TVA

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609

November 17, 1995

TVA-BFN-TS-370 10 CFR 50.90

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-259
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-260
		50-296

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) BASES (TS-370)

The purpose of this letter is to inform NRC of changes TVA made to the BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 TS Bases. These changes provide consistency between the Units 2 and 3 TS Bases. The fuel bundle weight was revised to reflect the lighter weight of the GE11 fuel design.

Enclosure 1 provides a description of the Bases changes. Enclosure 2 contains marked up copies of the appropriate Units 1, 2, and 3 Bases to show the changes. Enclosure 3 forwards the revised Units 1, 2, and 3 Bases pages for TS-370.

There are no commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions about these changes, please contact me at (205)729-2636.

Sincerely,

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ENCLOSURE 1

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS-370
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE

TVA revised Units 1, 2, and 3 TS Bases to revise the fuel bundle weight to reflect the lighter weight of the GE11 fuel design and to provide consistency between Units 2 and 3 TS Bases. The changes are detailed in the attached Table that provides a comparison of the Units 2 and 3 TS Bases.

II. REASON FOR THE PROPOSED CHANGE

These changes were the result of a comparison of the Units 2 and 3 TS Bases. They are administrative in nature and provide for consistency between the TS Bases for Units 2 and 3. The fuel bundle weight for Units 1, 2, and 3 was revised to reflect the lighter weight of the GE11 fuel design.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
1	1.1 <u>Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit</u> Page 1.1/2.1-8, second paragraph, last sentence - MCPR > **1.07** represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity.	1.1 <u>Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit</u> Page 1.1/2.1-8, second paragraph, last sentence - **This** MCPR represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
2	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-8, third paragraph, third sentence - The margin for each fuel assembly is characterized by the critical power ratio (CPR) which is the ratio of the bundle power which would produce onset of transition boiling, divided by the actual bundle power.	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-8, third paragraph, third sentence - The margin for each fuel assembly is characterized by the critical power ratio (CPR) which is the ratio of the bundle power which would produce onset of transition boiling divided by the actual bundle power.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
3	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-8, third paragraph, sixth sentence - The Safety Limit (MCPR of 1.07) has sufficient conservatism to assure that in the event of an abnormal operational transient initiated from a normal operating condition (MCPR > **limits specified in Specification 3.5.K**) more than 99.9 percent of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition.	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-8, third paragraph, sixth sentence - The Safety Limit (MCPR of 1.07) has sufficient conservatism to assure that in the event of an abnormal operational transient initiated from a normal operating condition (MCPR > ***) more than 99.9 percent of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition. Bottom of page 1.1/2.1-8 - *****See Section 3.5.K**	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
4	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, second paragraph, second sentence - Cladding temperatures would increase to approximately 1,100°F which is below the perforation temperature of the cladding material.	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, second paragraph, second sentence - Cladding temperatures would increase to approximately 1100°F which is below the perforation temperature of the cladding material.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
5	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, third paragraph, first sentence - If reactor pressure should ever exceed 1,400 psia during normal power operation	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, third paragraph, first sentence - If reactor pressure should ever exceed 1400 psia during normal power operation	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
6	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, fourth paragraph, third sentence - Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low powers and **flow** will always be greater than 4.56 psi.	1.1 Bases: Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit Page 1.1/2.1-9, fourth paragraph, third sentence - Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low powers and **flows** will always be greater than 4.56 psi.	Use the following wording from NUREG 1433, Revision 1, Section B 2.1.1, for Unit 2 and Unit 3: Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low power and flows will always be greater than 4.5 psi.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
7	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, first paragraph, first sentence - Analyses of the limiting transients show that no scram adjustment is required to assure MCPR > 1.07 when the transient is initiated from MCPR **limits specified in Specification 3.5.k**.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, first paragraph, first sentence - Analyses of the limiting transients show that no scram adjustment is required to assure MCPR > 1.07 when the transient is initiated from MCPR >***. Bottom of page 1.1/2.1-13 - *****See Section 3.5.K**	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
8	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, second paragraph, - . . . . constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, second paragraph, - . . . . . . constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer. **Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern.** Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
9	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, third paragraph, first, second, and third sentence - The IRM System consists of **eight** chambers, **four** in each of the reactor protection system logic channels. The IRM is a **five**-decade instrument which covers the range of power level between that covered by the SRM and the APRM. The **five** decades are covered by the IRM by means of a range switch and the **five** decades are broken down into	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, third paragraph, first, second, and third sentence - The IRM System consists of **8** chambers, **4** in each of the reactor protection system logic channels. The IRM is a **5**-decade instrument which covers the range of power level between that covered by the SRM and the APRM. The **5** decades are covered by the IRM by means of a range switch and the **5** decades are broken down into	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
