


• VERMONT YANKEE  
NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION



P.O. Box 157, Governor Hunt Road  
Vernon, Vermont 05354-0157  
(802) 257-7711

April 14, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28  
Docket No. 50-271  
Reportable Occurrence No. LER 92-008

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10 CFR 50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 92-008.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

Donald A. Reid  
Plant Manager

cc: Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region I  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

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NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (8-89)	APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)	

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NO. (2)	PAGE (3)
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1	0 1 OF 3

TITLE (4) One-Half Primary Containment Isolation System Group III Isolation Due to a Personnel Error When an Energized Terminal Was Shorted to Ground.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ #	REV#	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NO. (8)		
03	15	92	92	008	00	04	14	92			05000		
											05000		

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO REQ'TS OF 10 CFR §: CHECK ONE OR MORE (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 A	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER:					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NO.
DONALD A. REID, PLANT MANAGER	AREA CODE
	8 0 2 2 5 7 - 7 7 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYST	COMPONENT	MFR	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS	CAUSE	SYST	COMPONENT	MFR	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS
NA				....	NA				....

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	NO DAY YR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approx. fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/15/92 at approximately 0021 hours, with the reactor in cold shutdown and the plant in an outage, one half of a Group III Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) (EIIS=JM) and the "A" Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) (EIIS=VA) initiated. The PCIS initiation was the result of a blown fuse that occurred when a technician incorrectly shorted a terminal to ground.

The fuse was replaced and at approximately 0053 hours on 3/15/92 the trip was reset and the systems were returned to normal.

The root cause of this event is a personnel error. The technician working in the instrument cabinets incorrectly touched an energized terminal screw with a grounded lead. This caused the fuse to blow removing power from one-half of the PCIS logic.

The technician involved in the event was counseled regarding attention to detail when working around energized equipment.

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89)		APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.			
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NO (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	05000271	YEAR	SEQ #	REV #	2 OF 3
		92	018	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 3/15/92 at approximately 0021 hours, with the reactor in cold shutdown and the plant in an outage, one half of a Group III Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) (EIIS=JM) and the "A" Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) (EIIS=VA) initiated. Technicians were replacing coils in the PCIS auxiliary relays. In order to accomplish this task, a neutral jumper must be installed around the coil that is being replaced in order to maintain continuity. The energized terminal is located adjacent to the neutral, or ground terminal. When the technician went to install the neutral jumper he incorrectly touched the energized terminal which shorted to ground, and blew the supply fuse for one-half of the PCIS logic. This caused one-half of the logic to deenergize, closing the valves that receive a signal from that logic and starting the "A" SBT System.

The fuse was replaced and at approximately 0053 hours on 3/15/92 the trip was reset and the systems returned to normal.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of this event is a personnel error. This was a cognitive error in that the technician failed to recognize which terminal was the neutral terminal.

A possible contributing cause of this event is a human factors consideration in that the relay that was being worked on was the last of approximately 10 relays that required the same coil change but whose terminals were configured differently. The terminals on the last relay are all positioned to the left of the coil while the terminals on the other relays are positioned on both sides of the coil. This change in arrangement led to confusion as to which terminal was the neutral terminal.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The events that occurred as a result of the isolation did not have any safety implication to plant equipment or the public.

The one-half PCIS Group III isolation operated as designed and successfully isolated the appropriate outboard valves of the Primary and Secondary Containment Ventilation System. A half PCIS Group III Isolation and "A" SBGTS initiation are the expected results of a blown fuse in the outboard logic.

Although the configuration and location of the relays could have contributed to the cause of this event as a human factors problem, relocation or reconfiguration of these relays is not a realistic corrective action as various configurations exist throughout the facility.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate

1. The immediate corrective action was to replace the blown fuse, reset the logic and return the systems to normal.

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NO (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQ #	REV #		
VERMONT Yankee NUCLEAR POWER STATION	05000271	92	- 008	- 00	3 OF 3	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT.)

Subsequent

1. Subsequent corrective action involved counseling the technician regarding attention to detail and ensuring that he was thoroughly cognizant of his mistake.
2. I&C Department personnel and contractors will receive training in this LER during the 1992 training cycle.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No similar events have been reported to the commission in the last five years.