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UICENSEE EVENT REPO	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85					
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During unit startup, the #1 turbine bypass valve operated erratically, causing a Group I isolation on main steam low pressure with mode switch in run. Safety significance was minimal since all safe shutdown systems operated as designed. First occurrence of this type at Dresden.

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Cause of the event was the failure of the servovalve (model #450-1180, serial #150-R2) mechanism for opening and closing the valve. The servovalve will be sent to the manufacturer to determine the cause of the failure and a supplemental report will be sent when that information is obtained. The servovalve was replaced and the #1 turbine bypass valve operated properly.



Commonwealth Edison Dresden Muclear Power Station R.R. #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Telephone 815/942-2920

August 17, 1984

DJS Ltr #84-820

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #84-007-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

D.J. Scott Station Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station

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DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical