UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

JAN 11 1990

Docket No. 50-423
File No. RI-89-A-0052

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

This letter is in response to the following issues that you discussed with us on April 22 and May 11, 1989:

-- Concrete used to pour the fuel building exterior walls was substandard because of a failed slump test.
-- Concrete for the fuel building was poured with forms missing causing a bulge in an exterior wall.
-- Geologic faults exist under the containment structure.
-- Contamination by radon gas should have been reported by the licensee.

During the construction of Millstone Unit 3, numerous concrete pourings were witnessed by NRC inspectors with no inadequacies identified. A copy of an NRC inspection regarding concrete pouring for the containment structure is included as Attachment 1 for your review. Your specific concern over the acceptability of concrete which failed a slump test was reviewed and determined not significant since a failed slump test does not necessarily infer a reduced concrete structural strength. Final concrete breaking strength is determined through dynamic and static load breaking tests which are independent of the slump test.

Although the pouring of concrete with forms missing is not a good industry practice, the bulge you referred to in the fuel building wall would not reduce the strength of the rebar/concrete. Therefore, this issue is not safety significant and no further action is planned on this item.

The location of geologic faults at the Millstone site have been identified through extensive site drilling and excavation. These faults were documented in the Millstone Unit 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which was reviewed by the NRC. None of the faults were identified as a safety concern due to their age and inactivity. A copy of the chapter in the FSAR that identifies the location of the faults is enclosed for your review as Attachment 2.

Radon gas emissions from granite bedrock that collect in enclosed areas in nuclear power plants, as well as private homes, have long been a source of nuisance radiation alarms at operating nuclear plants. The gas is electrostatically charged and naturally clings to materials of opposite charge, such as polyester clothing. Radon gas from bedrock materials is short lived and decays rapidly, therefore no significant radiation exposure is received by an individual over an eight hour day/forty hour work week. The NRC does not require a licensee to report the contamination of individuals by these naturally occurring radioactive substances.

6/45

[redacted]

JAN 11 1990

The NRC appreciates you informing us of your concerns, and we feel that our actions have been responsive to them. If you have any further questions regarding these matters, you may call me collect at (215) 337-5120.

Sincerely,

Donald R. Haverkamp, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 4A
Division of Reactor Projects

Attachments:
Attachment 1, Inspection Report 81-09
Attachment 2, Millstone Unit 3 FSAR Chapter 2

ATTACHMENT 1

Inspection Report No. 50-423/81-09

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 50-423/81-09

Docket No. 50-423

License No. CPPR-113 Priority -- Category A

Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

P. O. Box 270

Hartford, Connecticut

Facility Name: Millstone, Unit 3

Inspection at: Waterford, Connecticut

Inspection conducted: July 27-31, 1981

Inspectors: for S. K. Chaudhary, Reactor Inspector — 9/9/81 date signed

Approved by: E. E. Tripp, Chief, Materials and Process Section, Engineering Inspection Branch — 9/9/81 date signed

Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 27-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-423/81-09)
Areas Inspected: An unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of the areas of concrete placement, Batch Plant, and design change control of concrete specifications. The inspection involved 37 inspector-hours onsite by one regional based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in two areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in the area of design control - failure to follow procedures.

Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

NUSCO

* R. E. Busch, Project Manager
* K. W. Gray, Supervisor - Construction QA
* R. A. Hastings, Tech A - Construction QA
* D. O. Nordquist, Supervisor - Design and Operations
* S. Orefice, Superintendent - New Site Construction
* T. F. Sullivan, Resident Electrical Engineer

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation

* J. S. Carty, Head SEO
* P. A. Gagel, Program Administrator - QA
  S. Golob, Field Engineer
  J. A. Jenson, SEO Lead Power Engineer
* J. Kappas, Superintendent - Construction
  S. Misenti, FQC Inspector
  W. D. Miller, Field QC
  S. D. Morris, Senior Engineer, FQC
* A. M. Prusi, Resident Engineer
  M. Sinha, Structural Engineer - SEO
* G. G. Turner, Superintendent, FQC
  J. Apostilitise, QFC Batch Plant Inspector
  W. Thompson, FQC Inspector
* F. K. Sullivan, Sr. Resident Engineer

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

* J. C. Mattia, Sr. Resident Inspector

* denotes persons attending exit interview.

