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Southern Nuclear Operating Company
the southern electric system

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Docket No.: 50-348

10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1
Licensee Event Report No. 95-010-00
Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature Equipment
Due to Loss of Main Feedwater

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report No. 95-010-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

DM Morey

Dave Morey

DPH/clt:ler95-10.doc

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Region II Administrator
Mr. B. L. Siegel, NRR Senior Project Manager
Mr. T. M. Ross, FNP Resident Inspector

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NRC FORM 366 (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 04/30/98

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 4 8	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature Equipment Due to Loss of Main Feedwater

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	
1 1	0 5	9 5	9 5	– 0 1 0	– 0 0	1 2	0 5	9 5	FNP - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 4
									FACILITY NAME	

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	2 8	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
R.D. Hill, General Manager - Nuclear Plant	AREA CODE 3 3 4 8 9 9 – 5 1 5 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1905, on November 5, 1995, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 operating at 28 percent power, an automatic actuation of engineered safety feature (ESF) [JE] pumps occurred when both motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps [BA] auto started due to trip conditions on both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFP). This occurred when the operating 'B' SGFP tripped on low lube oil pressure, during attempts to return lube oil system to its normal operating configuration. The 'A' SGFP had been taken out of service to have an overspeed test performed and was unavailable at time of the trip. The 'B' SGFP trip, concurrent with the 'A' SGFP being off-service, resulted in a trip condition on both SGFPs and the automatic actuation of the MDAFW pumps [BA]. These actions were followed by a manual trip of the main turbine. The reactor was stabilized at one percent power.

The primary cause of this event was the improper adjustment of the SGFP's lube oil pressure regulating system due to inadequate procedural guidance. The lube oil pressure regulating system was properly adjusted, restarted and the system functioned as designed. A contributing cause to this event was a perceived need to return the SGFP lube oil system to its normal operating configuration.

Plant and System Identification

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Description of Event

At 1905, on November 5, 1995, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 operating at 28 percent power, an automatic actuation of engineered safety feature (ESF) [JE] pumps occurred when both motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps [BA] auto started due to trip conditions on both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFP). This occurred when the operating 'B' SGFP tripped on low lube oil pressure, during attempts to return lube oil system to its normal operating configuration. The 'A' SGFP had been taken out of service to have an overspeed test performed and was unavailable at time of the trip. The 'B' SGFP trip, concurrent with the 'A' SGFP being off-service, resulted in a trip condition on both SGFPs and the automatic actuation of the MDAFW pumps [BA]. These actions were followed by a manual trip of the main turbine. The reactor was stabilized at one percent power.

On November 2, 1995, following a refueling outage, it was reported, while putting the 'B' SGFP in service, that 'B' SGFP lube oil pressure was low. Adjustments on the SGFP's lube oil pressure regulating system were made as a result of inspections and testing. Following the adjustments, the lube oil system functioned properly. The SGFP lube oil pressure was monitored to ensure lube oil pressure stayed in the expected normal operating range. On November 5, 1995, the SGFP lube oil pressure began to unexpectedly decrease and the emergency lube oil pump was started. Subsequently, the unexpected decrease in pressure was determined to have been caused by the improper adjustment of the SGFP's lube oil pressure regulating system. However, once the emergency lube oil pump was started, the lube oil pressure increased to a pressure higher than the acceptable range. In an effort to reduce the lube oil pressure, the number 2 main lube oil pump was started and the emergency lube oil pump was secured. It was considered that the number 2 main lube oil pump would maintain the lube oil pressure within the normal operating range. Therefore, the number 1 main lube oil pump was secured to return the lube oil system to it's normal operating configuration. After securing the number 1 main lube oil pump, the lube oil pressure to the SGFP decreased to less than 10 psig, thus causing the SGFP to trip. The emergency lube oil pump was manually started prior to reaching its autostart setpoint. However, the emergency lube oil pump did not reach running speed prior to the SGFP reaching its trip setpoint.

Cause of Event

The primary cause of this event was the improper adjustment of the SGFP's lube oil pressure regulating system due to inadequate procedural guidance.

A contributing cause to this event was a perceived need to return the SGFP lube oil system to its normal operating configuration.

Safety Assessment

This event is reportable since the MDAFW pumps are an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) whose actuation is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

All systems operated as designed.

This event would not have been more severe if had occurred under different operating conditions.

Corrective Action

The SGFP lube oil pressure regulating systems on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 have been properly adjusted.

Proper procedural guidance has been enhanced to include lessons learned from this event.

This event has been discussed with the appropriate personnel.

Additional Information

A four-hour notification was made to the NRC at 2146 hours on November 5, 1995 pursuant to 10CFR50.72.

No similar LERs have been reported by Farley Nuclear Plant.

The unit returned to power operation at 0251 on November 8, 1995.