


April 1, 1992

To: Jack Duncan, GE (408) 925-6947

Enclosed is a clarification of Confirmatory Item C-01. If you have additional questions on this issue, give me a call.


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C-01 The PRA documentation lacks detail for the IORV event, in that the event tree is incomplete and the accompanying text is ambiguous. (1) An IORV event initiated at full power adds additional heat load on the RHR system, since the steam discharged through the SRVs is directed to the suppression pool. Initially, the steam from the SRVs will heat up the suppression pool without raising the drywell pressure so that the operator may be required to manually scram the reactor. This is not explicitly modeled in the event tree. (2) If feedwater remains available following a successful reactor scram, the accident sequence is considered by GE to lead to no core damage even though the unavailability of the RHR function for containment heat removal is not examined. (3) Operational experience indicates that there is a high probability that the MSIVs will be closed during IORV events. It appears that reopening the MSIVs is not taken into consideration when calculating the availability of the normal heat removal system. The staff requires GE to include these areas in its event tree and IORV quantification in the updated ABWR PRA.