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J. L. Wilson
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April 13, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 92-02

The enclosed special report provides details concerning four fire barriers being breached for greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable time period in support of outage-related activities. Auxiliary building Fire Door A-75 was breached to allow video and communication lines to be routed into lower containment to aid in radiological control of activities during the Unit 2 refueling outage. The biological shield blocks were removed, and the Unit 2 reactor building equipment hatch was opened to provide unimpeded access during the refueling outage. Auxiliary building Fire Door A-156A was originally breached to allow welding leads to be routed into containment to support the Unit 1 feedwater nozzle work on the No. 3 steam generator. This work was expanded to include Nozzles 1, 2, and 4. Fire Door A-71 was breached to allow welding leads to be routed into residual heat removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger Room 2A to facilitate the installation of valves in the RHR system. This report is being made in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12. The enclosure contains the details of these conditions.


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If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone
M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8924.

Sincerely,



J. L. Wilson

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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Enclosure

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 92-02

I. FIRE DOOR A-75

Description

On March 17, 1992, with Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 5 refueling outage, auxiliary building Fire Door A-75 was breached to facilitate traffic entering and exiting the Unit 2 penetration room on Elevation 690.0. The fire door will be nonfunctional for the duration of the refueling outage and in excess of the seven days allowed by Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a). This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of Condition

Auxiliary building Fire Door A-75 will be breached to permit video and communication lines to be routed into lower containment to aid in the radiological control of activities. The door will remain breached for the duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 5 (U2C5) refueling outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors inside the Unit 2 penetration room were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire door barrier is reestablished at the end of the outage.

II. BIOLOGICAL SHIELD REMOVAL

Description

On March 13, 1992, with Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 5 refueling outage, the biological shield blocks were removed and the Unit 2 reactor building equipment hatch was opened to provide access during the refueling outage. The biological shield blocks will be nonfunctional for the duration of the refueling outage and in excess of the seven days allowed by LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a). This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of Condition

The shield blocks were removed to permit unimpeded access into and out of the reactor building in support of the U2C5 refueling activities.

Corrective Action

A breach permit was issued in response to the work request to remove the shield blocks. Fire detector operability in the auxiliary building was verified, and a roving fire watch was established. The fire watch will be maintained until the shield blocks are reinstalled and the breach is removed at the end of the outage.

III. FIRE DOOR A-156A

Description

On March 23, 1992, with Unit 1 in Mode 5, cold shutdown, for inspection and repair of the steam generator feedwater transition pieces, auxiliary building Fire Door A-156A was breached to allow welding cables to be routed into containment to support the feedwater nozzle work. The work scope originally covered only the No. 3 nozzle, but has increased to include the feedwater nozzle transition pieces for all four steam generators. The fire door will be nonfunctional for the duration of the work and in excess of the seven days allowed by LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a). This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of Condition

Auxiliary building Fire Door A-156A was breached to allow welding cables to be routed into containment in support of the steam generator nozzle transition replacement work. The work activity will require approximately 14 days to complete. The door will remain breached for the duration of the nozzle transition repair work.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire door barrier is reestablished.

IV. FIRE DOOR A-71

Description

On March 25, 1992, with Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 5 refueling outage, auxiliary building Fire Door A-71 was breached to allow welding cables to be routed into residual heat removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger Room 2A to facilitate the installation of check valves. The fire door will be nonfunctional for longer than the TS allowable seven-day timeframe as specified in LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a). This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN TS Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

Cause of Condition

Auxiliary building Fire Door A-71 was breached to allow welding cables to be routed into RHR Heat Exchanger Room 2A on Elevation 690. Check valves are being installed in the RHR system under Design Change Notice M05421A. The work activity will require approximately 14 days to complete. The door will remain breached for the duration of the check valve installation.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable; a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire door barrier is reestablished.