10	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, third paragraph, last sentence - For example, if the instrument **were** on range 1, the scram setting would be **at** 120 divisions for that range; likewise if the instrument was on range 5, the scram setting would be 120 divisions on that range.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-13, third paragraph, last sentence - For example, if the instrument **was** on range 1, the scram setting would be 120 divisions for that range; likewise if the instrument was on range 5, the scram setting would be 120 divisions on that range.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: For example, if the instrument was on range 1, the scram setting would be 120 divisions for that range; likewise if the instrument was on range 5, the scram setting would be 120 divisions for that range.
11	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, third sentence - **In addition**, the APRM 15 percent scram prevent**s** higher power operation without being in the RUN mode.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, third sentence - The APRM 15 percent scram **will** prevent higher power operation without being in the RUN mode.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
12	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, sixth sentence - For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, sixth sentence - For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough, due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods, that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
13	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, seventh sentence - An IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any **safety limit** is exceeded.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, seventh sentence - An IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any **SAFETY LIMIT** is exceeded.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
14	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, twelfth sentence - Quarter rod density is illustrated in paragraph 7.5.5 of the FSAR.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, first paragraph, twelfth sentence - Quarter rod density is illustrated in paragraph 7.5.5.**4** of the FSAR.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: Quarter rod density is discussed in paragraph 7.5.5.4 of the FSAR.
15	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, second paragraph, last sentence - Licensing analyses have demonstrated that with a neutron . . . violate the fuel **safety limit** and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-14, second paragraph, last sentence - Licensing analyses have demonstrated that with a neutron . . . violate the fuel **SAFETY LIMIT** and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
16	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-15, Title for item C. - Reactor Water Low Level Scram and Isolation (Except Main Steam lines)	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-15, Title for item C. - Reactor Water Low Level Scram and Isolation (Except Main Steam **L**ines)	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
17	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, first sentence - The low pressure isolation of the main steam lines at **825** psig was provided to protect against rapid reactor depressurization and the resulting rapid cooldown of the vessel.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, first sentence - The low pressure isolation of the main steam lines at **850** psig was provided to protect against rapid reactor depressurization and the resulting rapid cooldown of the vessel.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
18	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, second sentence - The scram feature that occurs when the main steamline . . . fuel cladding integrity **safety limit.**	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, second sentence - The scram feature that occurs when the main steam line . . . fuel cladding integrity **SAFETY LIMIT.**	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
19	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, third sentence - Operation of the reactor at pressures lower than **825** psig requires that the reactor mode switch be in the STARTUP position, where protection of the fuel cladding integrity **safety limit** is provided by the IRM and APRM high neutron flux scrams.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, third sentence - Operation of the reactor at pressures lower than **850** psig requires that the reactor mode switch be in the **startup** position, where protection of the fuel cladding integrity **SAFETY LIMIT** is provided by the IRM and APRM high neutron flux scrams.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: Operation of the reactor at pressures lower than 825 psig requires that the reactor mode switch be in the STARTUP position, where protection of the fuel cladding integrity SAFETY LIMIT is provided by the IRM and APRM high neutron flux scrams.
20	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, fourth sentence - Thus, the combination of main steam**line** . . . fuel cladding integrity **safety limit**.	2.1 Bases Page 1.1/2.1-16, first paragraph, fourth sentence - Thus, the combination of main steam line . . . fuel cladding integrity **SAFETY LIMIT**.	Revise Unit 2 to match 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
21	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-2, third paragraph, first sentence - Correspondingly, the design pressure (1,148 psig for suction and 1,326 psig for discharge) of the reactor recirculation system piping **Is** such that, when the 20 percent allowance (230 and 265 psi) allowed by USAS Piping Code, Section B31.1 for pressure transients **Is** added to the design pressures, transient pressure limits of 1,378 and 1,591 psig are established.	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-2, third paragraph, first sentence - Correspondingly, the design pressure (1,148 psig for suction and 1,326 psig for discharge) of the reactor recirculation system piping **are** such that, when the 20 percent allowance (230 and 265 psi) allowed by USAS Piping Code, Section B31.1 for pressure transients **are** added to the design pressures, transient pressure limits of 1,378 and 1,591 psig are established.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: Correspondingly, the design pressures (1,148 for suction and 1,326 for discharge) of the reactor recirculation system piping are such that, when the 20 percent allowance (230 and 265 psi) allowed by USAS Piping Code, Section B31.1 for pressure transients is added to the design pressures, transient pressure limits of 1,378 and 1,591 psig are established.
