

Omaha Public Power District
444 South 16th Street Mall
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247
402/636-2000

March 13, 1992
LIC-92-059S

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Protection Equipment

The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Unit No. 1 Technical Specification (TS) 2.19, "Fire Protection Systems".

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(1) requires that the fire detection zones protecting safety-related areas be operable. With a fire detection zone inoperable, within one hour, an hourly fire watch patrol is to be established to inspect the detection zone with the inoperable instruments. The inoperable fire detection zone must be restored to operable status within 14 days or, failing that, a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

FCS Technical Specification Section 2.19(7) requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, within one hour, either a continuous fire watch is to be established on at least one side of the affected penetration, or the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration is to be verified and an hourly fire watch patrol established. The non-functional penetration must be restored to functional status within seven days or, failing that, a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to TS 5.9.3 is to be prepared and submitted within an additional 30 days.

On February 18, 1992, the fire barrier between Corridor 4 and Room 21 was breached by removal of a floor plug to support installation of a modification. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at the time of the breach and will remain in place until the fire barrier is restored. The fire barrier remains breached at this time. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

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On February 21, 1992, fire detection zone 41 was removed from service due to numerous spurious false alarms caused by a faulty thermistor wire. At the time that the detection zone was removed from service, the appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(1), were in place and will remain in place until the detection zone is restored. Maintenance activities to restore this zone to operability are on-going and Zone 41 is expected to be returned to service by April 6, 1992.

On February 23, 1992, the Containment Equipment Hatch was opened to support on-going 1992 Refueling Outage activities. Appropriate compensatory measures, as required by TS 2.19(7), were instituted at the time of the impairment and will remain in place until the Equipment Hatch is closed. The Equipment Hatch remains open at this time. This impairment will be restored by the end of the 1992 Refueling Outage.

If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

W. G. Gates

W. G. Gates
Division Manager
Nuclear Operations

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