

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-237/92004(DRSS); 50-249/92004(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249

Licenses No. DPK-19; DPR-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: March 4-5 and 9-10, 1992

Inspector: Terry J. Madada
T. J. Madada
Physical Security Inspector

3/19/92
Date

Approved By: James R. Creed, Chief
James R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

3/19/92
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 4-5 and 9-10, 1992 (Reports No. 50-237/92004(DRSS); 50-249/92004(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced physical security inspection involving: Management Support; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Power Supply; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; Security Training and Qualification; and followup on a previously identified inspection finding, and a review of information received by Region III regarding sleeping of security officers on the night shift.

Results: No violations or NRC requirements were noted. The reviewed information concerning sleeping security officers was not substantiated.

Inspection results concluded that the licensee's performance continues to be effective in implementing the site security program. Specifically, senior plant management continued to show strong support for the security program as evidenced by short and long term planning involving equipment upgrades and personnel allocation. Security force management at the licensee and contractor level was effective in assuring program implementation. Licensee security personnel at the site and corporate level continue to have a strong working relationship. Security equipment was operating in an adequate and reliable manner. Security staffing at the licensee and contractor level was ample to meet security program requirements.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the Exit Interview conducted on March 10, 1992.

- *C. Schroeder, Station Manager
- *F. Kanwischer, Services Director
- *T. Josefik, Station Security Administrator
- *B. Saunders, Corporate Security Administrator
- *E. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance
- *D. Saccomando, Nuclear Licensing
- *E. Mayer, NQP Inspection
- *D. Koehn, District Manager, Burns International Security Services, Inc.
- *V. Gengler, Security Force Manager, Burns International Security Services, Inc.

- W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC
- *M. Peck, Resident Inspector, USNRC
- *K. Shembarger, Reactor Engineer, USNRC

2. Followup on a Previous Inspection Finding (IP 92702)

(Closed) Violation, Severity Level IV (Report Nos. 50-237/91019-01; 50-249/91019-01):

This violation was described in Section 5 of the above report and related to security's failure to search a package prior to admittance to the protected area. The failure was attributed to procedural ambiguities and a lack of communication between security officers to assure adequate package control. When identified, the licensee modified two security procedures (SPO 4 and 5) to remove ambiguities. In addition, security management committed to provide overview to assure proper searching techniques. No reply was necessary to this violation.

Current inspection verified the adequacy of package search requirements. The inspector observed package search activities, conducted interviews of security officers regarding package search techniques, and observed supervisory activities relating to package search overview. No problems were noted. This item is closed.

3. Entrance and Exit Interviews

- a. At the beginning of the inspection, the Station Security Administrator was informed of the purpose of this visit and the functional areas to be examined.
- b. The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 10, 1992.

A general description of the scope of the inspection was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview. The details of each finding discussed are referenced, as noted, in this report. Included below is a statement provided by or describing licensee management's response to each finding.

- (1) No violations or open items were identified and licensee representatives were advised that one previously identified inspection finding was closed based on our review of licensee corrective action. (Refer to Section 2)
- (2) Inspection activities identified positive licensee action in the areas of management support, quality of security management personnel and security staffing levels. Security equipment was operating in an adequate manner.
- (3) Licensee management was informed that information received by Region III regarding security officers sleeping on the night shift was reviewed. The concern was not substantiated. (Refer to report attachment for further details)

