

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **05000275** PAGE (3) **1 OF 02**

TITLE (4) **INADVERTENT START OF DIESEL GENERATOR 1-3**

EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
07	19	84	84	020	000	08	20	84	Diablo Canyon Unit 2		05000323	
											05000	

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.38(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 385A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER** TELEPHONE NUMBER **805 541-7724**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Diesel Generator No. 1-3 automatically started due to undervoltage on Unit 2's Bus F (4KV vital bus). While installing scaffolding in the area of the relay panel, construction workers inadvertently jarred the relay panel and actuated an undervoltage relay, causing the diesel to start. Normal power was returned to Bus F, and Diesel Generator 1-3 was secured and returned to normal standby mode. To prevent recurrence, functional logic signals from Unit 2 which affect Unit 1, such as the start of Diesel Generator 1-3, will be defeated until Unit 2 fuel load.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	- 0 2 0	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

To ensure a reliable power supply for Bus F, an undervoltage sensor (27)(EB) automatically starts the in-service diesel generator (DG)(EK). Diesel Generator 1-3 starts upon receipt of an initiating signal from either unit.

On July 19, 1984, at 0925 PDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) and Unit 2 still under construction, an undervoltage signal from Unit 2's Bus F caused the automatic starting of Diesel Generator Number 1-3 and an automatic transfer of the Unit 2 Bus F to an alternate power source.

Investigation revealed that construction personnel were erecting scaffolding in the area of Unit 2's Bus F and its relay panel. Inadvertent jarring of the relay panel actuated the undervoltage relay and initiated the automatic transfer actions.

Unit 2 Bus F was returned to its normal power source. Diesel Generator 1-3 was secured and returned to normal standby mode.

An inadvertent start of Diesel Generator Number 1-3 in any mode of operation would pose no possible safety consequences or decrease any safety margin as defined in the FSAR.

To prevent recurrence of this event, functional logic signals from Unit 2 which affect Unit 1, such as the auto start of Diesel Generator 1-3, will be defeated until fuel load in Unit 2. The Diesel Generator 1-3 auto start signal from the Unit 2 safety injection (BQ) logic had already been defeated for the same reason.

The susceptibility of relays to physical shock and the need for care while working in the area of relay panels were reviewed with the personnel involved.

Other diesel starts were previously reported in LERs 84-005-00, -009-00, and -011-00, dated 02/15/84, 04/16/84 and 04/30/84, respectively.

1970d/0021K

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E



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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

August 20, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-288

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Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-020-00
Inadvertent Actuation of Diesel Generator

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted concerning the inadvertent actuation of Diesel Generator 1-3.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,


J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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