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J. L. Wilson
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

March 13, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


In the Matter of)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL REPORT 92-01

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for a period greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable time period. The auxiliary building Fire Door A-111 is damaged and was determined to be beyond repair and must be replaced with a new door. This report is being made in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12. The enclosure contains the details concerning the condition.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8422.

Sincerely,


J. L. Wilson

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief
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This event was discussed with the Radiological Control personnel responsible for transporting C-zone laundry and radioactive waste through the door, and the personnel were cautioned about damaging the door. The lifting lugs were removed from the carts to increase the clearance between the cart sides and door facings. In addition, the possibility of obtaining smaller carts is being explored.

Commitment

A new door was ordered and is expected to be delivered and installed by October 1, 1992.

Enclosure

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SPECIAL REPORT 92-01

Description of Condition

On February 6, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 operating in Mode 1, it was determined that auxiliary building Door A-111 was nonfunctional and could not adequately perform its intended design function as a fire barrier because of physical damage to the door. A work request (WR) was initiated and a breach permit was posted. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was entered at 1027 Eastern standard time. The operability of the fire detection system on one side of the fire barrier was verified and an hourly fire watch patrol was established, as required by LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a). The roving fire watch will remain in effect until the fire door is replaced and the door is returned to service as a fire barrier.

Cause of Event

Fire Door A-111 is a 60-inch-wide, steel double door connecting the radioactive waste packaging area and Elevation 706 of the auxiliary building railroad bay. The door is a fire door and automatically closes and latches. Often the doors are momentarily held open to permit carts to enter and exit the radioactive waste packaging area. At other times, the doors are simply unlatched and the carts are used to push the doors open. The carts that are used to transport radioactive waste to the packaging area through Door A-111 usually weigh 500 to 600 pounds minimum. The cause of the physical damage to the door is unknown; but, because of small physical clearances, it is surmised that carts have repeatedly collided with the door causing irreparable damage to the fire barrier capability of the door.

The cause of the fire door not being returned to functional status within the 7-day timeframe, as specified by technical specifications, was that the damaged door could not be repaired and a new door could not be readily obtained.

Analysis of Event

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of Action Statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12. A roving fire watch was established to inspect the affected area on an hourly basis. The existing fire detection and suppression system for the affected area was determined to be operable and would actuate in the event of a fire. Therefore, there was no danger to plant personnel or equipment.

Corrective Action

A WR was initiated to repair or replace the door and a breach permit was posted. A roving fire watch was established and will remain in effect until the door is returned to operable status. The fire detection and suppression system for the affected area was verified operable. A new door was ordered and is expected to be delivered and installed by October 1, 1992.