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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - April 26, 1984

TIME	EVENT
10:38:46	"Y" Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI-Y) Power Supply (EE, RJX) fails.
10:38:46	Integrated Control System (ICS, JA) reduces main feedwater (JB) flow to "B" steam generator (SB, SG).
10:39:04	Reactor (AC, RCT) automatically trips on high reactor coolant system pressure. Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve (SB-PCV) opens and fails to reseat.
10:46:00	Plant is stabilized using backup instrumentation and manual control of condensate pumps (SD, P).
10:58:00	Leaking main steam atmospheric dump valve is manually isolated.
14:30:00	Failed input high frequency capacitor (EF, CAP) is found in 24 Volt DC NNI-Y power supply.
16:30:00	NNI-Y power supply is repaired and returned to service.
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PLANT PERFORMANCE

1. Pre-Trip Review

On April 26, 1984, Crystal River Unit 3 was operating at 97% reactor power while generating 862 electrical megawatts. All safety systems were operable.

2. Initiating Event

At 1039, the NNI-Y Power Supply failed which caused erroneous signals to be input to the ICS. The ICS responded by reducing main feedwater flow to the "B" steam generator and hence heat removal from the Reactor Coolant System (AB). This resulted in an automatic reactor trip on high reactor coolant system pressure. The NNI-Y failure was due to a shorted high frequency filter capacitor in the 120 VAC input to the + 24 VDC Power Supply (Lambda Electronics Corporation Model LM-E24). The failed capacitor was found to have incorrect voltage and capacitance ratings. The incorrect capacitor was installed by the manufacturer.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE	R) TEXT CONTINUATION
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

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3. Post-Trip Response

Although the NNI-Y failure caused erroneous indications and prevented the automatic control of some non-safety related systems, no Engineered Safety Feature (JE) (other than the Reactor Protection System (RPS)(JC)) was challenged or manually initiated. Plant operators were able to identify the erroneous indications and control the plant by using the redundant set of instrumentation (powered from the NNI-X power supply) for vital plant parameters to control the plant.

Other systems affected by the loss of NNI-Y included the condensate system (SD), the plant computer (ID, ALM) and the annunciator event alarms (IB, ALM). Significant erroneous indications on the plant computer and annunciator event alarms were detected by use of redundant instrumentation powered from NNI-X. The condensate pumps (SD, P) were controlled manually to balance flows in the secondary system.

Slightly low steam generator pressure (990 psig versus 1010 psig) and visual observation of valve tailpipes revealed that several main steam safety valves (SB, RV), and the "B" atmospheric dump valves had failed to fully reseat. The "B" atmospheric dump valve was isolated by an upstream valve, while the main steam safety valves were fully reseated by lowering main steam pressure to 900 psig.

4. Safety Considerations

The Reactor Protection System responded as designed by automatically tripping the control rods (AA, ROD) when the Reactor Coolant System High Pressure Trip Setpoint was sensed.

The reactor core was cooled normally through the secondary plant. Use of engineered safety features other than RPS was not required.

Due to the already existing small amount of steam generator tube leakage, a radioactive release was made via the main steam safety and atmospheric dump valves. This release did not cause any radioactive limits to be exceeded.

No safety equipment was damaged or otherwise made inoperable during this event. Engineered safety feature system instrumentation is not powered by NNI-Y.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The failed capacitor was replaced with one of correct ratings and the NNI-Y + 24VDC power supply was returned to service.
- Crystal River Unit 3 uses five other 24VDC power supplies similar to the failed power supply. The - 24 VDC power supply for NNI-Y was inspected and found to have the correct capacitor installed.

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUED

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- 3. The capacitors for the installed redundant NNI-X power supplies will be inspected during the next outage of sufficient duration. Spare NNI-X power supplies were withdrawn from stores and found to have correct capacitors installed. The NNI-X power supplies are of slightly different design than NNI-Y.
- 4. The failed main steam atmospheric dump valve was repaired and returned to service.
- 5. The main steam safety valves, that did not fully reseat until steam pressure was lowered, were adjusted for proper setpoint.
- 6. Redundant 24 VDC power supplies in NNI-Y will be installed which will prevent a similar transient from occurring as a result of a single 24 VDC power supply failure. After completion of this action, both NNI-X and NNI-Y will have redundant power supplies. This installation is presently scheduled for the next outage of sufficient duration but no later than Refuel V (Spring 1985).

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

On February 26, 1980, Crystal River Unit 3 experienced a loss of the NNI-X power supply. The failure mode in that event was unrelated to this event and was due to an improperly installed circuit card. Significant corrective actions were implemented following the loss of NNI-X transient, including the installation of the redundant instrumentation panel and operator training in mitigation of this type of transient. The success of the corrective actions is demonstrated by the vastly different consequences of the two transients which are listed in Table 1.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF CONSEQUENCES FOR LOSS OF NNI-X AND NNI-Y EVENTS

AT

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT #3

Con	sequence	Loss of NNI-X Feb. 26, 1980	Loss of NNI-Y April 26, 1984
1.	NNI and Safety System Interactions	No	No
2.	Valid Vital Plant Parameter Indications Available in Control Room	Yes	Yes
3.	Valid Vital Plant Parameter Clearly Identified to Operators in Control Room	No	Yes
4.	Integrated Control System Receives Erroneous Input Signals	Yes	Yes
5.	Reactor Coolant System Pilot Operator Relief Valve PORV (AB, RV)	Yes	No
6.	Reactor Trips on High Reactor Coolant System Pressure	Yes	Yes
7.	High Pressure Injection (BO) Initiated	Yes	No
8.	Reactor Coolant Pumps Tripped (AB, P)	Yes	No
9.	Reactor Coolant System Safety Valves Opened	Yes	No
10.	Emergency Feedwater (BA) Initiated	Yes	No
11.	Reactor Cooling System Subcooling Margin Maintain	Yes	Yes
12.	Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer (AB, PZR) Level Too High or Low	Yes	No
13.	Release of Radioactive Water Into Reactor Containment Building (NH) from the Reactor Coolant System	Yes	No



Florida Powel

August 8, 1984 3F0884-05

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No. 84-010-01

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 84-010-01 which is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Ulale

G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IOI Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323

General Office 3201 Thirty-tourth Street South . P.O. Box 14042. St. Petersburg. Florida 33733 . 813-866-5151

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