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Georgia Power
the southern electric system

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Docket No. 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
SPECIAL REPORT
INVALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE

In accordance with the requirements of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications, sections 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed Special Report concerning an invalid diesel generator failure.

Sincerely,

CKM
C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS/gmb

Enclosure: Special Report 2-92-2

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPECIAL REPORT 2-92-2
INVALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required in accordance with the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications (TS), section 4.8.1.1.3, which requires all diesel generator (DG) failures, valid or nonvalid, be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to TS 6.8.2.

B. DESCRIPTION OF INVALID FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR 2B

On March 17, 1992 at 0020 EST, DG 2B was being unloaded after successfully completing a 60-minute, full-load run for a monthly surveillance test. At 0021 EST, a plant equipment operator (PEO) heard a loud noise and upon turning around, observed dust and debris settling in the vicinity of the generator end of the diesel. The PEO immediately reported this occurrence to the control room, and the DG was manually tripped. It was then determined that a large piece of fireproofing insulation had fallen from the ceiling of the DG room, striking the generator end of the diesel and the generator power lead termination box. As a conservative measure, DG 2B was placed in local control at 0033 EST to allow for damage assessment. This resulted in DG 2B being unavailable for emergency operation. Since DG 2A was already inoperable, the action requirement of TS 3.8.1.2 were entered for not having at least one DG operable in Mode 1.

Inspection of the diesel found that the top of the power lead termination box was dented, and the latch assembly for the door of the box was damaged. However, no damage was found to have occurred to the high voltage leads or to components internal to the box. After cleaning up the debris from the falling fireproofing material and completing the inspection of the DG, DG 2B was successfully started at 0411 EST to verify operability. The operability test run was successfully completed, and DG 2B was declared operable at 0700 EST. The elapsed time that DG 2B was unavailable for emergency operation was 3 hours and 34 minutes.

C. SUMMARY

This event is classified as an invalid failure per Regulatory Guide 1.108, section C-2.e. For DG 2B, there has been 1 valid failure in the last 20 valid tests and 3 valid failures in 76 valid tests. After this event, the test frequency for DG 2B was established at once per 31 days in accordance with the requirements of TS table 4.8-1.

An engineering evaluation was completed on March 17, 1992, to determine the need to replace the fireproofing material which had fallen from the ceiling of the DG room. The fireproofing material had become detached from an 8-foot 6-inch by 6-foot (approximate) steel plate assembly used to provide a plenum or diffuser to direct HVAC air flow. It was determined that the fireproofing material was not required, and it will not be replaced. Additionally, corrective action to repair the power lead termination box has been completed.