22	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-3, References - 1. Plant Safety Analysis (BFNP FSAR Section 14.0).	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-3, References - 1. Plant Safety Analysis (BFNP FSAR Section **N** 14.0).	Revise Reference 1 of the Section 1.2 Bases for both Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: 1. Plant Safety Analysis (BFNP FSAR Sections 14.0 and Appendix N).
23	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-3, References - Unit 2 only has 4 references.	1.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-3, References - **5. Generic Reload Fuel Application, Licensing Topical Report, NEDE-24011-P-A and Addenda.**	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
24	2.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-4, first paragraph, first sentence - To meet the safety basis, 13 relief valves have been installed on the unit with a total capacity of **84.1** percent of nuclear boiler rated steam flow.	2.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-4, first paragraph, first sentence - To meet the safety basis 13 relief valves have been installed on the unit with a total capacity of **83.77** percent of nuclear boiler rated steam flow.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
25	2.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-4, first paragraph, second sentence - The analysis of the worst overpressure transient (3-second closure of all main	2.2 Bases Page 1.2/2.2-4, first paragraph, second sentence - The analysis of the worst overpressure transient, (3-second closure of all main	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
26	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-14, first paragraph, first sentence - The **r**eactor **p**rotection **s**ystem automatically initiates a reactor scram to:	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-13, first paragraph, first sentence - The **R**eactor **P**rotection **S**ystem automatically initiates a reactor scram to:	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
27	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-14, second paragraph, first sentence - This specification provides the **limiting conditions for operation** necessary to preserve the ability of the system	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-13, second paragraph, first sentence - This specification provides the **LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION** necessary to preserve the ability of the system	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
28	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-14, second paragraph, last sentence - When necessary, one channel may be made **INOPERABLE** for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-13, second paragraph, last sentence - When necessary, one channel may be made **Inoperable** for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
29	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-14, fourth paragraph, first sentence - The **r**eactor **p**rotection **s**ystem is made up of two independent trip systems (refer to Section 7.2, FSAR).	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-13, fourth paragraph, first sentence - The **R**eactor **P**rotection **S**ystem is made up of two independent trip systems (refer to Section 7.2, FSAR).	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
30	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-15, first paragraph, last sentence - The bases for the scram setting for the IRM, APRM, high reactor pressure, reactor low water level, MSIV closure, turbine control valve fast closure and turbine stop valve closure are discussed in Specifications 2.1 and 2.2.	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-14, first paragraph, last sentence - The bases for the scram setting for the IRM, APRM, high reactor pressure, reactor low water level, MSIV closure, turbine control valve fast closure, and turbine stop valve closure are discussed in Specifications 2.1 and 2.2.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
31	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-16, fifth paragraph, third sentence - For normal operating conditions, these limits . . . full power and from full power to **SHUTDOWN**).	3.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-15, fifth paragraph, third sentence - For normal operating conditions, these limits . . . full power and from full power to **shutdown**).	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
32	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-17, third paragraph, second sentence - During design, a goal of **0.9999** probability of success (at the 50 percent confidence level) was adopted to assure that a balanced and adequate design is achieved.	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-16, third paragraph, second sentence - During design, a goal of **0.99999** probability of success (at the 50 percent confidence level) was adopted to assure that a balanced and adequate design is achieved.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
33	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-17, item C. - Devices which only serve a useful function during some restricted mode of . . . that can be performed at **SHUTDOWN**.	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-16, item C. - Devices which only serve a useful function during some restricted mode of . . . that can be performed at **shutdown**.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
34	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-19, fourth paragraph, second sentence - For those devices which employ amplifiers, etc., drift specifications call for drift to be less than 0.4 percent/month; i.e., in the period of a month a drift of 4 percent would occur and thus providing for adequate margin.	4.1 Bases Page 3.1/4.1-18, fourth paragraph, second sentence - For those devices which employ amplifiers, etc., drift specifications call for drift to be less than 0.4 percent/month; i.e., in the period of a month a drift of .4-percent would occur and thus providing for adequate margin.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: For those devices which employ amplifiers, etc., drift specifications call for drift to be less than 0.4 percent/month; i.e., in the period of a month a drift of 0.4-percent would occur thus providing for adequate margin.
35	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-65, third paragraph, last sentence - Such instrumentation must be available whenever **primary containment integrity** is required.	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-64, third paragraph, last sentence - Such instrumentation must be available whenever **PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY** is required.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
