## DUKE POWER GOMPANY

P.O. BOX 53189 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

July 27, 1984

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TELEPHONE (704) 373-4531

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached a Significant Deficiency Report No. SD 413-414/84-19.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

LTP/rhs

Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

Palmetto Alliance 2135½ Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. Robert Guild, Esq. Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412

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## Catawba Nuclear Station

Report Number: SD 413-414/84-19

Report Date: July 27, 1984

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1&2s

Identification of Deficiency: Two cast iron subcovers were found to have cracked in a pedestal where the intake rocker arm shaft is bolted to the subcover.

Initial Report: On June 23, 1984, Mr Virgil Brownlee of the NRC Region II, Atlanta, Georgia, office was notified of this deficiency by Mr L M Coggins, Mr J M Lines, Mr T L Utterback, and Mr R D Carroll of Duke Power Company, Charlotte, NC 28242.

Supplier and/or Component: Transamerica Delaval, Inc. of Oakland, California, manufactured and supplied the subcovers that are installed in the four Catawba diesels which are designated 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B.

Description of Deficiency: During an inspection, following an extended operational test of the Catawba diesel generator 1A, two cast iron subcovers were found to have cracks in the pedestal where the intake rocker arm shaft is bolted to the subcover. Prior to the extended operation test, another subcover was found to have a piece of this pedestal missing.

None of these cracks affected the diesel operability.

Preliminary studies indicate that the cracks are due to installation tolerance between the dowels, bushings, and the pedestal which lend to excessive interference and possibly fatigue cracking.

Analysis of Safety Implication: Failure Analysis Associates has initiated a failure analysis of the subcover as part of the TDI Owners Group program. Once the failure analysis is complete, the issue of Safety Implication will be addressed. This is expected to be completed by September 27, 1984.

<u>Corrective Action:</u> The cracked subcovers have been replaced and the installation procedures have been revised to reduce the future possibility of excessive interferences and fatigue cracking.

Once the failure analysis is completed by Failure Analysis Associates on the subcovers, any further corrective action that is required will be made.

A final report addressing the safety implication and any further corrective action will be submitted by January 15, 1985.