Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

## April 21, 1992 NG-92-2091

Mr. A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No: 50-331 Op. License DPR-49 Licensee Event Report #92-004

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report.

Very truly yours,


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David L. Wilson Plant Superintendent - Nuclear

DLW/JP/pwj

cc: Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC



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Cable Spreading Room Fire Suppression System Test Carbon Dioxide into Control Room								
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On March 22, 1992, with the reactor shutdown and the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) carbon dioxide fi in intrusion of carbon dioxide into the Control unacceptable reduction in area oxygen levels with possibility, some Control Room personnel had bee breathing apparatus at the time of the test, and maintained. Non-essential personnel left the are level) and 15% (floor level) were recorded at va criteria of 19.5%. The test was conducted to ch following a similar event in 1990. The cause of overpressurization of the CSR directly beneath t	re suppression system resulted Room which lead to an hin a few minutes. Due to this n equipped with self-contained manning of the area was a. Oxygen levels of 17% (chest rious times versus the plant eck corrective actions taken the lower oxygen levels was							

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## I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On March 22, 1992, with the reactor shutdown and defueled, a Special Test of the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) carbon dioxide fire suppression system was conducted. This test was designed to demonstrate the adequacy of the fire suppression system (the CARDOX) in achieving and maintaining a CSR atmosphere with acceptable levels of carbon dioxide (CO2). The test was also designed to monitor the effect of the CARDOX discharge upon the Control Room atmosphere. The Control Room is located directly above the CSR. Following a partial CARDOX discharge in 1990, intrusion of carbon dioxide into the Control Room had been noted. This resulted in lower than normal cxygen levels in the Control Room for a brief period of time. (See Historical Background, at the end of this section). Changes to the Control Room and CSR ventilation systems to minimize CO2 intrusion into the Control Room had since been completed. The Special Test on March 22, 1992, was the first initiation of CARDOX since those modifications were installed.

The Special Test performed on March 22, 1992 specified certain conditions prior to CARDOX actuation to ensure continued personnel safety and adequate Control Room staffing regardless of the test results. These included monitoring of Control Room oxygen and CO2 levels by hand-held, portable monitors, the addition of a wintergreen scent to the CO2, and the posting and control of access to nearby areas due to the possibility of CO2 intrusion. As an added precaution, the test called for two licensed operators in the Control Room to be outfitted in Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) prior to the test beginning, and an additional individual wearing an SCBA to be posted outside the Control Room in order to assist in removal of personnel from the area, if that became necessary. The test designated 19.5% as the minimum level of o ... n necessary for continued occupancy of the Control Room by personnel without SCBAs. This value is considered the lowest acceptable oxygen level for worker occupancy per OSHA standards. Plant management was present to observe the test, and two Senior Reactor Operators were designated to wear the SCBAs.

Immediately prior to the test, steady-state oxygen levels of 21.3% and CO2 levels of 0.3% were recorded in the Control Room. At approximately 1050 hours, Control Room personnel were informed of the pending initiation of the CARDOX. At the beginning of the test they noted the CARDOX initiation alarms, and then, approximately forty seconds later, the sound of the CO2 injection itself could be heard as it was occurring one floor below. Approximately a minute after the injection of carbon dioxide into the CSR was first heard in the Control Room, personnel in that area began noticing leakage of the gas up through fire penetrations in the floor. Air flow could be felt and in some cases there was dust blown into the air. The wintergreen scent of the CO2 could also be detected.

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Monitoring of oxygen levels in the Control Room continued, and roughly three to four minutes after the CARDOX initiation (first audible alarm), an L ygen level below 19.5% was observed at waist level in the back panel area just behind the main control panels by a hand-held monitor. The senior Shift Supervisor on duty was informed of the reading, and he immediately ordered all non-essential personnel to leave the Control Room, as per the test requirements. At approximately the same time, other Control Room supervisory personnel were observing a stationary oxygen monitor positioned in the front panel area at roughly chest level. They also noted an oxygen level reading of 19.5%, and announced that non-essential personnel should leave. As personnel exited the area, an oxygen reading of 20% at waist level was recorded on the hand-held monitor in the main (front) control panel area.

As non-essential personnel left the Control Room, one two Senior Reactor Operators wearing SCBAs remained behind and began breathing from their SCEAs. As previously planned, outside air flow was directed into the Control Room to purge its atmosphere. The testing of the CARDOX system was also halted, approximately four minutes into the injection and just as the planned discharge of CO2 into the CSR was completed. Shortly before, or just after the CO2 injection into the Cable Spreading Room had been completed, one of them noted the stationary oxygen monitor at the front panel area was reading 17%.

As previously planned, temporary ductwork was set up through the main Control Room entrance to allow for increased venting of the area. Additional personnel began returning to the Control Room in SCBA's approximately seven minutes after the room had been cleared of non-essential personnel. The lowest oxygen reading recorded during the event were taken with the hand-held monitor shortly after these personnel returned, in the back panel area previously noted. The oxygen content of the air was recorded at 15% at floor level (and 18.5% at waist level). For CO2, the floor level concentration in this area was recorded at 12%. Shortly thereafter, oxygen levels in the front panel area of the Control Room were noted to be 17% at floor level, and 19.5% at waist level. Also at this time, the concentration of CO2 for the front panel area was recorded as 12% and 4% for floor and waist levels, respectively. Soon afterwards, oxygen levels in the Control Room began increasing steadily, as the venting of the room began to take effect. Oxygen levels had returned to acceptable levels within twenty minutes of the CARDOX initiation.

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Historical Background:

The Duane Arnold Energy Center completed installation of the carbon dioxide fire suppression system or the Cable Spreading Room in 1974. At that time, during pre-operational testing, CO2 leakage into the Control Room was first detected. Overpressurization of the Cable Spreading Room during the CARDOX initiation was thought to be the cause, and modifications were performed to provide a pathway to relieve this excess pressure. An additional fire damper was installed and designed to close only if high temperatures indicative of an actual fire were detected (>360F) (See Figure 1, Damper A).

In 1980, a review of Control Room habitability was performed in accordance with NUREG 0737. This review did not evaluate the possibility of CO2 intrusion into the Control Room during a CARDOX actuation, as it was assumed the Control Room isolated from the Cable Spreading Room when this occurred.

On September 19, 1990, an inadvertent initiation of the CARDOX system occurred during a scheduled surveillance procedure. Approximately 25% of the CARDOX tank's capacity was discharged into the Cable Spreading Room. (Later tests have shown 30% to be a full discharge.) During this event, CO2 intrusion into the Control Room via fire penetrations in the floor was observed by Operations personnel. Unnecessary personnel exited the room at that time, and the availability of SCBAs was verified. Subsequent measurements of Oxygen concentrations in the Control Room found none below 19.4%. Control Room ventilation was increased and oxygen levels were returned to normal (21%) within minutes. This event and the corrective actions stemming from it were discussed in an October 28, 1991 letter from Iowa Electric, NG-91-3284, to Dr. T. Murley, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Further review after the September, 1990 event determined that a backdraft damper, designed to prevent a ventilation path from the CSR to the toilet area of the Control Room, was not installed as indicated on design drawings. (See Figure 1, Damper B). Its presence was assumed for the 1980 NUREG 0737 review. It has not been determined why the damper was not installed. It was also determined the modification made in 1974 to increase the CSR vent path and reduce the atmospheric pressure in the room had been rendered insifective by a damper and fan further along in the ducting, which on a CARDOX initiation would close, and shut off, respectively. (See Figure 1, Damper C and Fan X). The increase in the atmospheric pressure of the CSR during CO2 injection therefore would be higher than desired, which in turn could lead to higher flow rates into the Control Room via the toilet exhaust ventilation, and leakage of the penetration seals between the CS<sup>2</sup> and the Control Room.

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As an initial corrective action for the September 1990 event, Control Room personnel were instructed to don SCBAs at the time of CARDOX initiation. Procedures were modified accordingly, including a provision to require removal of all non-essential personnel from the Control Room. In addition, as a long-term corrective action, design modifications to the CSR and Control Room ventilation systems were initiated. As planned, these design enhancements were completed prior to shutdown for the current refueling outage. The modifications included 1) elimination of the direct vent path from the CSR to the Control Room toilet area and 2) a modification to the CSR damper controls to provide better venting of the room during initial stages of a CO2 injection by leaving the exhaust damper open for four and a half minutes following the initiation. (See Figure 3, Damper C). Also provided were modifications to Control Room ventilation controls to make ventilation of the room with outside air an easier task. A wintergreen scent had been added to the CO2 as well. The Special Test performed on March 22 was designed to test the effect of these modifications on CSR fire-suppression capabilities, and Control Room ventilation and oxygen supply during a CARDOX initiation.