36	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-65, fifth paragraph - Unit 3 has a sentence at the end of the paragraph that unit 2 does not have.	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-64, fifth paragraph, last sentence - **The RCIC and HPCI system initiation opens the turbine steam supply valve which in turn initiates closure of the respective drain valves (Group 7).**	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
37	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-65, sixth paragraph, first sentence - The low water level instrumentation set to trip at ≥ 398 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.**A**) closes the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the Main Steam Line Drain Valves, and the Reactor Water Sample Valves (Group 1).	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-64, sixth paragraph, first sentence - The low water level instrumentation set to trip at ≥ 398 inches above vessel zero (Table 3.2.**B**) closes the Main Steam Isolation Valves, the Main Steam Line Drain Valves, and the Reactor Water Sample Valves (Group 1).	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
38	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-67, fourth paragraph, third sentence - Each trip system consists of two **elements**.	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-66, fifth paragraph, third sentence - Each trip system consists of two **channels**.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
39	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-68, third paragraph - **When the RBM is required, the minimum instrument channel requirements apply. These requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure the single failure criteria is met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for maintenance, testing, or calibration. This does not significantly increase the risk of an inadvertent control rod withdrawal, as the other channel is available, and the RBM is a backup system to the written sequence for withdrawal of control rods.**	3.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-67, third paragraph - **The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure the single failure criteria is met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for maintenance, testing, or calibration. This does not significantly increase the risk of an inadvertent control rod withdrawal, as the other channel is available, and the RBM is a backup system to the written sequence for withdrawal of control rods.**	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
40	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-72, title - 4.2 BASES (Cont'd)	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-70, title - Unit 3 does not have a title for this page.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
41	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-72, second paragraph - $i = \sqrt{\frac{2(0.5)}{10^{-6}}}$	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-70, second paragraph - $i = \sqrt{\frac{2(0.5)}{10^{-6}}}$	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
42	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-72, third paragraph, last sentence - The checks which are made on a daily basis are adequate to assure **OPERABILITY** of the sensors and electronic	4.2 Bases Page 3.2/4.2-70, third paragraph - The checks which are made on a daily basis are adequate to assure **operability** of the sensors and electronic	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
43	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-14, first paragraph, first sentence - 2. Reactivity Margin - Inoperable Control Rods - Specification 3.3.A.2	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-14, first paragraph, first sentence - 2. Reactivity margin - inoperable control rods - Specification 3.3.A.2	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
44	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-15, first paragraph, first sentence - 2. The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than **3** inches in the extremely remote event of a housing failure.	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-15, first paragraph, first sentence - 2. The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than **three** inches in the extremely remote event of a housing failure.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3
45	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-17, second paragraph - The control rod system is designated to bring the reactor subcritical at **the** rate fast enough to prevent fuel damage; i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than 1.07. **The limiting power transient is given in Reference 1.** Analysis of this transient shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram with the average response of all the drives as given in the above specification provide the required protection, and MCPR remains greater than 1.07.	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-17, second paragraph - The control rod system is designated to bring the reactor subcritical at **a** rate fast enough to prevent fuel damage; i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than 1.07. Analysis of this transient shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram **(FSAR Figure N3.6-9)** with the average response of all the drives as given in the above specification, provide the required protection, and MCPR remains greater than 1.07.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: The control rod system is designed to bring the reactor subcritical at a rate fast enough to prevent fuel damage; i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than 1.07. The limiting power transients are given in Reference 1. Analysis of these transients shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram with the average response of all drives as given in the above specification provide the required protection and MCPR remains greater than 1.07.
46	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-17, third paragraph, first sentence - On an early BWR, some degradation of control rod scram performance occurred during plant **STARTUP** and was determined	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-17, third paragraph, first sentence - On an early BWR, some degradation of control rod scram performance occurred during plant **startup** and was determined	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
47	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, first paragraph, second sentence - These include Oyster Creek, Monticello, Dresden 2 and Dresden 3.	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, first paragraph, second sentence - These include Oyster Creek, Monticello, Dresden 2, and Dresden 3.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
