

Reneased Valley Authority Peak Office Box 2000, Soddy Daily, Terrelater 37,379

April 27, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-328/92000

The enclosed LER provides details concerning an inoperable mechanical snubber. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition that resulted in an operation prohibited by plant technical specifications.


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Sincerely,

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Wilson

Enclosure cc: See page 2



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cc (Enclosure): INPO Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 110C Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89)	Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)	
FACILITY NAME*(1) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
TITLE (4)	
Inoperable Mechanical Chubber	
EVENT DAY (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7)	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR	FACILITY NAMES [DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0
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OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUAN. TO THE REQUIREMEN	TS OF 10 CFR §:
MODE (Check one or more of the following)(11)	
	(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
	(a)(2)(v)73.71(c)
The second se	(a)(2)(vii) []OTHER (Specify in
	(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below and in
	(a)(2)(viii)(B) Text, NRC Fo m 366A)
	3(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH 3 LEF	
NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED [MONTH] DAY YEAR
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X YES (IF yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO	DATE (15) 0 5 2 9 9 2
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-s	pace typewritten lines) (16)

On March 27, 1992, at approximately 0750 Eastern standard time, with Unit ? in a refueling outage (Cycle 5), a snubber was observed to be disconnected from the pipe clamp, and various support attachment bolts were found loose or missing. This condition was detected during performance of a surveillance instruction on an adjacent snubber. Investigation has concluded that the snubber was in the inoperable condition since the previous Unit 2 refueling outage (Cycle 4), at which time the snubber was disconnected to facilitate reacts: coolant pump No. 3 main flange retensioning. The cause for why the snubber was not properly reassembled has not yet been determined; discrepancies that have been identified in the work document are under continuing investigation. An engineering analysis was performed demonstrating that plant safety and operability were not adversely affected by the condition. A work request was initiated and completed, correcting the condition.

NRC Form 3 (6-89)	LICEN	LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SEE FVENT REPORT (LER) KT CONTINUATION	Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92
FACILIÍY N		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	SEQUENTIAL REVISION
	Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ore spage is required, use at		YEAR NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER I I 19 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 (17) 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4
		ALL COMAL MAC TOTAL SOOK ST	
I. FLA	NT CONDITIONS		
Uni	t 2 was in Mode 6, in t	he process of refuel:	ing.
II. DES	CRIPTION OF EVENT		
Α.	Event		
	in a refueling outage disconnected from the loose or missing. Thr it was determined that the previous Unit 2 re	(Cycle 5), a snubber pipe clamp, and varie cough investigation of the snubber had been fueling outage (Cycle	e (EST) on March 27, 1992, with Unit 2 (EIIS Code SNB) was observed to be ous support attachment bolts were f Cycle 5 and Cycle 4 work activities, n in the inoperable condition since e 4), at which time the snubber was pump No. 3 main flange retensioning.
В.	Inoperable Structures,	Components, or Syste	ems That Contributed to the Event
c.	Dates and Approximate	Times of Major Occurs	rences
	September 19, 1990		disassembled to facilitate reactor CP) main flange retensioning.
	October 14, 1990	A work document reinstalled.	indicates that the snubber was
	March 13, 1992	Unit 2 Cycle 5 m	refueling outage began.
	March 27, 1992 at 0/50 EST	disconnected fro	. 2-CVCH-931 was observed to be om the pipe clamp, and various pipe ent bolts were loose or missing.
D.	Other Systems or Secon	dary Functions Affect	ted
	None.		
Е.	Method of Discovery		

The condition of snubber mark No. 2-CVCH-931 was 'iscovered during performance of a surveillance instruction on an adjacent snubber.

NRC form 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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F. Ope.ator Actions

No operator action was required; the unit was in Mode 6 (in process of refueling), and operability of the RCP seal leakoff piping was not required.

G. Safety System Responses

Not applicable - no safety system responses were required.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. Immediate Causes

The support was not reassembled upon completion of related work activities.

B. Root Cause

The root cause has not yet been determined. Discrepancies that have been identified in the work document are under continuing investigation.

C. Contributing Factors

No contributing factors have been determined. Contributing factors will be determined upon completion of the investigation.

IV. ANALYS'S OF THE EVENT

The potential consequence of an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping or components, as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. An engineering analysis was performed, demonstrating that the piping system (including pipe stresses, loads on other pipe supports, nozzle loads on the RCP, and valve accelerations) remained within allowable limits for this specific condition. Therefore, plant safety and operability were not adversely affected by the condition.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. Immediate Corrective Actions

The pipe snubber and associated support were restored to an operable condition.

A field walkdown of 16 other snubbers installed on the No. 1 seal leakoff and the No. 1 sea' bypass piping at all four reactor coolant pumps was performed. The other snubbers were found properly installed. NRC' Form 366A U.S. NUCLTAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1	엄마로 영상에 가지	YEAR NUMBER NUMBER	トリート・トレー
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B. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

The event is under investigation to determine the root cause and contributing factors and development of applicable corrective actions. After the investigation is completed, TVA will notify NRC of the investigation results by supplement to this LER.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components

None.

B. Previous Similar Events

A review of previous events identified one LER associated with this event. LER 327/88040 addressed the failure to ensure operability of a safety-related snubber during unit Modes 1 through 4. This condition was found during closure review of a work document and was attributed to scheduling inadequacies. Although the cause of the event described in this LER has not yet been determined, it is expected that the corrective action of LER 327/88040 would not have been expected to have prevented this event.

VII. COMMITMENTS

After the investigation is completed, TVA will notify NRC of the investigation results by supplement to this LFR.