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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

10 CFR 50.73

April 17, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-92-12
NAPS:WCH
Docket Nos. 50-338
License Nos. NPF-4

Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1.

Report No. 50-338/92-008-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very Truly Yours,

C Eufinger for
G. E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. M. S. Lesser
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

IE22 1/1

NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
North Anna Power Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)

BOTH TRAINS OF "F" TRANSFER BUS UV INPUT TO AFW PUMP AUTO START LOGIC DEFEATED

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	1 9	9 2	9 2	- 0 0 8	- 0 0	0 4	1 7	9 2		0 5 0 0 0
										DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	9 5 %	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71 (b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
G. E. Kane, Station Manager	AREA CODE 7 0 3 8 9 4 - 2 1 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 19, 1992, with Unit 1 operating at 95 percent power (Mode 1), during the performance of the "Protective Relay Maintenance for Loss of Reserve Power - Bus 1F" procedure, both channels of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Station Blackout automatic start circuit were defeated. Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3-3 Item 6e Action 18 allows one channel to be inoperable for up to 48 hours provided the other channel is maintained operable. Since both channels were defeated, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

The cause of the event was the execution of an inadequate procedure. The surveillance procedure did not contain adequate instructions in the Initial Conditions section concerning the number of protection channels required to be operable when either unit was in a mode that required operability of AFW pump Station Blackout auto start logic.

This event did not pose any significant safety implications because diverse AFW pump Station Blackout automatic start logic circuits remained available. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public was not affected at any time during this event.

1.0 Description of the Event

On March 19, 1992, with Unit 1 operating at 95 percent power (Mode 1), during the performance of the "Protective Relay Maintenance for Loss of Reserve Power - Bus 1F" procedure (EMP-P-RT-85A), both channels of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (EIIS BA-P) Station Blackout automatic start circuit were defeated. Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3-3 Item 6e Action 18 allows one channel to be inoperable for up to 48 hours provided the other channel is maintained operable. Since both channels were defeated, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

"F" Transfer Bus supplies Unit 1 H and Unit 2 J Emergency busses (Figure 1). Inputs from "F" Bus to the Station Blackout AFW pump auto start circuitry consist of four UV relays per unit. These inputs are divided into two trains of two relays each. For example: Unit 1 Train "A" AFW pump Station Blackout auto start circuit uses two series connected Train "A" relays on "F" Transfer Bus in series with two series connected Train "A" relays on "D" Transfer bus (Figure 2). Train "B" is similar with separate relays, as is Unit 2 which utilizes "E" and "F" Transfer Bus Relays. In all cases, Removal of one or more relays in a train will defeat that train of Station Blackout protection.

Figure 1

TRANSFER BUS CONFIGURATION



Figure 2

LOSS OF RESERVE STATION POWER TRAIN "A"



EMP-P-RT-85A directed that the four "F" Transfer Bus Station Blackout UV relays on the unit being tested be removed simultaneously. The procedure did not indicate that removal of the four F Transfer Bus relays on the operating unit (Unit 1) would defeat both trains of Station Blackout

1.0 Description of the Event (continued)

protection circuitry and cause the AFW pump UV auto start feature to be inoperable. Therefore, during EMP-P-RT-85A testing on March 19, 1992, both trains of Unit 1 Station Blackout protection AFW pump Station Blackout auto start logic were inoperable which resulted in a violation of TS LCO 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3-3 Item 6e.

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

This event did not pose any significant safety implications because diverse AFW pump Station Blackout automatic start logic circuits remained available. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public was not affected at any time during this event.

3.0 Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was the execution of an inadequate procedure. The surveillance procedure did not contain adequate instructions in the Initial Conditions section concerning the number of UV protection channels required to be operable when either unit was in a mode that required operability of AFW pump Station Blackout auto start logic.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

As an immediate corrective action, the test was terminated, and the subject relays were returned to service.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

A Deviation Report was submitted, and the appropriate TS were reviewed. When it was determined that Unit 1 had violated the LCO of TS 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3-3, TS 3.0.3 was entered. Since the relays had already been returned to service, no further action was required.

A revision to EMP-P-RT-85A was submitted which adds detail to the Initial Conditions and Instructions sections. The revised procedure specifies that only one train of Transfer Bus "F" relays will be tested at a time, and it provides instructions to install jumpers which effectively place the applicable circuit in a trip condition while UV relays are removed from the circuit and tested.

EMP-P-RT-85A was successfully completed as revised on April 9, 1992.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Similar procedures for other transfer buses will be revised prior to their next scheduled performance.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence (continued)

It has previously been recognized that the subset of station procedures performed by the matrixed relay testing organization were not written to the prevailing procedure quality standards of today. Consequently, we have elected to include this subset of procedures in our procedure upgrade program. It is expected that as these procedures are upgraded, future events of this nature will be precluded.

7.0 Similar Events

None.

8.0 Additional Information

Unit 2 was in Mode 6 and defueled during this event and was not affected, as AFW operability is not required.