2. Plant Tour

The inspector performed a walk-through tour of the plant site to assess general conformance to work procedures and good construction practices in the area of concrete placement, curing, and structural steel erection. The inspector also observed work in progress and preparations for concrete placement of the dome section of the containment exterior wall. Also, the inspector interviewed craft, engineering, and quality control personnel available in the work area. Where more detailed inspection of an area was conducted, the inspection scope and findings are described in other paragraphs of this report.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3. Changes to Concrete Specifications

The inspector reviewed specifications, procedures and Engineering Design and Coordination Reports (E&DCR) applicable to those concrete specifications, and held discussions with cognizant licensee and AE/Constructor personnel. The review of documentation and discussions were to determine the adequacy of the technical requirements specified and control exercised over the changes made in the requirements. The following documents were reviewed:

-- S&W Specification #C-241, May 2, 1973, "Mixing and Delivery of Concrete"

Addenda:
1. November 30, 1973
2. April 19, 1974
3. July 8, 1974
4. December 31, 1974

-- S&W Specification #C-282, April 17, 1974, "Concrete Testing Services"

Addenda:
1. July 10, 1974
2. October 16, 1974
3. December 6, 1974
4. August 19, 1975
5. May 17, 1977

-- S&W Specification #C-999, Revision 2, January 16, 1981, "Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel"

-- S&W Engineering Assurance Procedure, EAP 6.3, Revision 3, "Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of E&DCRs"

-- S&W Engineering Assurance Procedure, EAP 6.5, Revision 0, "Preparation, Review, Approval and Control of Engineering and Design Coordination Reports (E&DCRs) - Computerized Logging and Tracking System"

-- Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, PSAR, Chapter 17, Sections 17.1.1.3, 17.1.2.5 and 17.1.2.6

-- S&W "E&DCR and N&D Specification Change Record" for Specifications 2199-142-999

E&DCRs:

F-S-3257	F-S-2002	P-S-3452
F-S-3059	F-S-193	P-S-2136
F-S-3010	F-S-176	P-S-1932
F-S-2959	F-S-97	P-S-2286
F-S-2216	F-S-91	
F-S-2123	F-S-74	

F-S-4629	F-S-4022	P-S-3307
F-S-4551	F-S-3668	P-S-3302
F-S-4416	F-S-3468	P-S-3278
F-S-4373	P-S-3427	PS-S-1136
F-S-4152	P-S-3385	PS-S-1074
F-S-4081	P-S-3380	PS-S-1004
F-S-4027	P-S-3310	F-S-2683

S&W Computer Log: "Unincorporated E&DCR/VIR Document Changes", July 16, 1981

Based on the review of above records and discussions with cognizant personnel, the inspector determined that the changes to the concrete specifications were controlled by the E&DCR system. However, the inspector also observed that E&DCRs, in many cases, had been issued to change and/or impose further requirements contained in other E&DCRs by reference only. As an example, E&DCR #F-S-2683 was issued for providing concrete repair procedures not contained in Specification C-999. This E&DCR was not required to be incorporated in the specification, and was designated to be "for information only". However, the repair procedure was generic, and was used extensively onsite for concrete repairs. The Specification C-999 was revised in January, 1981, but the requirements of E&DCR F-S-2683 were not incorporated in the specification because the E&DCR was "for information only". On February 24, 1981, another E&DCR PS-S-1004 was initiated to revive the old E&DCR F-S-2683 by reference, because F-S-2683 had become obsolete due to the specification revision. S&W EAP 6.3, Revision 3, and EAP 6.5, Revision 0, which established and controlled the design change system did not provide for such use of E&DCRs. Procedure EAP 6.3, Revision 3, which was applicable at the time of the issuance of E&DCR PS-S-1004 did not provide for such use as incorporating an "information only" E&DCR into the specification by reference. Section 5.0 of EAP 6.3 which described the special uses of E&DCRs provided only for revision and/or cancellation of E&DCRs. It did not provide for reviving an obsolete document by a new E&DCR by reference only.

Furthermore, the same procedure (EAP 6.3, Revision 3, Section 3.0), also requires that changes to specification requirements would be entered in the "E&DCR and N&D Specification Change Record" against the specification. However, the inspector observed that as of July 30, 1981 the "E&DCR and N&D Specification Change Record" for Specification C-999 did not accurately reflect the status of E&DCRs against above specification. Specifically, E&DCRs F-S-2640 and F-S-3374 had been incorporated in the Revision #2 of the Specification C-999 issued in January, 1981; however, the "E&DCR and N&D Specification Change Record" for the above specification listed these two E&DCRs as "open" and still to be incorporated.

The above are examples of violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (81-09-01)

4. Safety Related Concrete Placement

The inspector witnessed the placement of concrete in the exterior wall of containment (Placement #C-3762, Containment Dome, Elev. 116'8" South half) for an independent evaluation of work performance, and to ascertain if the placement activities were being accomplished in accordance with project procedures and applicable codes. In addition to the personal observation of the placement, the following documents were reviewed:

-- S&W Specification C-999, Revision 2, "Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel".

