NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Sequoyah, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Inoperability of Residual Heat Removal System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	1 0	8 4	8 4	— 0 1 2 —	0 0	0 8	0 8	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 1

POWER LEVEL (10): 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check one or more of the following)* (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)	XX	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	XX	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER *(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)*
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	XX	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
Glenn B. Kirk, Compliance Section Engineer	6 1 5 870-6146

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES *(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)*	XX NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)* (16)

During surveillance testing for external piping leakage, both trains of the residual heat removal system were inoperable for two hours, forty seven minutes on 07/10/84 when valve HCV-74-34 (RHR to RWST recirc line isolation valve) was opened as part of the procedure for checking RHR pipe leakage.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	PAGE (3)
Sequoyah, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8	8 4	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Both SI-632.3 (Auxiliary Building Residual Heat Removal System External Leakage) and SI-267.74.2 (Inservice Pressure Testing of Residual Heat Removal System Outside Containment) perform inspection for leakage from the RHR system outside containment. SI-632.3 meets the requirement of NUREG 0578 to have an inspection program for leakage of systems which process primary coolant outside containment. SI-267.74.2 meets the ASME section XI requirement to perform an inservice system pressure test on class II and III pressure-retaining components outside containment. SI-632.3 is performed annually and SI-267.74.2 is required to be performed three times in ten (10) years. Both procedures allow credit to be taken for SI-632.3 whenever SI-267.74.2 is performed. SI-267.74.2 requires use of SI-632.3 in that it references numerous steps of SI-632.3. Simply, both instructions require valve lineups be performed followed by starting of the RHR pump. A four-hour hold time is required prior to the inspection being performed. The only difference in the valve lineups required by the procedures was that SI-267.74.2 required HCV-74-34 (RHR to RWST recirc line isolation valve) to be opened, and SI-632.3 did not.

On 07/10/84 at 0223 CST with unit 2 in mode 1 at 100% reactor power, the 2A-A RHR pump was started in preparation for SI-267.74.2 and SI-632.3. Subsequent QA verification discovered that the required valve lineup was not complete in that HCV-74-530 and HCV-74-34 had not been opened as required by procedure. At approximately 0858 CST, valves 74-530 and 74-34 were opened, and the four-hour hold time was restarted. At approximately 1145 CST, the test was terminated due to CVCS valve 62-83 leaking back through 74-530. At that time, HCV-74-530 and HCV-74-34 were closed.

Review of the system determined the test could be accomplished by keeping 74-530 closed and opening 62-83, and a procedure change was issued. When personnel initiated performance of the test on 07/11/84, they were informed by the unit operator that opening HCV-74-34 would result in both trains of RHR being inoperable. Additional review of the RHR system determined that the leakage inspection could be satisfied with the RWST head pressure on the RHR-RWST recirc line and HCV-74-34 need not be opened. A procedure change was issued to delete the requirement to open HCV-74-34, and the inspection was satisfactorily completed on 07/11/84.

For the event of 07/10/84, unit 2 did operate in a condition prohibited by technical specifications for two hours, forty seven minutes, but technical specifications were not violated due to HCV-74-34 being closed within the seven-hour action time of LCO 3.0.3.

All similar instructions pertaining to section XI external leakage inspections are being reviewed to ensure additional improper valve lineups are not being required.

There was no effect on public health or safety. There have been no previous occurrences.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

August 8, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQRO-50-328/84012

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning both trains of the residual heat removal (RHR) system being inoperable. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i, a.2.v, and a.2.vii.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

P.R. Wallace

P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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