

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Inoperable Auxiliary Control Air Compressors

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	0 9	8 4	8 4	0 4 5	0 0	0 8	0 7	8 4	Sequoyah, Unit 2		0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Michael R. Cooper, Compliance Section Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
X	L E	C M P	I 0 7 5	Yes					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
			1	1	1 5 8 4

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Unit 1 - Mode 1, 100% reactor power, 578 degrees F, 2235 psig.
Unit 2 - Mode 1, 100% reactor power, 578 degrees F, 2235 psig.

On June 25, 1984, the A-A auxiliary control air compressor was taken out of service for maintenance. Due to insufficient spare parts, it was not returned to service. On July 9, 1984, at 0750 CST, the B-B auxiliary control air compressor was removed from service. These compressors are not technical specification equipment, but are attendant equipment for various safety systems (auxiliary feedwater being the most limiting with respect to action times). With both trains inoperable, it was determined that entry into 3.0.3 should be made, and 3.0.3 was entered at 0750 CST on July 9, 1984. Power reduction to mode 3 was initiated but was stopped at 88% when the BB compressor was returned to service.

There was no effect on public health or safety.

Previous occurrences - none.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
			- 0 4 5 -	0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On June 25, 1984, the A-A auxiliary control air compressor became inoperable. A broken crankshaft was found during the teardown. A spare shaft was not available in Power Stores, so a new shaft was ordered on emergency basis. On July 9, 1984, at 0750 CST with the A-A compressor still inoperable, the B-B compressor began making a knocking noise and was removed from service. The NRC Resident Inspector, during a plant walkdown, noticed both compressors out of service and notified Operations of a potential technical specification problem with both air compressors out of service. A meeting was held by plant management, and it was determined (at 1350 CST) that both units should enter 3.0.3. Both units entered 3.0.3, and a late log entry of 0750 CST was made the 3.0.3 entry time. Power reduction was initiated and continued down to 88%. At that point (1448 CST), the B-B auxiliary control air compressor was returned to service and 3.0.3 was exited. Parts for the A-A compressor arrived on July 10, and the compressor was returned to service on July 11, 1984.

The auxiliary control air compressors are not technical specification equipment but are attendant equipment for various safety systems. This system is designed to remain operable during a maximum probable flood, and the design basis earthquake following a service air isolation.

This system supplies air to the following safety-related equipment:

1. Control bay heating and ventilation system.
2. Auxiliary building gas treatment system.
3. Containment vacuum relief isolation valves.
4. Emergency gas treatment system.
5. Auxiliary feedwater system.
6. Steam generator pressure relief valves.
7. Pressurizer spray valves.

Component Information

The compressors involved are Model No. 4-ESV-NL manufactured by Inger-Soll Rand. The cause of failure of the A-A compressor is unknown at this time. A failure analysis is being performed by TVA Metallurgy Staff and results will be supplied in a followup report. The B-B compressor's problem has been attributed to a broken lock-tab washer which allowed a locknut to back off. The piston rod then became disconnected from the cross-head.

Corrective Action

A review of the spare parts inventory will be made and the quantity of each stock item will be adjusted to ensure adequate parts are available for future repairs. A detailed maintenance procedure is being prepared specifically for these compressors and will be used for future repairs. The preventive maintenance program will be upgraded to ensure better reliability of the compressors.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

August 7, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-327/84045

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning plant operation with both auxiliary control air compressors inoperable. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.v.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah