



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA
VOGTLÉ ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 92
License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated March 17, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated July 6, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 92, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 30, 1995



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20565-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 70
License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated March 17, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated July 6, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 70 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 30, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 92

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

DOCKET NO. 50-424

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 70

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKET NO. 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
I	I
II	II
IX	IX
X	X
XI	XI
XIX	XIX
XXIII	XXIII
3/4 6-10	3/4 6-10
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
B 3/4 9-1	B 3/4 9-1
B 3/4 9-2	B 3/4 9-2
B 3/4 9-3*	B 3/4 9-3

* overflow page - no change

INDEX

DEFINITIONS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>1.0 DEFINITIONS</u>	
1.1 ACTION.....	1-1
1.2 ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.....	1-1
1.3 ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST.....	1-1
1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE.....	1-1
1.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION.....	1-1
1.6 CHANNEL CHECK.....	1-1
1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.....	1-2
1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.....	1-2
1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS.....	1-2
1.10 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.....	1-2
1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.....	1-2
1.12 E-AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY.....	1-3
1.13 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME.....	1-3
1.14 FREQUENCY NOTATION.....	1-3
1.15 GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM.....	1-3
1.16 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.....	1-3
1.17 MASTER RELAY TEST.....	1-3
1.18 MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC.....	1-4
1.19 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL.....	1-4
1.20 OPERABLE - OPERABILITY.....	1-4
1.21 OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE.....	1-4
1.22 PHYSICS TESTS.....	1-4
1.23 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.....	1-4
1.24 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM.....	1-4
1.25 PURGE - PURGING.....	1-5
1.26 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.....	1-5
1.27 RATED THERMAL POWER.....	1-5
1.28 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.....	1-5
1.29 REPORTABLE EVENT.....	1-5
1.30 SHUTDOWN MARGIN.....	1-5
1.31 SITE BOUNDARY.....	1-5

INDEX

DEFINITIONS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1.32 SLAVE RELAY TEST.....	1-5
1.33 SOLIDIFICATION (DELETED).....	1-6
1.34 SOURCE CHECK.....	1-6
1.35 STAGGERED TEST BASIS.....	1-6
1.36 THERMAL POWER.....	1-6
1.37 TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST.....	1-6
1.38 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.....	1-6
1.39 UNRESTRICTED AREA.....	1-6
1.40 VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM.....	1-7
1.41 VENTING.....	1-7
TABLE 1.1 FREQUENCY NOTATION.....	1-8
TABLE 1.2 OPERATIONAL MODES.....	1-9

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves.....	3/4 7-1
TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES.....	3/4 7-2
TABLE 3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP.....	3/4 7-3
Auxiliary Feedwater System.....	3/4 7-4
Condensate Storage Tank.....	3/4 7-6
Specific Activity.....	3/4 7-7
TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM.....	3/4 7-8
Main Steam Line Isolation Valves.....	3/4 7-9
Main Feedwater Isolation Systems.....	3/4 7-9a
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.....	3/4 7-10
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-11
3/4.7.4 NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER (NSCW) SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-12
3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK.....	3/4 7-13
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (Common System).	3/4 7-14
3/4.7.7 PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM....	3/4 7-17
3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS.....	3/4 7-19
FIGURE 4.7-1 SAMPLE PLAN 2 FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST.....	3/4 7-24
TABLE 4.7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL.....	3/4 7-24a
3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.....	3/4 7-25
3/4.7.10 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING..(DELETED).....	3/4 7-27
TABLE 3.7-3 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING..(DELETED).....	3/4 7-28
3/4.7.11 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) ROOM COOLER AND SAFETY- RELATED CHILLER SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-29
3/4.7.12 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP THERMAL BARRIER COOLING WATER ISOLATION.....	3/4 7-30
3/4.7.13 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPHOUSE ESF HVAC SYSTEMS	3/4 7-31

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES	
Operating.....	3/4 8-1
TABLE 4.8-1 DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE.....	3/4 8-9
Shutdown.....	3/4 8-10
3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES	
Operating.....	3/4 8-11
TABLE 4.8-2 BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.....	3/4 8-13
TABLE 4.8-3 PERFORMANCE DISCHARGE TEST SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.....	3/4 8-13a
Shutdown.....	3/4 8-14
3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION	
Operating.....	3/4 8-15
Shutdown.....	3/4 8-18
3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES	
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices and Feeder Breakers to Isolation Transformers Between 480 V Class 1E Busses and Non-Class 1E Equipment.....	3/4 8-19
Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices.....	3/4 8-21
TABLE 3.8-1 SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION BYPASS DEVICES.....	3/4 8-22

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT	
Containment Integrity.....	3/4 6-1
Containment Leakage.....	3/4 6-2
Containment Air Locks.....	3/4 6-4
Internal Pressure.....	3/4 6-6
Air Temperature.....	3/4 6-7
Containment Structural Integrity.....	3/4 6-8
Figure 3.6.1 SCHEDULE OF LIFT-OFF TESTING FOR TWO CONTAINMENTS AT A SITE.....	3/4 6-10
Containment Ventilation System.....	3/4 6-11
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS	
Containment Spray System.....	3/4 6-13
Containment Cooling System.....	3/4 6-15
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.....	3/4 6-16
3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL	
Hydrogen Monitors (DELETED).....	3/4 6-18
Electric Hydrogen Recombiners.....	3/4 6-19

