

Enclosure 4

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Request to Revise Technical Specifications:

Page Change Instructions and Revised TS Pages

Unit 1 TS

<u>Page</u>	<u>Instruction</u>
1.1-3	Replace
3.6-2	Replace
3.6-7	Replace
3.6-14	Replace
5.0-16	Replace
5.0-16a	Add
5.0-16b	Add

Unit 2 TS

<u>Page</u>	<u>Instruction</u>
1.1-3	Replace
3.6-2	Replace
3.6-7	Replace
3.6-14	Replace
3.6-15	Replace
5.0-16	Replace
5.0-16a	Add
5.0-16b	Add

1.1 Definitions

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131
(continued)

ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

END OF CYCLE
RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP
(EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE
TIME

The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE

All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE

Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing, in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.</p>	<p>18 months</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>-----NOTE----- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass -----</p> <p>9 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.1 -----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. <p>-----</p> <p>Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.2 -----NOTE-----</p> <p>Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.</p>	<p>184 days</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.3.6	Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is ≥ 3 seconds and ≤ 5 seconds.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.1.3.7	Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.8	Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.9	Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.1.3.10	Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is ≤ 11.5 scfh when tested at ≥ 28.0 psig.	In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

(continued)

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

- a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:
 1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or
 2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
- c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

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5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program (continued)

- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 49.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests;
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
- 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$,
 - 2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_a$ when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

(continued)

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

1.1 Definitions

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 (continued)	ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE TIME	The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME	The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.
ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME	The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing, in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.</p>	<p>18 months</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>-----NOTE----- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass -----</p> <p>9 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.1 -----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. <p>-----</p> <p>Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.2 -----NOTE-----</p> <p>Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.</p>	<p>184 days</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.3.6	Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is ≥ 3 seconds and ≤ 5 seconds.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.1.3.7	Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.8	Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.9	Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP System.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.1.3.10	Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is $\leq 0.009 L_a$ when pressurized to $\geq P_a$.	In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is ≤ 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage ≤ 250 scfh for all four main steam lines, when tested at ≥ 28.8 psig.</p> <p>However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be ≤ 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.12 Replace the valve seat of each 18 inch purge valve having a resilient material seat.</p>	<p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.</p>	<p>18 months</p>

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

- a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:
 1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or
 2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
- c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

(continued) |

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program (continued)

- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 45.5 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests;
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
- 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\leq P_a$,
 - 2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_a$ when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

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5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

1.1 Definitions

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131
(continued)

ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

END OF CYCLE
RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP
(EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE
TIME

The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

X

~~The Maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , shall be 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day at the calculated peak containment pressure (P_a).~~

LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or
2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE

All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE

Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE;

(continued)

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p>	<p>NOTE SR 3.0.2 is not applicable</p>
<p>The leakage rate acceptance criteria is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. However, during the first unit startup following testing performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, the leakage rate acceptance criteria is $< 0.6 L_a$ for the Type B and Type C tests and $< 0.75 L_a$ for the Type A test.</p>	<p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.</p>	<p>18 months</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>-----NOTE----- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass</p> <p>-----</p> <p>9 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.1 -----NOTES-----</p> <p>1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.</p> <p>2. Results shall be <u>applicable to</u> evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p> <p>The acceptance criteria for air lock testing are:</p> <p>a. Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_s$ when tested at $\geq P_o$.</p> <p>b. For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_s$ when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.</p>	<p>the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p> <p>-----NOTE----- SR 3.0.2 is not applicable</p> <p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.2 -----NOTE-----</p> <p>Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.</p>	<p>184 days</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is ≥ 3 seconds and ≤ 5 seconds.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is ≤ 11.5 scfh when tested at ≥ 28.0 psig.	<div style="border: 1px dashed black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p>NOTE SR 3.0.2 is not applicable.</p> </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 10px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <p>the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</p> </div> <p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>

(continued)

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

- a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:
 1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or
 2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
- c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.
- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 Insert

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 49.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests:
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.
 - 2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_a$ when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

1.1 Definitions

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131
(continued)

ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE
TIME

The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE
RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP
(EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE
TIME

The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from initial signal generation by the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

ISOLATION SYSTEM
RESPONSE TIME

The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

X

~~The Maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , shall be 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day at the calculated peak containment pressure (P_a).~~

(continued)