48	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, fourth paragraph, first sentence - 2. The dirt load is primarily released during **STARTUP** of the reactor when the	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, fourth paragraph, first sentence - 2. The dirt load is primarily released during **startup** of the reactor when the	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
49	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, fourth paragraph, last sentence - This preoperational and **STARTUP** testing is sufficient to detect anomalous drive performance.	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-18, fourth paragraph, last sentence - This preoperational and **startup** testing is sufficient to detect anomalous drive performance.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
50	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-20, second paragraph, third sentence - One percent reactivity into the core would not lead to transients exceeding design conditions of the reactor system.	3.3/4.3 Bases Page 3.3/4.3-20, second paragraph, third sentence - One percent reactivity **limit is considered safe since an insertion of the reactivity** into the core would not lead to transients exceeding design conditions of the reactor system.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: One percent reactivity limit is considered safe since an insertion of one percent reactivity into the core would not lead to transients exceeding design conditions of the reactor system.
51	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-24, first paragraph, first sentence - Analyses presented in the FSAR* and analyses presented in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, demonstrated that the core spray system **in conjunction with two LPCI pumps** provides adequate cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident and to limit fuel clad temperature to below 2,200° F which assures that core geometry remains intact and to limit the core average clad metal-water reaction to less than 1 percent.	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-27, first paragraph, first sentence - Analyses presented in the FSAR* and analyses presented in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, demonstrated that the core spray system provides adequate cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident and to limit fuel clad temperature to below 2,200° F which assures that core geometry remains intact and to limit the core average clad metal-water reaction to less than 1 percent.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
52	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-24, first paragraph, second sentence - Core spray distribution has been shown in tests of systems similar **to** design to BFNP to exceed the minimum requirements.	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-27, first paragraph, second sentence - Core spray distribution has been shown in tests of systems similar **in** design to BFNP to exceed the minimum requirements.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
53	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-30, first paragraph, first sentence - The emergency core coolir ȷ system LOCA analyses for small line breaks assumed ․nat four of the six ADS valves were **operable**.	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-33, second paragraph, first sentence - The emergency core cooling system LOCA analyses for small ıine breaks assumed that four of the six ADS valves were **OPERABLE**.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
54	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-30, Section 3.5.H. - 3.5.H. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-33, Section 3.5.H. - H. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
55	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-32, first paragraph, last sentence - A **6**-hour time period to achieve this condition is justified since the additional	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-35, first paragraph, last sentence - A **six**-hour time period to achieve this condition is justified since the additional	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
56	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-32, third paragraph, first sentence - Because the probability of thermal-hydraulic oscillations is lower and the margin to the MCPR safety limit is greater in Region II than in Region I of **f**igure 3.5.M-1, an immediate scram upon entry into the region is not necessary.	3.5 Bases Page 3.5/4.5-35, third paragraph, first sentence - Because the probability of thermal-hydraulic oscillations is lower and the margin to the MCPR safety limit is greater in Region II than in Region I of **F**igure 3.5.M-1, an immediate scram upon entry into the region is not necessary.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
57	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, second paragraph, first sentence - The **2** gpm limit for coolant leakage rate increases over any 24-hour period is a limit specified by the NRC (Reference 2).	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, second paragraph, first sentence - The **two** gpm limit for coolant leakage rate increase over any 24 hour period is a limit specified by the NRC (Reference 2).	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follow: The two gpm limit for coolant leakage rate increases over any 24-hour period is a limit specified by the NRC (Reference 2).
58	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, sixth paragraph, first sentence - To meet the safety basis, 13 relief valves have been installed on the unit with a total capacity of **84.1** percent of nuclear boiler rated steam flow.	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, sixth paragraph, first sentence - To meet the safety basis, 13 relief valves have been installed on the unit with a total capacity of **83.77** percent of nuclear boiler rated steam flow.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
59	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, eighth paragraph, first sentence - Experience in relief valve operation shows that a testing of 50 percent of the valves per year is adequate to detect failures or deteriorations.	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, eighth paragraph, first sentence - Experience in relief **and safety** valve operation shows that a testing of 50 percent of the valves per year is adequate to detect failures or deteriorations.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
60	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, eighth paragraph, second sentence - The relief valves are benchtested every second operating cycle to ensure that their setpoints are within the $\pm$ 1 percent tolerance.	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-30, eighth paragraph, second sentence - The relief **and safety** valves are benchtested every second operating cycle to ensure that their setpoints are within the $\pm$ 1 percent tolerance.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
