

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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July 19, 1984

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, GA 30323


Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-369  
NRC/OIE Bulletin 82-02

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In response to Mr. R. C. DeYoung's letter of June 2, 1982 which transmitted NRC/OIE Bulletin 82-02, attached is the report required by Action Item 4 providing the requested information relative to Action Items 1 and 2. This completes our response to the bulletin. Note that NRC/OIE Inspection Report 50-369/84-06 and 50-370/84-06 addressed work related to this bulletin.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Very truly yours,



H. B. Tucker, Vice President  
Nuclear Production

P3N/glb  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO NRC/OIE BULLETIN NO. 82-02

Action Item 4

A written report signed under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office within 60 days following the completion of the outage during which Action Item 2 was performed. The report is to include:

- a. A statement that Action Item 1 has been completed.
- b. Identification of the specific connections examined as required by Action Item 2.
- c. The results of the examinations performed on the threaded fasteners as required by Action Item 2. If no degradation was observed for a particular connection, a statement to that effect, identification of the connection and, whether the fasteners were examined in place or removed is all that is required. If degradation was observed, the report should provide detailed information.

Response

- 4a. Action Item 1 has been completed. All procedures related to piping and flanges in the reactor coolant pressure boundary have been revised to reference a procedure which covers the serializing, testing, and inspection of threaded fasteners. In addition, fastener lubricants and injection sealant compounds must be approved through the chemical analysis program prior to use.
- 4b. All joints which were opened during the unit 1 refueling outage (February 24 through April 27, 1984) were inspected. The following are the closure/connections which were examined:
  - o All steam generator primary manways.
  - o Valves: 1NC-2 and 1NC-3 (inlet flange and body to bonnet); 1NI-70, 1NI-71, 1NI-248, and 1NI-249 (body to bonnet).
  - o Piping connections: Gray-loc connection 8", Gray-loc connection 5".All threaded fasteners were removed, cleaned, and inspected before being reused.
- 4c. Of the items examined, the only evidence of leakage was on Steam Generator 1A (hot and cold leg manways) which was found to have primary leakage. All fasteners were inspected and replaced as necessary. Five bolts on S/G 1A hot leg had linear indications - rejected by QA inspections (MT), and a sixth had obvious steam cut. Seven bolts on cold leg had steam cut and some thread erosion, and two other bolts were rejected by QA inspections (MT). Although the hot leg bolt was obviously steam cut, the other studs could have been steam cut or corrosion damaged. Extensive testing could not be performed due to contamination.