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing except for primary containment air lock testing, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p>	<p>NOTE SR 3.6.2 is not applicable</p>
<p>The leakage rate acceptance criteria is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. However, during the first unit startup following testing performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, the leakage rate acceptance criteria is $< 0.8 L_a$ for the Type B and Type C tests and $< 0.75 L_a$ for the Type A test.</p>	<p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of 1 psid.</p>	<p>18 months <u>AND</u> -----NOTE----- Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass ----- 9 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.1</p> <p>-----NOTES-----</p> <p>1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. <i>applicable to</i></p> <p>2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1 <i>the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</i> in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Perform required primary containment air lock leakage rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions.</p> <p>The acceptance criteria for air lock testing are:</p> <p>a. Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L$, when tested at $\geq P$.</p> <p>b. For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.1 L$, when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.</p>	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>SR 3.0.2 is not applicable</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.2.2</p> <p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify only one door in the primary containment air lock can be opened at a time.</p>	<p>184 days</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is ≥ 3 seconds and ≤ 5 seconds.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.	18 months
SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP System.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is $\leq 0.009 L_a$ when pressurized to $\geq P_a$.	<p>NOTE SR 3.6.2 is not applicable.</p> <p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is ≤ 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage ≤ 250 scfh for all four main steam lines, when tested at ≤ 28.8 psig.</p> <p>However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be ≤ 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.</p>	<p>NOTE SR 3.0.2 is not applicable.</p> <p>In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.12 Replace the valve seat of each 18 inch purge valve having a resilient material seat.</p>	<p><i>the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program</i></p> <p>18 months</p>
<p>SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.</p>	<p>18 months</p>

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

- a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:
 1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or
 2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
- c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.
- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 Insert

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 45.5 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests:
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.
 - 2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_a$ when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to ≥ 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Enclosure 5

**Edwin L. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Request to Revise Technical Specifications:**

Bases Changes

BASES

SR 3.0.2
(continued)

(e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulations is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3

SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay

(continued)

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock"; and
- c. All equipment hatches are closed.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 49.6 psig (Ref. 1).

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO

Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq L_a$, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5) leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref. 6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref. 8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $1.0 L_a$. At $1.0 L_a$, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.
 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
 5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.
 7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Revision 0, July 26, 1995.
 8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," 1994.
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BASES

BACKGROUND (continued) containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the calculated design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 49.6 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3). This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage.

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.5.
 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.
 3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 4), the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. For Core Spray and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, leakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.8

This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.9

The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10

The analyses in References 1 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be ≤ 11.5 scfh when tested at ≥ 28.0 psig.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 6).

SR 3.6.1.3.11

The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.12

The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.4.
 2. Technical Requirements Manual
 3. FSAR, Section 5.2.
 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
 5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
 6. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
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BASES

SR 3.0.2 (continued) (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulations is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay

(continued)

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock"; and
- c. All equipment hatches are closed.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 1).

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO

Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq L_a$, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5) leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), secondary containment bypass leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), or main steam isolation valve

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.11) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref. 6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref. 8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $1.0 L_a$. At $1.0 L_a$, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.
 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
 5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.
 7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Revision 0, July 26, 1995.
 8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," 1994.
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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the calculated design basis LOCA maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO

As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3). This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage rate.

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 3.8.2.8.2.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. |
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 5), the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. For Core Spray and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, leakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 7).

SR 3.6.1.3.11

The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be ≤ 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage ≤ 250 scfh for all four main steam lines when tested at ≥ 28.8 psig. In addition, if any MSIV exceeds the 100 scfh limit, the as left leakage shall be ≤ 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.12

The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.13

The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 15.
 2. Technical Requirements Manual.
 3. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.
 4. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. |
 6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
 7. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. |
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BASES

SR 3.0.2 (continued) (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. ~~An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions."~~ The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. ~~The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interval specified in the regulations. Therefore, there is a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."~~

See insert

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay

(continued)

INSERT FOR B 3.0-12

Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulation is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock"; and
- c. All equipment hatches are closed.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

Option B

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_p) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the maximum peak containment pressure (P_p) of 49.6 psig (Ref. 1). *design basis LOCA*

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

Primary Containment leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5)

LCO

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Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to ~~less than L_p~~ , except prior to the first startup after performing a required ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J~~, leakage test. At this time, ~~the combined Type B and C leakage must be $< 0.6 L_p$, and the overall Type A leakage must be $< 0.75 L_p$~~ . Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Programs

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as ~~modified by approved exemptions~~. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), does not necessarily result

(continued)

BASES

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions (Ref. 3).~~ ~~As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage test is required to be $< 0.6 L_a$ for combined Type B and C leakage, and < 0.75 for overall Type A leakage.~~ At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of $1.0 L_a$. At $1.0 L_a$, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

See Insert

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once

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INSERT For B 3.6-4, SR 3.6.1.1.1

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref.6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref.8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

HATCH UNIT 1

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.
 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. *Option B*
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.
 7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J." Revision 0. July 26, 1995.
 8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements." 1994.

