On July 25, 1984, Fire Detection System and Suppression System (S-29) "Turbine Building/Control Room Wall Spray System" was disconnected and the suppression system isolation valves 9274 & 9275 were held in the closed position for Station modification activities and a continuous firewatch was established. Subsequent to modification activities being terminated for the day, the fire detection and suppression system was reconnected, however the isolation valves were left in the closed position and the firewatch was removed, thus resulting in a violation of Technical Specification 3.14.2.2, which requires a continuous firewatch when the suppression system is inoperable.

NO

MONTH

EXPECTED

DAY

YEAR

8408290112 840824 PDR ADDCK 05000244 S PDR

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YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces (a. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

PACILITY NAME (1)						DOCKET NUMBER (2)						LER NUMBER (6)								PAGE (3)		
		Nuclear	Power	Plant						YEA	R		SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER									
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

On July 25, 1984, Fire Detection and Suppression System (S-29) "Turbine Building/Control Room Wall Spray System" was disconnected and the suppression system isolation valves 9274 & 9275 were held in the closed position for Station modification activities, and a continuous firewatch was established. Subsequent to modification activities being terminated for the day, the fire detection and suppression system was reconnected per procedure SC-3.16.2.4 Attachment A (Generic procedure, no specific valve identified.) Step 7.21 required that the isolation valve be verified in its proper position for fire suppression system. This step was signed as completed, however, the valves remained closed. This procedure was turned over to the Shift Supervisor as completed, and the Administrative procedure A-52.4 "Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment" was inadvertently logged in the S.S. log as being completed even though the A-52.4 was not actually signed as completed. The Auxiliary Operator in turn notified the Fire and Safety Coordinator that the system was returned to operable status and that the firewatch could be removed. The following morning, the same fire system was again held for station modification activities and a firewatch established. The NRC resident inspector, during his daily review of operations, identified that the isolation valves (9274 & 9275) were held closed and that the A-52.4 had been logged as completed and the firewatch removed the previous day. Thus for a period of approximately 16 hours, the fire system (S-29) was inoperable without a firewatch.

Possible contributing causes of this occurrence was the restoration of the fire system (S-29) to service during shift changeover at approximately 1530, miscommunication between the On-Shift personnel as to the status of the valve position, lack of a separate A-52.4 for those two valves in addition to the A-52.4 placed for the detection/suppression system, and perhaps complacency on the part of some personnel in the restoration of these systems due to the very frequent disconnection/restoration of those fire systems.

The Acting Operations Supervisor discussed this occurrence with the individuals involved and reprimanded where appropriate. Increased awareness to the consequences of procedural errors was emphasized. This event will be discussed at the forthcoming Shift Supervisor meeting and the importance of adherence to written procedures will be stressed for all personnel. The existing procedures (SC-3.16.2.4 and A-52.4) will be reviewed to identify means to preclude occurrence and for clarifications for firewatch requirements.





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ROSER W. KOBER VICE PRESIDENT ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

AREA CODE 716 546-2700

August 24, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LER 84-008, Inoperable Fire Suppression System

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1

Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B) which requests a report of, "any operation or conditions prohibited by the plant Technical Specification," the attached Licensee Event Report LER 84-008 is hereby submitted.

Koger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I

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