61	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-31, References - **2. Amendment 22 in response to AEC Question 4.2 of December 6, 1971.**	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-31, References - Unit 3 does not list the reference listed in Unit 2.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
62	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-31, References - **5. Generic Reload Fuel Application, Licensing Topical Report, NEDE-24011-P-A and Addenda**	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-31, References - Unit 3 does not list the reference listed in Unit 2.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
63	3.6/4.6-32 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-32, fourth paragraph, first sentence - Requiring at least one recirculation pump to be **operable** while in the RUN mode (i.e., requiring a manual scram if both recirculation pumps are tripped)	3.6/4.6-32 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-32, fourth paragraph, first sentence - Requiring at least one recirculation pump to be **OPERABLE** while in the RUN mode (i.e., requiring a manual scram if both recirculation pumps are tripped)	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
64	3.6/4.6-32 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-32, fifth paragraph, first sentence - Requiring the discharge valve of the lower speed loop to remain closed until the speed of the faster pump is below 50 **%** of its rated speed	3.6/4.6-32 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-32, fifth paragraph, first sentence - Requiring the discharge valve of the lower speed loop to remain closed until the speed of the faster pump is below 50 **percent** of its rated speed	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
65	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, sixth paragraph - **An augmented inservice surveillance program is required to determine whether any stress corrosion has occurred in any stainless steel piping, stainless components, and highly-stressed alloy steel such as hanger springs, as a result of environmental conditions associated with the March 22, 1975 fire.**	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33 - This Unit 2 paragraph is not in the Unit 3 technical specifications.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3. The special surveillances implemented as a result of the 1975 fire were not applicable to Unit 3. However, Amendment 206 to the Unit 2 Tech Specs deleted Section 4.6.G.3 which required the augmented inservice inspections. The section shown for the unit 2 Tech Specs should have been deleted by Amendment 206.
66	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - 1. **Inservice Inspection and Testing (BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12)**	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - 1. **Inservice Inspection and Testing (BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12)**	Revise Reference 1 for both Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: 1. BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12, Inservice Inspection and Testing.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
67	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - **5. Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 46 (Mechanical Equipment, Concrete, and Structural Steel Cleaning Procedure for Residue From Plant Fire - Units 1 and 2)**	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - Unit 3 does not list reference 5 listed in Unit 2.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3. The Unit 2 special instructions implemented as a result of the 1975 fire were not applicable to Unit 3. However, Amendment 206 to the Unit 2 Tech Specs deleted Section 4.6.G.3 which required these special instructions. Reference 5 shown for the Unit 2 Tech Specs should have been deleted by Amendment 206.
68	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - **6. Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 53 (Evaluation of Corrosion Damage of Piping Components Which Were Exposed to Residue From March 22, 1975 Fire)**	Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - Unit 3 does not list reference 6 listed in Unit 2.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3. The Unit 2 special instructions implemented as a result of the 1975 fire were not applicable to Unit 3. However, Amendment 206 to the Unit 2 Tech Specs deleted Section 4.6.G.3 which required these special instructions. Reference 6 shown for the Unit 2 Tech Specs should have been deleted by Amendment 206.
69	3.6/4.6 Bases Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - **7. Plant Safety Analysis (BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12)**	Page 3.6/4.6-33, References - Unit 3 does not list reference 7 listed in Unit 2.	Delete reference 7 from the 3.6/4.6 Bases for Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
70	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, third paragraph, second sentence - The actions required by Specifications 3.7.**C.** - **3**.7.F. assure the reactor can be depressurized in a timely manner to	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-25, second paragraph, second sentence - The actions required by Specifications 3.7.**C.**-**3**.7.F. assure the reactor can be depressurized in a timely manner to	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
71	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, fourth paragraph, first sentence - Should it be necessary to drain the suppression chamber, this should only be done when there is no requirement for **c**ore **s**tandby **c**ooling **s**ystems OPERABILITY.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, third paragraph, first sentence - Should it be necessary to drain the suppression chamber, this should only be done when there is no requirement for **C**ore **S**tandby **C**ooling **S**ystems OPERABILITY.	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.
72	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, fifth paragraph, first sentence - Limiting suppression pool temperature . . . and **ensures** margin for complete condensation of steam from the design basis **LOCA.**	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, fourth paragraph, first sentence - Limiting suppression pool temperature . . . and **assures** margin for complete condensation of steam from the design basis **loss-of-coolant accident** .	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follow: Limiting suppression pool temperature . . . and **ensures** margin for complete condensation of steam from the design basis **loss-of-coolant accident** (LOCA).

