



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 163
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated May 14, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating Licence No. DWR-50, is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as amended through Amendment No. 163, are hereby incorporated in this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

- 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz
 John F. Stolz, Director
 Project Directorate I-2
 Division of Reactor Programs
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ATTACHMENT
 FACILITY
 The following pages of Appendix A are hereby incorporated into this license amendment and contain vertical lines

APPROVE
 2/4 5-15
 2/4 6-16
 2/24 4-3
 2/20 4-4

Attachment:
 Changes to the Technical
 Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 6, 1992


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 163, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 6, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 163

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 6-15

3/4 6-16

B3/4 4-3

B3/4 4-4

Insert

3/4 6-15

3/4 6-16

B3/4 4-3

B3/4 4-4

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 The chemical addition system shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A chemical addition tank containing at least 4700 gallons of between 19.5 and 20 percent by weight NaOH solution, and
- b. Two chemical injection subsystems each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical addition tank to a containment quench spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIONS:

With one chemical addition subsystem inoperable, restore the subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the chemical addition subsystem to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 The chemical addition system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a flow between 25 and 35 gpm when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 6 months by:
 - 1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
 - 2. Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.

- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
 - 1. Cycling each valve in the chemical addition system flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 - 2. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.
 - 3. Verifying that each chemical injection pump starts automatically on a test signal.
 - 4. Verifying that in each subsystem with two chemical injection pumps operating, one pump will stop following closure of the cut back control valve.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems."

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage detection systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limitation restricts operation when the total flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals exceeds 28 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply line fully open at RCS pressures in excess of 2,000 psig. This limitation ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the accident analyses.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 gpm for all steam generators not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 gpm limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Should PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE occur through a component which can be isolated from the balance of the Reactor Coolant System, plant operation may continue provided the leaking component is promptly isolated from the Reactor Coolant System since isolation removes the source of potential failure.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.4.6.3 PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE

The leakage from any RCS pressure isolation valve is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series valve failure. It is apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series valves and when failure of one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required. Since these valves are important in preventing overpressurization and rupture of the ECCS low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA, these valves should be tested periodically to ensure low probability of gross failure.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valve is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant system over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the resulting 2 hour doses at the site boundary will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of Part 100 limits following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady state primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1.0 GPM.



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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 43
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated May 14, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 43 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 6, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 43

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 6-14

Insert

3/4 6-14

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.*
3. Initiating flow through each Service Water subsystem and its two associated recirculation spray heat exchangers, and verifying a flow rate of at least 11,000 gpm.
- f. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

*The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 The chemical addition system shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A chemical addition tank containing at least 8500 gallons of between 23 and 25 percent by weight NaOH solution, and
- b. Two chemical injection subsystems each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical addition tank to a containment quench spray system pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one chemical addition subsystem inoperable, restore the subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the chemical addition subsystem to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 The chemical addition system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. By verifying that on recirculation flow, each injection pump develops a flow between 40 and 60 gpm when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
- c. At least once per 6 months by:
 1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
 2. Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.
- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
 1. Cycling each valve in the chemical addition system flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 2. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a test signal.
 3. Verifying that each chemical injection pump starts automatically on a test signal.