At the time the March 22 test was stopped, the system design requirement (per NFPA 12-1973 and the UFSAR) of a 30% CO2 concentration within two minutes had been satisfied. 50% concentration was achieved approximately four minutes after CARDOX initiation. This was an expected result and met the NFPA 12-1973 requirement of seven minutes. (It did not fully conform to the current UFSAR and June 1978 Fire Protection SER values of three minutes, twenty seconds, as the calculations that these values are based on do not take into account the additional time after full discharge that is required for the CO2 distribution system to empty.)

## II. CAUSE OF EVENT:

Review of the Special Test data indicate that the cause of the unacceptable levels of CO2 intrusion into the Control Room on March 22, 1992 was an unacceptably high pressure in the CSR during the initial stages of CARDOX operation. Atmospheric pressure in the CSR peaked at over 13 inches H2O (gage) approximately four minutes into the CARDOX initiation. The fire penetrations between the CSR and Control Room were unable to maintain an air-tight seal under this substantial pressure. The root cause of the event was the (prior to 1990) unrecognized negative impact of the CARDOX on Control Room habitability. This required corrective actions be taken. The need to verify the adequacy and effect of these actions lead to the performance of the Special Test on March 22, 1992. The test demonstrated that the actions taken up to that time did not provide sufficient venting capability for the CSR if CARDOX were initiated.

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ILL. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

As noted in the event description, the possibility of an unaccestable displacement of oxygen by CO2 during the Special Test was recognized beforehand, and a great number of pretaitiens were included in the test to prevent any negative effect on place of personnel safety. These wa increased management attention throughout the test process due to this concern. The test was run with the place is a shundown condition. Speause of the extensive precautions takes, the resulting removal of non-resself all personnel from the Control Powe dia not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.

## IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:


The review of the test data from March 22 indicated that enhancements to reduce pressure further in the CSR during GD2 injection would likely result in significantly less CO2 intrusion into the Control Room while not greatly effecting the fire suppression system. Therefore, an additional, manually-operated temporary vent was added to the Cable Spreading Room (see Figure 3, Damper D), and the automatic damper on the existing vent path (Damper C) was also set to remain open an additional thirty seconds. The test was rerun on April 5, 1992. The reactor vessel was partially fueled, with no fuel movement in progress, nor other work with the potential to drain the vessel. As with the first test on March 22, a number of precautions were taken, including the wearing of SCBAs by Control Room personnel prior to the test commencing. Management personnel were again present.


At approximately 1110 hours on April 5, 1992, the second Special Test commenced. The temporary vent was opened when CSR atmospheric pressure reached one inch H20 (gage). The results of the test were very positive with respect to both Control Room habitability and the functioning of CARDOX as a fire suppression system. The maximum CSR atmospheric pressure recorded during the test was 4.5 inches H20, which was a significant reduction from the March 22 test. Oxygen levels in the Control Room changed little from their pre-test levels of 21% (front panel) and 20.8% (back panel). (All gas levels given were measured at waist height unless otherwise specified). The lowest front panel Oxygen reading was 20.5% near the end of the CO2 discharge, and a back panel Oxygen reading of 20.5% was taken shortly thereafter. (A floor level reading of 19.5% for oxygen was recorded in the back panel area during the discharge). The highest waist-height CO2 readings were 1.1% at the front panel during the discharge and 2.9% in the back panel area shortly after the discharge. (A floor level reading of 6% was recorded in the back panel area during the discharge). Regarding fire suppression capabilities, the applicable NFPA standard (12-1973) was met for CO2 levels in the CSR. These levels were above the requirements after 2 minutes (30%) and seven minutes (50%). CO2 levels remained above 50% for greater than 20 minutes, which meets the 1989 NFPA standard (12-1989).

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EIIS System Codes: Cable Spreading Room Fire Suppression System -- KQ Control Room Ventilation System -- VI









Figure 3: Cable Spreading Room and Control Room Ventilation Interfaces, April 5, 1992



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