

March 17, 1992

JGH

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE -- PNO-IV-92-14B

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region IV staff on this date.

FACILITY: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. Wolf Creek Generating Station Docket: 50-482	Licensee Emergency Classification: <input type="checkbox"/> Notification of Unusual Event <input type="checkbox"/> Alert <input type="checkbox"/> Site Area Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> General Emergency <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
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SUBJECT: FORCED OUTAGE TO EXCEED 72 HOURS (SECOND UPDATE)

This preliminary notification updates information provided in Preliminary Notification PNO-IV-92-14A, dated March 5, 1992, that provided information of the licensee's ongoing investigation of the February 28, 1992, "noise" event.

At 7:20 p.m. (CST) on March 16, 1992, with the plant operating in Mode 3 (reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature were 2237 psig and 551°F, respectively), a noise that was similar to the noise that was heard and sensed on February 28, 1992, occurred. The plant was being heated up to normal operating temperature and pressure in order to obtain field measurements and other data in accordance with the licensee's monitoring plan that was established to identify the cause of the February 28, 1992, "noise" event. Seismic monitor and loose parts monitor (LPM) alarms similar to those on February 28, 1992, were received. Several people who were inside the containment performing monitoring activities heard the noise.

The licensee originally postulated three potential sources of the noise; however, after performing monitoring of various parameters and measurements of RCS piping restraint clearances at established RCS pressure and temperature plateaus, the licensee concluded that the most likely cause of the noise is a thermal expansion event that is occurring as the result of binding of primary system supports. An NRC special inspection began on March 6, 1992, and is ongoing; however, the team is currently performing in-office inspection activities. The senior resident inspector was onsite at the time of the event and provided prompt onsite coverage. Previous results of the licensee's monitoring program revealed that the saddle blocks associated with RCS crossover piping restraints (pipe whip restraints) and reactor coolant pump tie rods had the potential for interference. In addition, the licensee found that the vertical drop restraints which are attached to RCS piping under Steam Generators A and C had dropped approximately 6 inches and have come into contact with other structural supports. These vertical drop restraints were repositioned on March 15, 1992. The licensee's investigation as to why the restraints were not in their proper position is ongoing.

As of 10 a.m. (CST) on March 17, 1992, the plant was stable in Mode 3, and the licensee was evaluating the data that were gathered following the event. The sources of this data include pressure and temperature measurements associated with the safety injection accumulator discharge check valves, seismic monitor data, LPM sensor data (all 12 channels were being continuously monitored), interviews of personnel, system walkdowns, and field measurements of various supports. Preliminary review of the data revealed that several displacement

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lanyards indicated a step change in displacement indication following the event. A review of seismic monitor data revealed that the magnitude of the event was approximately one half of the February 28, 1992, event. No damage to systems, structures, or components was identified following the event; however, three snubbers (two on the B safety injection line and one on the B RCS loop) were found to be in hard contact with insulation. The licensee plans to stay in Mode 3 until the available data is fully evaluated. The evaluation of this data is expected to be completed within the next one to two days. Region IV will determine what additional inspection followup is necessary after licensee evaluation of this data is completed. A technical meeting, open to public observation, is planned to be held with the licensee prior to plant restart.

The licensee has been issuing press releases on a periodic basis and has issued a press release for the March 16, 1992, event. The NRC is continuing to respond to media and other public inquiries.

The state of Kansas is being updated on the status of this event on a periodic basis.

Region IV received updated information pertaining to this event during a conference call with licensee personnel and members of the NRR and EDO staff at 10 a.m. (CST) on March 17, 1992.

CONTACT: A. T. Howell FTs 728-8180

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