U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/84-12(DRP)

Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: June 17 through July 7, 1984

Inspector: C. H. Brown

Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2C

7/26/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 17 - July 7, 1984 (Report No. 50-263/84-12(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of onsite review committee; procedures; recirculation vessel riser; and long term shutdown. The inspection involved a total of 60 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 12 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
M. H. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager
D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Rad. Protection
H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager
D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations
W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services
*L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
W. W. Albold, Superintendent, Maintenance
B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.

*Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.

2. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector attended three meetings of the onsite review committee (Operations Committee (OC)) during the inspection to observe conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included noting adherence to the charter and administrative procedures governing the review group activities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency and required quorum. The activities of the committee, including review of proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility modifications and procedure changes, and biannual review of procedures, were noted to be performed as required.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Procedures

A review of the following procedures was performed to determine if the regulatory requirements were addressed and if the procedures are consistent with the desired actions and modes of operation:

a. 4ACD-3.2, Rev. 6 - Operations Committee

b. 4ACD-3.1-R7-353 (Effective Date 11/15/83 - Administrative Control Document - Memorandum Change to Monticello Plant Organization

c. 4ACD-3.6, Rev. 8 - Work Request Authorizations including the following Memorandum Changes:

4ACD-3.6-R8-406 (Effective Date 4/9/84)
4ACD-3.6-R8-363 (Effective Date 12/19/83)
4ACD-3.6-R8-433 (Effective Date 6/26/84)
4ACD-3.6-R8-431 (Effective Date 6/26/84)

d. 4ACD-3.9, Rev. 10 - Operating Occurrences and Events

e. 4ACD-3.20, Rev. 1 - Procedure Implementation

The procedures and changes to the procedures were found to reflect applicable technical specifications or license revisions. The content of the procedures was found to be consistent with applicable technical specifications requirements. The checklists and forms related to the procedures in the "working files" were found to be current and out-of-date forms were destroyed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Recirculation Vessel Riser - Safe End Alignment

When the vessel risers (the thermal barrier) were cut apart from the safe ends, the risers sprung away from the pre-cut "zero-zero" position. The misalignment raised the question: if the risers were pulled into position and welded, how would the jet pumps fit? The vessel open penetrations were plugged and the vessel reflooded so that the jet pump plugs could be removed and original jet pumps could then be installed. The plugs used on the ten recirc discharge vessel penetrations were designed to hold the riser in a known position so tests could be performed on the installed jet pumps. These tests verified that the risers could be welded to the safe ends in the "zero-zero" position and the jet pumps would have an acceptable fit up to the associated riser. The controlling procedures were properly reviewed and followed throughout the evolution.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Inspection During Long Term Shutdown

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of June and July. The inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment

in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping/ cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper/bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system controls. The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

On July 6, 1984, Monticello was notified of a problem with the rail car used to transport a cask of solidified radwaste to the burial site. The car had been placed on a siding when a wheel alignment problem developed on the car. A licensee site team was dispatched to the site and found that the cask and its contents were unaffected by the problem. The cask was returned to the site and the car sent for repairs. NSP is discussing car inspection procedures with the rail transportation company.

The inspector witnessed portions of the work in progress for maintenance on equipment and design changes of the following:

a. Recirculation piping replacement

b. Preventive maintenance on large electrical motors

c. Installation of fire dampers

d. Fireproofing structural steel

e. Preventive maintenance of 4100-volt and 480-volt breakers

f. Retubing the main condensers and leak testing upon completion of the retubing

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 11, 1984, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and the update on the status of open inspection items.