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DUKE POWER

March 27, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
Station Blackout (SBO) (10 CFR 50.63)
Response to NRC Recommendations
(TACS M68564/M68565)

Reference: Letter from T.A. Reed(NRC) to T.C. McMeekin(DPC), dated February 19,1992

Dear Sir;

By a February 19, 1992 letter, the NRC transmitted its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and supporting Technical Evaluation Report (TER) of their review of the Duke Power Company's response to the SBO rule for the McGuire Nuclear Station. The NRC staff found that the McGuire Nuclear Station design conforms with the SBO rule, the Guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.155, NUMARC 87-00, and NUMARC 87-00 Supplemental Questions/Answers and Major Assumptions (dated December 27, 1989), contingent upon the satisfactory resolution of the recommendations identified within the SER.

Your letter of February 19, 1992, requested that we review the recommendations and to submit a response within 30 days of receipt of the SER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.63(c)(4). Accordingly, please find attached the documentation of the results of our evaluation of the recommendations.

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If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Paul Guill at (704) 875-4002.

Very truly yours,

TC McMeekin

Ted C. McMeekin, Vice President
McGuire Nuclear Site

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Regional Administrator, Region II

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Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire

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MNS-RC File: 801.01
Master File: 1.3.2.11
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ATTACHMENT

DUKE POWER COMPANY
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
STATION BLACKOUT RULE, (10 CFR 50.63)
RESPONSE TO NRC RECOMMENDATIONS

NRC Recommendation 1:
The licensee should ensure and confirm the accessibility to the above cited valves and the habitability in the areas where these valves are located during an SBO event.

DPC RESPONSE 1:
The cited valves mentioned in the NRC SER are the steam generator safety valves (SVs), the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs), and the AFW flow control valves. Further, the SER stated that during an SBO event, that the SVs would be used to remove decay heat and if cooldown was necessary, pursuant to procedure ECA 0.0, that the ADVs would be operated manually.

Before responding to this recommendation, clarification of what valves and which procedure would be used to cooldown during an SBO event is warranted. If it became necessary to cooldown the plant during an SBO event the steam generator Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) would be manually operated instead of the ADVs referred to within the NRC SER, as specified by procedure EP/1(2)/5000/09. In addition, please note that the SVs do not require any manual action at the valve location in order for it to function during an SBO event. Accordingly, the recommendation regarding the steam generator SVs is considered by Duke to be fully addressed and therefore closed.

Two of the steam generator PORVs are located in the outboard doghouse at McGuire. The outboard doghouses are not a dominant area of concern as they are vented to the outside environment and are not provided with forced ventilation. Therefore, the SBO environment would not be different from the normal operating environment. The other two steam generators PORVs are located in the inboard doghouses. The inboard doghouses have been classified as a dominate area of concern. If plant cooldown was necessary during an SBO event, the two PORVs within the outboard doghouse would be sufficient for cooldown. Duke considers the portion of this recommendation pertaining to the steam generator PORVs fully addressed and therefore closed.

The AFW flow control valves are located in the CA pump rooms at McGuire. The AFW pump room is identified as a dominant area of concern. Although the valves are located in the AFW pump rooms, the expected temperature should not preclude manual operation of these valves. Duke considers the portion of this recommendation pertaining to the AFW flow control valves fully addressed and therefore closed.

NRC Recommendation 2:
The licensee should ensure the accessibility and habitability in these areas for the manual operation of the AFW flow control valves during an SBO event.

DPC RESPONSE 2:
This recommendation appears to be the same as Recommendation 1, as such, please see Response 1 pertaining to the AFW flow control valves. Duke considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.

NRC Recommendation 3:
The licensee should provide a procedure which will require the operators to open instrument cabinet doors within 30 minutes following an SBO in accordance with the guidance described in NUMARC 87-00.

DPC RESPONSE 3:
AP/0/5500/39, Control Room High Temperature procedure, contains instructions for opening the instrument cabinet doors due to high control room temperature. The opening of the cabinets is performed based on the following observed symptoms;

1) Increasing control room temperature
2) Control room air handling supply unit high temperature alarm
3) Control room area chiller high temperature alarm

Duke considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.

NRC Recommendation 4:
The licensee should verify that no manual operation of SBO response equipment in the annulus and mechanical penetration rooms is required during an SBO event.

DPC RESPONSE 4:
There is no SBO response equipment within the annulus that requires manual operator action during an SBO event. Accordingly, Duke considers this portion of the recommendation pertaining to the annulus fully addressed and therefore closed.

The Loss of all AC power procedure, EP/1(2)/A/5000/09, does instruct the operator to close certain valves that are located within the mechanical penetration rooms. This action is only undertaken if certain valves can not be closed from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF); or if the SSF standby makeup pump fails to start; or if LOCA conditions exist. This action is only undertaken as a precautionary step, due to some failure or if a certain response is not observed. Accordingly, the recommendation pertaining to the mechanical penetration rooms is considered by Duke to be fully addressed and thus closed.

NRC Recommendation 5:
The licensee should provide confirmation and include in the documentation supporting the SBO submittal that a program meeting as a minimum the guidance of RG 1.155, position 1.2, is in place or will be implemented.

DPC RESPONSE 5:
Duke Power Company currently has in place for McGuire a program which is designed to maintain the reliability of the emergency power sources. This program includes, among other things, maintenance, testing, surveillance, and root cause investigation. Additionally, Duke Power Company is closely following the progress of Generic Issue B-56. Upon resolution of this Generic Issue, Duke Power Company will review its emergency power source reliability program and make changes as necessary. Duke power Company considers this recommendation fully addressed and therefore closed.