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 49.6 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

design basis
LOCA

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO

As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3).

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage ~~rate~~.

of applicable to

Combined Type Band C

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.5.
 2. FSAR, Section 5.2.
 3. ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J~~. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
-

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing.

Option B
(Ref. 4)

Option B

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing.

Option B,

Option B,

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table 17.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing. For Core Spray and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

Option B,

[Redacted text block]

Option B,

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.8

This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.9

The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10

The analyses in References 1 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be ≤ 11.5 scfh when tested at ≥ 28.0 psig. ~~The MSIV leakage rate must be verified to be in accordance with the leakage test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 4), as modified by approved exemptions. This ensures that MSIV leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.~~

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 6).

The Frequency is required by ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions; thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.~~

SR 3.6.1.3.11

The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.12

The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.4.
2. Technical Requirements Manual
3. FSAR, Section 5.2.
4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. *Option B*
5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
6. *Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.*

BASES

SR 3.0.2 (continued) (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. ~~An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions."~~ The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. ~~The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interval specified in the regulations. Therefore, there is a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."~~

See insert

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay

(continued)

INSERT FOR B 3.0-12

Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulation is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or
 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock"; and
- c. All equipment hatches are closed.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

Option B,

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_0) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the maximum peak containment pressure (P_0) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 1). *design basis LOCA*

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5)

LCO

≤

Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to ~~less than L_0~~ , except prior to the first startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, leakage test. At this time, ~~the combined Type B and C leakage must be $< 0.6 L_0$, and the overall Type A leakage must be $< 0.75 L_0$~~ . Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 8), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), secondary containment bypass leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), or main steam isolation valve

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.11) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions (Ref. 3).~~ As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage test is required to be ~~< 0.6 L_e for combined Type B and C leakage, and < 0.75 for overall Type A leakage.~~ At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of 1.0 L_e. At 1.0 L_e, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

See insert

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once

(continued)

INSERT FOR B 3.6-4, SR 3.6.1.1.1

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref.6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref.8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

HATCH UNIT 2

BASES


SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J *Option B.*
4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

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5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 6. Regulatory Guide 1.163. "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program." September 1995.
 7. NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J." Revision 0. July 26, 1995.
 8. ANSI/ANS-56.8-1994. "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements." 1994.

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

design basis
LOCA

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO

As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.~~ Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows frequency extensions) does not apply.

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3).

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria ~~if applicable to~~ SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.

if applicable to

combined Type Band C

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 3.8.2.8.2.2.
 2. FSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. ~~10 CFR 50, Appendix J~~ Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
 4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing.

Option B (Ref. 5)

Option B,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time (8 hours for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing.

Option B,

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

D.1

With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate or MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance to the overall containment function.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J testing ("-" in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing. For Core Spray and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

Option B,

Option B,

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. ~~This method of quantifying maximum pathway leakage is only to be used for this SR (i.e., Appendix J maximum pathway leakage limits are to be quantified in accordance with Appendix J). The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions (and therefore, the frequency extensions of SR 3.0.2 may not be applied), since the testing is an Appendix J, Type C test. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.~~

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 7).

SR 3.6.1.3.11

The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be ≤ 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage ≤ 250 scfh for all four main steam lines when tested at ≥ 28.8 psig. In addition, if any MSIV exceeds the 100 scfh limit, the as left leakage shall be ≤ 11.5 scfh for that MSIV. ~~The MSIV leakage rate must be verified to be in accordance with the leakage test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), as modified by approved exemptions. This ensures that MSIV leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.~~

~~The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows frequency extensions) does not apply.~~

the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.12

The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.13

The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter 15.
2. Technical Requirements Manual.
3. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.
4. FSAR, Section 6.2.
5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
6. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

7. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.