Wayne H. Jens Vice President Nuclear Operations



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August 9, 1984 EF2-69666

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference: (1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341

- (2) Letter, D. A. Wells to J. G. Keppler, April 28, 1983, EF2-63500
- (3) Letter, D. A. Wells to J. G. Keppler, August 26, 1983, EF2-64312
- Subject: Final Report 10CFR50.55(e) Item 92 "Structural Steel Sliding Connections"

This is Detroit Edison's final report concerning Item 92, "Structural Steel Sliding Connections". This item was originally reported as a potential 10CFR50.55(e) deficiency in April, 1983. Additional information was provided in References (2) and (3).

Description of Deficiency

A review of structural steel sliding connection construction practices revealed that the original method of defining bolt tightness on the design drawings for sliding connections was imprecise. Although the original concern was loose bolted connections, our analysis indicates that the safety consideration was structural sliding connections that may have been overtorqued.

The deficiency was detected when an inspection of structural steel sliding connections revealed that some nuts were loose and that there was no objective evidence that the other connecting bolts and nuts were correctly torqued. The applicable design drawings contained notes which required bolting connections to be "finger tight" or "hand wrench tight."

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Analysis of Safety Implications

If left uncorrected, this deficiency could have resulted in structural steel sliding connections that were tighter than design. Non-functioning sliding connections could impose unanalyzed stresses on safety related structures or equipment. Loose nuts would not adversely affect the performance of structural steel sliding connections.

Corrective Action

Deviation Disposition Requests (DDR) were initiated based on the initial inspection. Detroit Edison and Sargent & Lundy, the A/E, concurred in the disposition of the DDR and the design drawings were revised to specify torque values. Affected connections have been reworked to the specified requirements and inspected and found acceptable.

There were no known instances where a structural steel sliding connection would not have functioned.

This is Detroit Edison's final report on this item. If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Lewis P. Bregni at (313) 586-5083.

Sincerely,

Thayne & Jens

cc: Mr. P. M. Byron Mr. R. C. DeYoung Mr. R. C. Knop