



July 21, 1995 NG-95-2301

Mr. Hubert J. Miller Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532

Subject:

Duane Arnold Energy Center

Docket No: 50-331
Op. License No: DPR-49

Licensee Event Report #95-006.

File:

A-118a

## Gentlemen:

Please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73. There are no new commitments associated with this report.

Sincerely,

Gary VanMiddlesworth

Plant Superintendent - Nuclear

cc:

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Document Control Desk

Hay Van Middlemood

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mail Station P1-37

Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

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On 25, 1995, the plant was operating at 100% power when a Primary Containment Iso. on System (PCIS) Group III ('B' side) isolation occurred along with the initiation of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System. Investigation of the isolation determined that a fuse in the power supply to the 'B' fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor had blown, causing the monitor (Group III PCIS input) to fail downscale. All automatic actions (primary and secondary containment isolations) were completed satisfactorily, and all systems functioned as required. Following repair of the power supply and replacement of the fuse, the isolation was reset.

The cause of the Group III isolation was loss of power to the 'B' fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor. On a loss of power, the monitor defaults to the tripped condition. Investigation into the cause of the blown fuse revealed that a capacitor across the input to the power supply voltage regulator had shorted causing the fuse to blow. The failed capacitor and fuse were replaced and the power supply and monitor were returned to service.

This event had no effect on the safe operation of the plant.

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NRC FORM 366A (4-95)	U.S. NUC		APPROVED BY	DMB NO. 31	50-0104	
Lic	ENSEE EVENT REPORT					
F/	FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMB			LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Duane Arnold	Energy Center	05000-331	95	006	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of MRC Form 366A) (17)

#### I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On June 25, 1995 at 18:13 hours, the plant was operating at 100% power when a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group III ('B' wide) isolation occurred along with the initiation of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System. All automatic actions (Primary and Secondary Containment Isolations) were completed satisfactorily, and all systems functioned as required. Investigation into the cause of the blown fuse revealed that a capacitor across the input to the power supply voltage regulator had shorted. The failed capacitor and fuse were replaced and the power supply and monitor returned to service. At 14:02 hours on June 26, 1995 the isolation was reset.

#### II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the Group III isolation was loss of power to the 'B' fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor. On a loss of power, the monitor defaults to the tripped condition. Investigation into the cause for the shorted capacitor did not identify any conditions which would have caused it to fail. No breakers tripped and no other electrical malfunctions occurred. At the time of the event, there were no ongoing maintenance or surveillance activities that could have affected this equipment.

# III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event had no effect on the safe operation of the plant. The Group III isolation functioned as designed in response to the trip signal received from the 'B' fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor. Had this event occurred under different plant conditions, the effect on safe operation would have been the same.

## IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective actions were to determine the cause for the isolation. Following determination that the Group III isolation was caused by a failed power supply and not a radiation release, the power supply was repaired. At 14:02 hours on June 26, 1995 the isolation was reset.

The capacitor (50 V, 500 microfarad, electrolytic located in the voltage regulator circuit of the -24 VDC power supply) which failed was the correct size and type as indicated by the vendor drawing. A review of the maintenance history for this power supply showed that the capacitor was replaced in 1988 as part of corrective maintenance to fix a "drifting output" problem.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. MUCLEAR REGULATO (4-95)	APPROVED BY CMB NO. 3150-0104					
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The capacitor failure is considered a random unpredictable failure. The failure of this capacitor results in the conservative actuation of a safety system. For these reasons, no further actions are considered necessary.

The Duane Arnold Energy Center currently has a program which is evaluating the useful service life of electrolytic capacitors in critical components and equipment. The results of this avaluation have been provided to that program.

## V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

### A) PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A similar event occurred in 1991 when a fuse failed in the 'A' side fuel pool exhaust radiation monitor. No reason for the fuse failure was found at that time. (LER 91-006)

### B) EIIS SYSTEM AND COMPONENT CODES

Systems: JM Containment Isolation Control System

Emergency Standby Gas Treatment System

Low Vultage Power System - Class 1E

Components: ED-CAP Capacitor