INDEX

BASES


<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS</u>	
3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION.....	B 3/4 9-1
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.....	B 3/4 9-1
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME.....	B 3/4 9-1
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS.....	B 3/4 9-1
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS.....	B 3/4 9-2
3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE.....	B 3/4 9-2
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS.....	B 3/4 9-2
3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.....	B 3/4 9-3
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM.....	B 3/4 9-3
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL.....	B 3/4 9-3
3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING POST ACCIDENT VENTILATION SYSTEM...	B 3/4 9-3
<u>3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS</u>	
3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN.....	B 3/4 10-1
3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS....	B 3/4 10-1
3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS.....	B 3/4 10-1
3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS.....	B 3/4 10-1
3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN.....	B 3/4 10-1

INDEX

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
6.4.2 SAFETY REVIEW BOARD (SRB)	
Function.....	6-9
Composition.....	6-10
Alternates.....	6-10
Consultants.....	6-10
Meeting Frequency.....	6-10
Quorum.....	6-10
Review.....	6-11
Audits.....	6-11
Records.....	6-12
<u>6.5 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION.....</u>	<u>6-13</u>
<u>6.6 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION.....</u>	<u>6-13</u>
<u>6.7 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS.....</u>	<u>6-13</u>
<u>6.8 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS</u>	
6.8.1 ROUTINE REPORTS.....	6-17
Startup Report.....	6-17
Annual Reports.....	6-17
Annual Radiological Environmental Surveillance Report.....	6-18
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.....	6-19
Monthly Operating Reports.....	6-20
Core Operating Limits Report	6-20
6.8.2 SPECIAL REPORTS.....	6-21
<u>6.9 RECORD RETENTION.....</u>	<u>6-22</u>

SAMPLE SIZE CRITERIA (SEE SECTION 4.8.1.6.1)



Schedule to be used provided:

- a. The containments are identical in all aspects such as size, tendon system, design, materials of construction, and method of construction. The tendon system for Unit 2 does not provide for detensioning. Detensioning can be performed only on the Unit 1 tendon system.
- b. The 1-year inspection for Unit 2 will consist of a visual inspection only. No lift-off testing will be performed on Unit 2 until the 3-year inspection.
- c. There is no unique situation that may subject either containment to a different potential for structural or tendon deterioration.
- d. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillances may be performed back-to-back to facilitate detensioning of Unit 1 tendons during the Unit 2 surveillance.
- e. In order to perform back-to-back surveillances on Units 1 and 2, the Unit 1 10-year surveillance and the Unit 2 5-year surveillance are to be performed between 5/1/95 and 11/1/95.

FIGURE 3.6-1

SCHEDULE OF LIFT-OFF TESTING FOR TWO CONTAINMENTS AT A SITE

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

- a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,
- b. The emergency airlock is isolated by at least one airlock door, and the personnel airlock is isolable by at least one airlock door with a designated individual available to close the personnel airlock door; and,
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
 - 1) Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
 - 2) Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve (HV-2626 A&B, HV-2627 A&B, HV-2628 A&B, HV-2629 A&B).

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its required condition or capable of being closed an OPERABLE automatic containment ventilation isolation valve (HV-2626 A&B, HV-2627 A&B, HV-2628 A&B, HV-2629 A&B) within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

- a. Verifying the penetrations are in their required condition, or
- b. Testing the containment ventilation isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The locking closed of the required valves, except valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 for short periods of time to maintain chemistry control, during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System. These actions prevent flow to the RCS of unborated water in excess of that analyzed. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the Boron Dilution Accident in the safety analysis. The Boron concentration value of 2000 ppm or greater ensures a K_{eff} of 0.95 or less and includes a conservative allowance for calculational uncertainties of 100 ppm of boron.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material from containment will be minimized. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Item b of this LCO includes requirements for both the emergency airlock and the personnel airlock. The emergency airlock is required to be isolated by at least one airlock door at all times when Specification 3.9.4 is applicable.

The personnel airlock is required by Item b of this LCO to be isolable by at least one airlock door. Both containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during core alterations provided one airlock door is isolable. The personnel airlock is isolable when the following criteria are satisfied.

1. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE,
2. at least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange in accordance with Specification 3.9.10.1,
3. a designated individual is available to close the door.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS (continued)

OPERABILITY of a containment personnel airlock door requires that the door seal protectors are easily removed, that no cables or hoses are being run through the airlock, and that the airlock door is capable of being quickly closed. The requirement that the plant maintain 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures there is sufficient time to close the personnel airlock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs. This requirement for the personnel airlock may be satisfied by maintaining at least one airlock door closed.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements of the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that:

(1) The refueling machine will be used for the movement of fuel assemblies and/or rod control cluster assemblies (RCCA) or thimble plug assemblies, and the auxiliary hoist will be used for the movement of control rod drive shafts,

(2) the refueling machine will have sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly and/or a rod control cluster assembly or thimble plug assembly, and the auxiliary hoist will have sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod drive shaft and attached RCCA, and

(3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) train be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR trains OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR train will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR train, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gas activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING POST ACCIDENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The operability requirements on the Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Ventilation Systems are intended to ensure that this equipment will be available in the event that a fuel handling accident results in the release of radioactive material from an irradiated fuel assembly. Although no credit is taken for the operation of this equipment in the safety analyses, its availability will serve as defense-in-depth in the event of a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building. ANSI N510-1980 and ASTM D3803-89 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. Verification of heater power dissipation (KW) for surveillance testing is referenced to 460 volts.