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	**Unit 3** (Section/Page/Text)	**Revision** (Affected Unit/Text)
73	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, sixth paragraph, second sentence - This action would include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling heat exchangers, (3) initiate reactor shutdown, and (4) if other relief valves are used to depressurize	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-25, fifth paragraph, second sentence - This action would include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve; (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling heat exchangers; (3) initiate reactor shutdown; and (4) if other relief valves are used to depressurize	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
74	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, seventh paragraph, first sentence - If a **LOCA** were to occur when the reactor water temperature is below . . . permissible pressure**s** even if no condensation were to occur.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-25, sixth paragraph, first sentence - If a **loss-of-coolant accident** were to occur when the reactor water temperature is below . . . permissible pressure**,** even if no condensation were to occur.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
75	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, first line - In conjunction with the Mark I containment Short Term Program, a plant unique analysis	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, first line - In conjunction with the Mark I Containment Short Term Program, a plant-unique analysis	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
76	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, second paragraph, first sentence - The relativity small containment volume . . . limited (a-percent or so) reaction of the zirconium and steam during a **LOCA** could lead to the	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, second paragraph, first sentence - The relativity small containment volume . . . limited (a percent or so) reaction of the zirconium and steam during a **loss-of-coolant accident** could lead to the	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
77	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, second paragraph, last sentence - The <4 percent hydrogen concentration minimizes the possibility of hydrogen combustion following a **LOCA**.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, second paragraph, last sentence - The <4 percent hydrogen concentration minimizes the possibility of hydrogen combustion following a **loss-of-coolant accident**.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
78	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, third paragraph, first sentence - The occurrence of . . . occurrence of the **LOCA** upon which the specified oxygen concentration limit is based.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, third paragraph, first sentence - The occurrence of . . . occurrence of the **loss-of-coolant accident** upon which the specified oxygen concentration limit is based.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
79	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, fourth paragraph, third sentence - Following a **LOCA** the Containment Air Monitoring (CAM) System continuously monitors the hydrogen concentration of the containment volume. Two independent systems (a system consists of one hydrogen sensing circuit) are installed in the drywell and the torus. Each sensor and associated circuit is periodically checked by a calibration gas to verify operation. Failure of one system does not reduce the ability to monitor system atmosphere as a second independent and redundant system will still be OPERABLE.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-26, fourth paragraph, third sentence - Following a **loss-of-coolant accident** the Containment Air Monitoring (CAM) System continuously monitors the hydrogen concentration of the containment volume. Two independent systems (a system consists of one hydrogen sensing circuit) are installed in the drywell and the torus. Each sensor and associated circuit is periodically checked by a calibration gas to verify operation. Failure of one system does not reduce the ability to monitor system atmosphere as a second independent and redundant system will still be OPERABLE.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: Following a LOCA, the Containment Air Monitoring (CAM) System continuously monitors the hydrogen concentration of the containment volume. Two independent systems are capable of sampling and monitoring hydrogen concentration in the drywell and the torus. Each sensor and associated circuit is periodically checked by a calibration gas to verify operation. Failure of one system does not reduce the ability to monitor the hydrogen concentration in the drywell or torus atmosphere as a second independent and redundant system will still be OPERABLE.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
