50 36(e)(2)

50.73(a)(2)(i)

50.73(a)(2)(ii)

50.73(a)(2)(iii)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Thomas L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance 9 1 1 12 31617 + 17 18 151 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

60.73(a)(2)(vill)(A)

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

50 73(a)(2)(v)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	TURER	TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	СОМР	ONENT	TURER		TO NPADS		
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	SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)					EXP	ECTED	MONT	DAY YEAR					
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20.406(a)(1)(iii)

20.405(a)(1)((v)

20 405(4)(1)(4)

On Friday, June 29, 1984, following a concern that maintenance personnel working in Control Room panels had been shocked by cable ends which were not terminated or properly identified, a preliminary review by personnel indicated that numerous cable leads were lifted and not properly tagged in the Unit 2 Control Room. Also, improper cable separation problems were noted. From the concern on 6/29/84 the initial deficiency on this event was written on 7/2/84 and did not indicate a reportable occurrence, however, the deficiency written after further investigation on 7/20/84 did indicate a reportable occurrence.

The cause of this event was personnel error and inadequate administrative controls (i.e., inadequate spared wire instructions and unclear Design Change Request instructions). Work was stopped in control room panels to reestablish and upgrade administrative controls. Procedures were reviewed to make necessary revisions. Personnel were retrained on procedure revisions. Also, prior to working in control room panels, plant personnel review DCR packages to determine if clarification on installation instructions for routing cables, termination, and separation requirements is necessary.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)			R NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)					
			YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVIS	ION			
EDWIN I. HATCH. UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2	1	8 4	_	0 0 15	-01	0	0 2	OF	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17;

This 30 day report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) due to this event placing the plant into a potentially unanalyzed condition which could have been undetected by administrative procedures prior to returning Unit 2 to an operable status.

On 06/29/84 Unit 1 was in steady state operation at 2421 MWT (approximately 99% power) and Unit 2 was in a recirculation pipe replacement outage preparing for fuel load.

On Friday, June 29, 1984, following a concern that maintenance personnel working in Control Room panels had been shocked by cable ends which were not terminated or properly identified, a preliminary review by personnel indicated that numerous cable leads were lifted and not properly tagged in the Unit 2 Control Room. Also, improper cable separation problems were noted. Further investigation revealed that some cable separation problems in control room panels involved cables pulled for Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) installation made this outage. Also, some of the cables and internal panel wires not terminated or properly identified resulted from Design Change Requests implemented this outage. From the concern on 6/29/84 the initial deficiency on this event was written on 7/2/84 and did not indicate a reportable occurrence, however, the deficiency written after further investigation on 7/20/84 did indicate a reportable occurrence.

Investigation revealed that errors in unterminated cables and internal panel wires, along with the cable separation problems were due to personnel error in removing and installing cables per inadequate administrative controls (i.e., inadequate spared wire instructions and unclear Design Change Request instructions).

The "CABLE & CABLE WAYS INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6921) has been revised to strengthen administrative control (i.e., such as clear and specific cable separation instructions and spared wire instructions, along with stronger Quality Controls). Also, personnel (both GPC & Contractor) are being retrained on the requirements of the "Lifted Wire & Temporary Jumper Control" procedure (HNP-504) and HNP-6921. Prior to being worked in control room panels, plant personnel are reviewing DCR packages to determine if clarification on installation instructions for routing cables, termination, and separation requirements is necessary. Cable/wire termination and cable separation problems on Unit 2 will be resolved with additional details in an update report. If possible potentially unanalyzed cable/wire terminations and cable separation problems are found on Unit 1 from investigations for this event; they will be included in an update report.



Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

August 14, 1984 GM-84-697

PLANT E. I. HATCH Licensee Event Report Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1984-005. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

H. C. Nix

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General Manager

HCN/TLE/vlt

xc:

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