bistables for the residual heat removal system (RHRS) suction isolation valves specified voltage values which could allow the RHRS suction isolation valves to be opened with reactor coolant system pressure slightly above the TS required maximum of 377 psig. A review of the interlock calibrations on April 2, 1992 found a Unit 2 bistable that had been calibrated in February 1989 with values which established the open permissive interlock for valve 2HV-8702A at approximately 380 psig. However, since this calibration setpoint had been lowered during a subsequent calibration, there was no effect on unit operations.

The cause of this event was incorrect calibration procedures which caused the upper end of the range of acceptable setpoints for the open permissive interlock for valve 2HV-8702A to be higher than the maximum value specified by the TS. The appropriate procedures have been revised.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 5	9 2	0 0 3	0 0	2	OF 3

TEXT

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit had operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS). A residual heat removal system (RHRS) suction isolation valve was found to have had its open permissive interlock incorrectly set, placing the interlock outside of TS requirements.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of the discovery of this event, Unit 2 was defueled at 0 percent of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 25, 1992, a procedure writer was preparing revisions to procedures used to calibrate the RHRS suction isolation valve open permissive interlocks, due to TS changes which revised the open permissive setpoint from 377 to 365 psig. These interlocks ensure that the suction isolation valves between the RHRS and the reactor coolant system (RCS) cannot be opened until RCS pressure drops below 377 psig, as required by TS 4.5.2.d.1.a. The procedure writer found that the procedures called for calibrating the bistables with voltage values which were high enough to allow the valves to open with RCS pressure above 377 psig. After review of existing calibration data, it was found that on two occasions, the as-left voltage values would have allowed the valves to be opened with RCS pressure at approximately 379 psig. However, when the static head pressure of 4.77 psi was taken into account, the calibrated setpoint was found to be less than 377 psig.

On April 2, 1992, further review of the previous interlock calibration data was performed and it was found that a Unit 2 bistable had been calibrated in February 1989 with a value which would have allowed valve 2HV-8702A to be opened with RCS pressure at approximately 380 psig, even when taking static head pressure into account. However, there was no effect on unit operations since this setpoint had been lowered during a subsequent calibration. No other incorrect calibrations were found.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was incorrect calibration procedures which caused the open permissive interlock setpoint for valve 2HV-8702A to be higher than the maximum value specified by the TS. A review of the procedures and instrument scaling sheets used to prepare the procedures revealed that the procedure writer applied a tolerance band above the expected setpoint. In this case, the upper end of the band for the setpoint tolerance should have prohibited calibration values corresponding to pressures greater than 377 sig.

LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
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E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Although the highest found "as-left" calibrated setpoint of approximately 380 psig for the interlock was above the TS limit, it was still well below the design pressure of 600 psig for the RHRS. Additionally, in September 1990 the "as-found" setpoint for this same interlock was found to be at the same approximate 330-psig value, as in February 1989, indicating there had been no instrument drift. Furthermore, no event has occurred to challenge the system since administrative controls were in place to prevent operators from opening the valves until RCS pressure was less than 365 psig. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. A "Temporary Change to Procedure" (TCP) was initiated for all eight procedures (four each in Unit 1 and Unit 2) used for the interlock calibrations. This prevented future calibrations from being performed using the improper instrument settings. Due to a design change in progress which lowers the TS open permissive setpoint value to less than 365 psig in Unit 2, the four Unit 2 procedures were again changed to further lower the instrument settings. The corresponding design change for Unit 1 is planned for implementation during the Spring 1993 refueling outage.
2. An additional review of TS surveillance procedures is being conducted to identify similar misapplications of setpoint tolerances. This review will be completed by June 1, 1992, and any additional discrepancies discovered will be reported in a revision to this LER, as necessary.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components:
None
2. Previous Similar Events:
None
3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Reactor Coolant System - AB
Residual Heat Removal System - BO