80	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-28, first paragraph - In terms of separability, redundancy for a failure of the torus system is based upon at least one OPERABLE drywell system. The drywell hydrogen concentration can be used to limit the torus hydrogen concentration during post-LOCA conditions. Post-LOCA calculations show that the CAD system initiated within two-hours at a flow rate of 100 scfm will limit the peak drywell and wetwell hydrogen concentration to 3.6-percent (at 4 hours) and 3.8-percent (at 32 hours), respectively. This is based upon purge initiation after 20 hours at a flow rate of 100 scfm to maintain containment pressure below 30 psig. Thus, peak torus hydrogen concentration can be controlled below 4.0 percent using either the direct torus hydrogen monitoring system or the drywell hydrogen monitoring system with appropriate conservatism ($\leq$ 3.8-percent), as a guide for CAD/Purge operations.	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-27, first paragraph - In terms of separability, redundancy for a failure of the torus system is based upon at least one OPERABLE drywell system. The drywell hydrogen concentration can be used to limit the torus hydrogen concentration during post-loss-of-coolant accident conditions. Post-loss-of-coolant accident calculations show that the CAD system within two hours at a flow rate of 100 scfm will limit the peak drywell and wetwell hydrogen concentration to 3.9-percent (at 3 hours) and 3.9-percent (at 32 hours), respectively. This is based upon purge initiation after 20 hours at a flow rate of 100 scfm to maintain containment pressure below 30 psig. Thus, peak torus hydrogen concentration can be controlled below 4.0 percent using either the direct torus hydrogen monitoring system or the drywell hydrogen monitoring system with appropriate conservatism ($\leq$ 3.9-percent), as a guide for CAD/Purge operations.	Delete the paragraph in Unit 2 and Unit 3 - Does not agree with FSAR 5.2.6.
81	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-35, fourth paragraph - Group 7 - (Deleted)	3.7/4.7 Bases Page 3.7/4.7-34, fourth paragraph - Group 7 -**Process lines are closed only on the respective turbine steam supply valve not fully closed. This assures that the valves are not open when HPCI or RCIC action is required.**	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
82	3.9 Bases Page 3.9/4.9-19, first paragraph, first sentence - The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the **plant** during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident.	3.9 Bases Page 3.9/4.9-18, first paragraph, first sentence - The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the **unit** during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident.	Revise Unit 2 and Unit 3 as follows: The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the units during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident.
83	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-12, second paragraph, last sentence - The 400-lb load-trip setting on these hoists is adequate to trip the interlock when one of the more than **600**-lb fuel bundles is being handled.	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-11, second paragraph, last sentence - The 400-lb load-trip setting on these hoists is adequate to trip the interlock when one of the more than **600**-lb fuel bundles is being handled.	Revise Units 1, 2, and 3 as follows: 3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-12, second paragraph, last sentence - The 400-lb load-trip setting on these hoists is adequate to trip the interlock when one of the more than **550**-lb fuel bundles is being handled.
84	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-13, fourth paragraph, last sentence - Control rods in cells from which all fuel has been removed **and which are outside the periphery of the then existing fuel matrix** may be armed electrically and moved for maintenance purposes during full core removal, provided all rods that control fuel are fully inserted and electrically disarmed.	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-12, fourth paragraph, last sentence - Control rods in cells from which all fuel has been removed may be armed electrically and moved for maintenance purposes during full core removal, provided all rods that control fuel are fully inserted and electrically disarmed.	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.

Technical Specification Change 370

List of Bases Changes for Units 2 and 3

	Unit 2 (Section/Page/Text)	Unit 3 (Section/Page/Text)	Revision (Affected Unit/Text)
85	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-14, fourth paragraph - **D. Reactor Building Crane** The reactor building crane and 125-ton	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-13, fourth paragraph - **3.10.D/4.10.D Bases** **Reactor Building Crane** The reactor building crane and 125-ton	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
86	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-14, seventh paragraph - **E. Spent Fuel Cask** The spent fuel cask design	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-13, seventh paragraph - **3.10.E/4.10.E** **Spent Fuel Cask** The spent fuel cask design	Revise Unit 3 to match Unit 2.
87	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-15, page title - Unit 2 does not have a title.	3.10 Bases Page 3.10/4.10-14, page title - 3.10 BASES (Cont'd)	Revise Unit 2 to match Unit 3.