4. Program Areas Inspected (MC 0610):

Listed below are the areas which were examined by the inspector within the scope of these inspection activities in which no violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified. These areas were reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified "Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of the applicable NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) and the licensee's approved security plan. Only those areas in which findings were identified are discussed in subsequent report sections. Sampling reviews included interviews, observations, testing of equipment, document reviews and at times drills or exercises that provide independent verification of your ability to meet security commitments. The depth and scope of activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the program area and operational status of the security system.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Program Area and Inspection Requirements Reviewed</u>
81700	<u>Physical Security Program for Power Reactors</u>
a.	<u>Management Support:</u> (01a) Degree of Management Support;
b.	<u>Protected and Vital Area Barriers:</u> (02a) PA and VA Barriers Meet Commitments and Provided Required Penetration Resistance; (02b) Isolation Zones Adequately Maintained; (02c) Detection Aids Functionally Effective, Meet Commitments, and no Vulnerabilities to Avoid Detection; (02d) Assessment Aids Functional and Meet Commitments.
c.	<u>Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles:</u> (03a) Positive Access Control to include: Proper Identification; Required Personnel Screening Completed; Adequate Search Upon Entering PA; Badges Displayed;

Visitors Escorted; Emergency Access to Vital Equipment;
VA Access is Duty Related; (03b) Packages Searched and
Properly Authorized; Controls for Containment Access;
(03c) Vehicles Properly Authorized, Searched, and
Controlled; Access to Vehicle Gates Controlled.

- d. Alarm Stations and Communications: (04a) Alarm Stations Adequately Equipped with Alarm, Surveillance, and Communications; Continuously Manned and Independent Functioning Capability; (04b) No CAS Interfering Operational Activities; (04c) Alarm Stations Have Continuous Communication Capability with Guards and LLEA.
- e. Power Supply: (05a) Secondary Power Source for Alarm and Communication System.
- f. Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures: (06b) Compensatory Measures Implemented and Effective.
- g. Training and Qualification: (07a) Officers Trained Equipped, and Qualified; (07b) Officers Possess Adequate Knowledge and Ability to Perform Duties; (07c) Responses are Consistent with Plans and Procedure Requirements; Safeguards Capabilities in SCP are Available, Effective, and Functional; (07d) Required Armed Response and Supervisor(s) Available.

5. Concern Review (Closed) AMS No. RIII-92-A-0003

Concern: Six security officers were suspended pending licensee investigation results regarding officers sleeping on the night shift. (Note: The licensee investigation reportedly took place in June 1991. NRC was made aware of this issue on January 6, 1992.)

NRC Review: Our review included interviews with the licensee's Station Security Administrator, the contractor security manager, and several security officers assigned to the night shift (10:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m.). A selective review of records showed that the site contract security agency (Burns International Security Services, Inc.) had conducted an investigation between June and July 1991, of alleged sleeping of a security officer on the midnight shift.

On the morning of June 26, 1991, the contract security assistant site security force manager received information from a named security officer that a security officer (name unknown) on the midnight shift was found sleeping on post and everyone on the shift knew about the incident. The licensee was notified and a investigation was immediately initiated.

Between June 26 and July 1, 1991, senior onsite security contractor personnel conducted an investigation into the concern. The investigation included interviews of all midnight shift and recent former midnight shift security personnel. During these interviews one security officer stated that he/she observed a security officer sleeping in April 1991. However,

when the officer was approached, the officer became alert. The accused officer was interviewed and stated that his head was down and the perception could have been he was asleep. Investigation results did not substantiate that the officer was asleep.

The contractor's investigation identified no further incidents involving security officers sleeping. However, the investigation did identify that the officer involved in the identification of the event failed to report the incident to security supervision. Apparently, the officer told only other officers of the incident. Two security supervisors became aware of the alleged sleeping incident through one of these officers. The two supervisors were interviewed. Both acknowledged hearing of the incident, but concluded it was a rumor, and did not investigate or report the incident.

Contractor procedures required security officers to report any unusual occurrences to their supervisors and supervisors are required to investigate the event and document the results.

The inspector confirmed that six members of the security force were suspended pending completion of the investigation. Subsequent to the investigation, all six individuals were reinstated and two security supervisors were demoted one rank for failing to investigate an event and several security officers received written warning for untimely notification of a possible inattention to duty incident.

Conclusion: Based on interviews and a review of records, the concern that security officers on the night shift were sleeping was not substantiated. It was substantiated that six officers were suspended pending completion of the contractor's investigation. No regulatory issues were identified. This issue is closed.