

Report No. 50-454/84-48(DRS)

Docket No. 50-454

License No. CPPR-130

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: July 13, 16, and 17, 1984.

Inspector: *P. D. Kaufman*
P. D. Kaufman

7/27/84
Date

Approved By: *D. H. Danielson*
D. H. Danielson, Chief
Materials & Processes Section

7/27/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 13, 16, 17, 1984 (Report No. 50-454/84-48(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced safety inspection to followup on previous inspection findings in the area of testing of pipe support and restraint systems. The inspection involved a total of 16 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)

R. E. Querio, Station Superintendent
M. E. Lohman, Assistant Construction Superintendent
*R. C. Ward, Assistant Superintendent, Administrative and Support Services
*R. J. Poche, Technical Staff Engineer
E. E. Falb, Shift Overview Superintendent
*B. L. Koehler, Technical Staff Engineer
*D. St. Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor
*L. M. Johnson, QA Engineer
*R. Gruber, QA Engineer

Hunter Corporation (Hunter)

M. L. Somsag, QA Supervisor
L. E. Hadick, QC Supervisor
B. Tucker, Assistant QC Supervisor
T. Young, Hanger Engineer
R. Fry, Lead Auditor

*Denotes those attending the exit meeting on July 17, 1984.

2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items

- a. (Closed) Noncompliance (454/83-33-01): - Licensee failure to observe, record, and write a deficiency that was observed during performance of preoperational Thermal Expansion Test Procedure EM 2.028.10, Revision 2. The procedure listed support 1SI24008R as a rigid support, which was actually a snubber. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response, dated September 26, 1983, and verified that the support number was corrected in Revision 3 to this test procedure. The inspector concluded that the licensee's response and revision to the test procedure are acceptable.
- b. (Closed) Open Item (454/83-33-03): - During a previous inspection it was identified that the licensee had checked variable spring hangers only to verify that the springs are not bottomed or topped out. Specifically, the licensee does not verify that the spring hangers are in the manufacturers recommended range of movement or are within tolerance at the design hot load setting. The NRC tentatively accepted the licensee's position in a conference call on July 13, 1983, pending a review of the licensee's evaluation and/or analysis of the thermal expansion test data results. The engineering evaluations to Thermal Expansion Test EM 2.028.10 were reviewed by the NRC inspector. The following two spring hangers 1SD-21-030V and 1SD-23-083V had deficiencies issued against them for bottomed out springs. The deficiencies were resolved by a field engineering inspection, which found the hangers were low off scale but not

bottomed out. The spring can positions were within Sargent and Lundy's design drawing M-919 tolerances. The inspector determined that the test evaluations supported the "acceptability of the licensee's response," with regard to spring can settings.

- c. (Closed) Open Item (454/83-33-04): This item deals with the accuracy of FSAR, Section 3.7.3.3.2, with regard to organizational responsibility for design and analysis of Seismic Category I safety-related piping. In Amendment 43 (September 1983) to the FSAR the licensee did revise FSAR, Section 3.7.3.3.2, to clarify Seismic Category I piping design responsibility. The inspector had no further questions.
- d. (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/83-33-05): During a previous inspection variable spring support 1CV11012V appeared to be incorrectly cold set and not identified during the ambient condition baseline inspection for Thermal Expansion Test Procedure EM 2.028.10. The inspector concurred with the licensee, that proper cold setting verification of spring cans is not within the scope of the EM 2.028.10 test. However, such supports are verified as being set to the appropriate cold loads, per their applicable ECN's during the "Type 4" QC inspections. The inspector field verified that support 1CV11012V was correctly cold set to ECN-48578. The "Type 4" inspection to ECN-48578 was performed and signed off by QC on November 17, 1983.
- e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/83-33-06): This item concerns snubber 1CV11019S, which appeared to be incorrectly set at the cold load setting. In addition, a weld joint did not appear to be in accordance with the pipe support drawing. The inspector reviewed ECN-790, which required a cold setting of 7/8 inch, and ECN-48579 which modified the weld joint configuration. The inspector determined the as-installed pipe support installation was in accordance with the above ECN's.
- f. (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/83-33-07): This item deals with loss of fluid from eight steam generator snubbers, and as to whether this problem was correctly reviewed for reportability and evaluated for acceptability of performing the Hot Functional Test. The inspector reviewed deficiency 4348, dated April 14, 1983, which properly identified and addressed the steam generator snubber concerns. An evaluation to the above deficiency was performed on May 20, 1983, by the licensee's Project Engineering Staff and stated that the appreciable hydraulic fluid leakage would not affect the Hot Functional Testing. This fluid leakage problem is also addressed in Region III Inspection Report No. 50-454/83-20, 50-454/83-17. A potential deficiency reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) was called in to the Region III office on June 28, 1984, concerning these snubbers, which failed an ITT Grinnell functional test.

- g. (Closed) Open Item (454/83-33-08): This item concerns water leakage on mechanical snubbers 1CV11010S and 1CV11011S. Manual stroke testing should be done prior to plant startup to verify freedom of movement and functionally tested at the first refueling outage. The manual stroke testing was performed and signed off by QC during the "Type 4" inspections dated October 3, 1983. Both snubbers are being tracked by AIR No. 6-83-056, so as to include these snubbers in the functional test sample at the first refueling outage.
- h. (Closed) Open Item (454/83-33-09): During a previous inspection it was pointed out that the licensee should submit their program for stroke testing mechanical snubbers to the NRC for review with justification of any snubbers exempted from testing. The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised response to question Q 110.63 in the FSAR. Amendment 43 (September 1983) to the FSAR requires only mechanical snubbers size 10 or smaller to be stroked 6 months prior to fuel load. The inspector considers this issue closed, since Amendment 43 (September 1983) has been accepted by NRR.
- i. (Closed) Open Item (454/83-33-02): This item deals with NRC's acceptability of the licensee's response to Q110.37 and Q110.63 in FSAR Amendment 42, dated May 1983. The inspector in reviewing Supplement 3 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) surmised the NRC's acceptance of the licensee's response to Q110.63 (Amendment 42) was considered addressed and closed in Supplement 1 of the SER. The inspector determined the licensee's response to Q110.37 (Amendment 42) was addressed and acceptable in the original SER.

3. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on July 17, 1984.