



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

November 13, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of )  
Tennessee Valley Authority )

Docket Nos. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE  
DPR-77 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-09

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the breaching of a Unit 1 auxiliary building mechanical sleeve and five fire doors. The fire barriers were intentionally removed from service to facilitate the inspection of tubing inside the mechanical sleeve and to perform a surveillance instruction that required the breaching of the fire doors. The fire barriers were nonfunctional for a time period greater than allowed by TSs.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone S. D. Gilley at (423) 843-7427.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell  
Site Licensing Manager  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

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## ENCLOSURE

### SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 95-09

#### I. Auxiliary Building Mechanical Sleeve Penetration Breach

##### Description of Condition

On October 6, 1995, the auxiliary building mechanical sleeve, Mark No. 422F, on Elevation 690 was breached in order to inspect the tubing inside the sleeve. This inspection was to determine how the tubing was routed and to facilitate the subsequent removal of two of the four tubing assemblies as part of a modification. The attempt to reseal the sleeve failed and resulted in the sleeve being breached beyond the 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO).

##### Cause of Condition

The tubing inside the penetration was crossed, and the sealant was removed from the sleeve to trace the lines and verify that the proper lines were identified for isolation. After the lines were traced, they were isolated to facilitate subsequent removal as part of a modification. Following the removal of two of the tubes, sealant was applied to the penetration to reestablish the fire barrier. Following the 24-hour cure time, the seal was inspected and failed to meet the acceptance criteria for cell structure. As a result, this breach exceeded the seven days allowed by TSs.

##### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS.3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch was maintained until the fire barrier was reestablished. The unacceptable seal material was removed, and sealant was reapplied and was determined to meet the acceptance criteria on November 6, 1995.

#### II. Fire Door Breaches

##### Description of Condition

On October 26, 1995, with Unit 1 in a refueling outage, five fire doors were intentionally breached to support preplanned outage activities. The doors were breached by routing instrumentation cables through the doorways. The breached doors are: A-25 (Room A-6, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room); A-26

(Room A-7, pipe gallery); A-138 (Room A-25, Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A); A-139 (Room A-26, Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B); and A-140 (Room A-1, auxiliary control room).

The penetration fire barriers have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

#### Cause of Condition

The fire doors were breached to route instrumentation cables that are required for the performance of a surveillance instruction (SI) associated with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The SI cannot be performed until adequate steam output is available to support equipment operation after the unit is in Mode 3 operation. The fire doors were breached just before Mode 3 entry for the installation of test equipment and SI performance. However, as a result of problems experienced with reactor coolant pumps, the unit was returned to Mode 5 before the SI was completed. This caused a delay in completing the SI and resulted in the fire door being breached beyond the 7-day timeframe. The test instrumentation and associated cables were not disconnected to restore the fire barriers because of the complexity of the test configuration and the time required to install the test equipment.

#### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS.3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch was maintained until the fire barriers were reestablished. The fire barriers were reestablished on November 7, 1995, after Mode 3 was entered and the associated SI was completed.