

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sarry Power Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  05000281	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

**2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS**

The charging pumps provide makeup and seal water injection flow to the Reactor Coolant System during normal operation and also serve as high head safety injection pumps in a design basis accident. Three charging pumps are provided. Each pump can provide 100% of normal charging or design high head safety injection flow. The pumps were not fully operable in accordance with the definition in Technical Specification 1.0.D. However, either the "A" or "B" charging pump was capable of performing its high head safety injection function during a design basis accident until the "C" charging pump could be placed in service. Engineering calculations performed previously for Station Blackout indicate that a charging pump could run while its associated damper was closed for up to four hours. Therefore, the accident design basis assumptions would have been satisfied and no actual or potential consequences to public health and safety were created by the event.

**3.0 CAUSE OF THE EVENT**

The January 30, 1992 event was caused by mechanical failure due to an oil leak from the "A" charging pump bearing and the damper remaining closed on the "B" charging pump. The failure of the damper resulted from human error due to a procedural deficiency and weakness in training on the manual operation of the damper. On January 28, 1992 testing had been performed on the Emergency Ventilation System. This testing required the charging pump ventilation damper (2-VS-MOD-201B) for the "B" charging pump to be de-energized and the handwheel manually depressed. The charging pump ventilation dampers are equipped with a manual cut off switch which is actuated when the handwheel is depressed for manual operation. The cut-off switch prevents injury due to unexpected restoration of power and is automatically reset when the handwheel is returned to the raised position. It was concluded that the handwheel was left in the manual position upon completion of the testing. The manual operation of the damper is infrequently performed and not covered by a procedure. In addition, the operator training program does not provide training on this feature.

**4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)**

Troubleshooting by on shift Operations and Maintenance personnel determined that the handwheel on the operator for damper 2-VS-MOD-201B was depressed for manual operation which prevented the

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