EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station P.O. Box 98 Brownville, NE 68321

December 9, 1994

Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Lieberman:

The purpose of this letter is to respond to the letter I received from Mr. Joseph R. Gray of your office dated November 10, 1994, which contained a copy of the Demand for Information (DFI) transmitted to the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) by letter dated November 10, 1994.

In connection with this matter, I was interviewed under oath by a representative of the NRC's Office of Investigations. Since that time I have had the opportunity to review in greater detail the events during the March 1993 refueling outage, particularly the approval by the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) on March 9, 1993 of changes to procedures governing reactor pressure vessel (RPV) disassembly. This letter provides the NRC with information that is in addition to the information I provided during my previous interview. To the best of my recollection and belief, the information provided herein is in all material respects consistent with my previous interview.

Explanation of SORC's Action

I served as Dutage Director for the March 1993 refueling outage. I reported to Rick Gardner My responsibilities included managing the outage schedule. I was a voting member of SORC and attended a portion of the March 9, 1993 SORC meeting when changes to the procedure (7.4.4) governing RPV head removal were discussed and approved. I had become aware on the previous day that detensioning of the head bolts was prohibited by the procedure pending completion of a successful test to verify secondary containment integrity.

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I knew then that previously the RPV was disassembled prior to verifying secondary containment integrity. Accordingly, I did not feel that the delay to verify containment integrity was consistent with this prior practice. Because I thought the delay was not appropriate, I expressed my displeasure (using an intemperate word or two). At the time, I was not familiar with revisions to the procedure in 1990-1991, which added a prohibition against lifting the head prior to verifying secondary containment integrity. Others besides myself (including, as I recall, Mick Gardner also questioned the rationale for the prohibition in the procedure.

I recall that a temporary procedure change was processed to move the requirement to verify containment integrity to a later step in the procedure. To the best of my recollection, the temporary change was initiated by Deff Bracrsovsky. But I do not recall who directed that the change be made. I believe that I was not in the approval chain for the temporary change to the procedure. I recall that detensioning the stude took about one shift to complete. I believe that perhaps Rick Gardner contacted Dim Flaherty subsequently about the need for permanent changes to the RPV disassembly procedures.

I was not involved much in discussions leading up to the SORC meeting on March 9, 1993. I remember that SORC considered the change to procedure 7.4.4 (removal of the RPV head) during the first session on March 9, 1993 and that the meeting was subsequently reconvened that afternoon. I did not attend the subsequent session of the meeting.

I recall oim Flaherty, the Engineering Manager, presented the proposed procedure changes to SORC. He consulted a stack of reference materials which he had brought to the meeting. I remember looking at the PCN form for the change. I do not recall specifically what other materials were distributed at the meeting for SORC members' information (in addition to the PCN form). I do not recall looking at the NUREG-0612 document, although at the time I believe I was generally familiar with its coverage of the heavy loads issue. I do not recall asking many questions during the meeting or challenging the basis for Cim Flaherty s presentation.

My recollection in general is that SORC considered the purpose of that procedur.l restriction in relation to safe movement of loads over the RPV and the need to maintain secondary containment integrity as required by the technical specifications. I recall that the meeting lasted a couple of hours and involved a

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considerable amount of discussion. As I remember, the concurrence portion of the PCN form was blank when the SORC meeting began, and was filled in during the meeting after the procedure was approved.

Typically, as Dutage Director I did not attend SORC meetings. I attended the March 9, 1993 meeting in particular because I felt the need to be aware of the procedures governing RPV disassembly which were to be discussed. During the meeting, SORC members discussed so-called "heavy" loads, as addressed by NUREG-0612, and distinguished them from lighter loads addressed by GE PRC 88-11 (loads other than the RPV head, dryer and assembly). SORC also discussed Technical Specification Amendments 147 and 150, which dim Flaherty had identified in his research. I do not recall whether SORC reviewed copies of the amendments. As SORC viewed it, the proposed procedure changes allowing RPV disassembly prior to verifying secondary containment integrity were consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612 and GE PRC 88-11.

My recollection is that SORC was satisfied that the District's actions in response to NUREG-0612 left no credible potential for damage to irradiated fuel a. a result of movement of loads during RPV disassembly (i.e., moving the head, separator and dryer). I recall discussion at the meeting on the telecon with GE concerning the scope of PRC 88-11. We were in a somewhat unique position at the time, with the RPV head bolts detensioned under the temporary PCN and the pending procedure changes being considered by SORC. My view at the time was that the 1991 procedure changes probably exceeded the guidelines contained in GE PRC 88-11 because the changes unnecessarily restricted the timing of RPV disassembly. I recall SORC members discussing the NUREG-0612 aspects of the lifting systems in place at the plant (i.e., the systems are designed to withstand single failures).

To the best of my recollection, SORC also discussed an earlier interpretation by the NRC Staff indicating that the technical specifications did not prohibit RPV disassembly pending verification of secondary containment integrity. I do not recall any dissenting votes by SORC members, and to my knowledge the proposed procedure change was unanimously approved at the meeting. I do not recall whether or not wohn Meacham attended the SORC meeting.

Explanation Why NRC Sanctions Are Inappropriate

From my experience as outage Director for the 1993 refueling, it is important to try to maintain a schedule for

refueling activities and schedule demands are primarily selfimposed. Although maintaining a schedule is important, it is of secondary importance to plant safety. In my view, SORC members considered several relevant factors in approving the procedure change, including the requirements for moving loads in secondary containment, GE PRC 88-11, NUREG-0612 and requirements for secondary containment integrity. I do not recall any undue pressure from SORC members or others to reach a hasty conclusion in connection with the procedure changes.

Although I do not recall having personally reviewed all of the background documents discussed at the SORC meeting, it was my understanding at the time that the changes to procedures approved by SORC on March 9, 1993 were considered to be consistent with technical specification requirements for secondary containment integrity. In hindsight, I still believe that SORC's decision was appropriate under the circumstances.

In this regard, I respectfully suggest that sanctions against me personally as suggested in the November 10, 1994 Demand for Information would be inappropriate. As explained above, I believe that my understanding of the matters discussed at the SORC meeting on March 9, 1993, provided an adequate basis for my vote to approve the procedure change. Any sanctions against me personally would result in personal hardship because of my significant investment as a nuclear power professional. I earned a B.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Nebraska in 1982. My experience includes approximately 12 years of employment by NPPD at the Cooper Nuclear Station (1982 to Present). Prior to that time, I served in the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine program for about nine years (1968 to 1977). I am certified as a Senior Reactor Operator (1990) and am a qualified Shift Technical Advisor (1983) at Cooper Nuclear Station. I have held various positions including Senior Manager of Site Support (1992), Senior Manager of Staff Support (1990), Engineering Manager (1986), Plant Engineering Supervisor (1983) and Mechanical Engineer (1982)

In my current position as Senior Manager of Site Support, I have overall responsibility for supporting site activities in matters related to training, site services, security, outage and modifications, emergency preparedness and personnel coordination. This position reports directly to the Site Manager. This position also has interface responsibility with the Construction Management Department and serves as public relations spokesperson for the site. My additional collateral duties include memberships in the Safety Review and Audit Board and the Station Operations Review

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Committee (SORC). I am also Rechnical Support Center Directory under the NPPD Emergency Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station.

I affirm that this letter is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I hereby request that this letter be withheld from placement in the NRC Public Document Room and from disclosure pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.790.

Sincerely, Eugene M. Mace/

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of <u>Accember</u>, 1994.

Mary Frances armstrong Notany Public

My Commission Expires:

Jan. 11, 1998