-- S&W Specification C-281, May 2, 1973, "Mixing and Delivery of Concrete" with Addenda 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

-- Concrete Batch Delivery Tickets for the concrete delivered to the placement.

By review of documentation and personal observation, the inspector determined as follows:

a. Forms were properly secured and clean.

b. Rebars and other embedments were properly secured, free of excessive rust and concrete, and proper clearance was maintained.

c. Preplacement inspection was completed before the release of placement.

d. Proper concrete mix was specified on the "pour card" and was delivered at the placement.

e. Duration of concrete mixing/agitation in transport trucks, placing equipment, and required testing of concrete were adequately controlled and met the project procedures.

f. Adequate crew and procedures were used to place and consolidate the concrete in forms. Chutes were utilized to prevent excessive free fall.

g. The inspection at the point of placement was adequate.

Based on the above observations, the inspector determined that the placement of concrete was carried out as required by project procedures and applicable codes. However, the inspector noticed that during the placement of first and second lifts, the lateral movement of concrete due to vibration appeared excessive. The inspector pointed out this problem to the placement QC inspector, and this apparent problem was brought under control.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

5. Concrete Batch Plant Operation

The inspector observed the onsite batch plant operation during production of concrete. By this personal observation, the inspector determined that the concrete aggregates were being drawn from proper aggregate piles, the cement was free flowing and did not have excessive storage time in bins, water, ice, admixtures were properly stored and were dispensed by properly calibrated equipment. There was a S&W batch plant inspector available in the batch plant to observe and verify the plant operation. The inspector also witnessed an air-content test run by batch plant personnel. The test was for information only for the benefit of the batch plant operator.

The inspector also verified that the batch plant scales were calibrated and sealed by the State of Connecticut. This calibration is done on an annual frequency.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6. Status of Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item 423/81-06-02: Pertaining to the bundling of rebars in containment structure. The inspector reviewed the licensees rationale for this design and considered it acceptable. The bundled rebars are hoop reinforcement, and are cadweld spliced as a complete hoop. In hoop reinforcements, bond stresses are not critical, therefore, the item is resolved to the inspector's satisfaction.

7. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted * in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 31, 1981. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of this inspection, and discussed the inspection findings.

ATTACHMENT 2

Millstone Unit 3 FSAR Chapter 2

directly overlying the fault was examined and found to be not disturbed. The largest fault uncovered in this portion of the discharge tunnel consists of three related faults, numbers 2817, 2818, and 2819. Offset of pegmatite veins up to 1.5 feet were
231.3 | observed across 2817 and 2818, whereas no continuity could be determined across 2819 in the width of the excavation. Fault gouge material from 2819 produced a K/Ar age date of 142 million ±6 million years. The zone was filled with undisturbed drusy quartz and also showed no disruption of overlying stratified and unstratified glacial
231.3 | deposits. Faults 2894 and 2899 (NNECo, 1982) show 4-inch and 0.5-inch displacements, respectively, on very narrow fault zones. Displacements on both faults were observed to end within the excavation.

2.5.3.2.1 Petrographic Analysis

Six samples were taken from the T-2 and T-3 fault zones at final excavation grade to determine the geologic history of the faulting. Figures 2.5.3-1 through 2.5.3-3 show the location of these samples. Table 2.5.3-2 lists the samples and gives a general description of each.

Appendix 2.5B includes a report on the petrographic analyses performed by Dr. Reinhard A. Wobus of Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts. The work described herein supplements previous studies performed on these faults (NNECo, 1975) from samples taken at the bedrock surface.

Petrographic analyses of the samples indicate that the fault zones have undergone at least one period of deformation, and possibly more. The cataclasite samples (2F, 5F, 6F, 9F, and 11F) consist mainly of a very fine-grained matrix of subhedral quartz prisms. For the most part, these prisms exhibit no preferred orientation. Chlorite is also common in the matrix, along with some plumose muscovite. The remainder of the cataclasite is made up of quartz, plagioclase, and mica fragments. The fragments indicate that large pieces have undergone some deformation. The quartz crystals are highly strained and the plagioclase twin lamellae have been deformed. All of the larger fragments have been altered and chlorite is present between many of the crystals. Chlorite has replaced the plagioclase in many places, and, where it has not been replaced, the plagioclase has been altered to a highly-birefringent clay (Appendix 2.5B).

Sample 12F is a sample of the Monson Gneiss taken adjacent to the T-3 fault zone. Hand specimens of the gneiss appear to be sheared. The analysis indicates that quartz present in the thin section is very highly strained and that the plagioclase has been altered to highly birefringent clay. Wobus (Appendix 2.5B) classifies this as an altered biotite-quartz-andesine gneiss.

The petrographic analysis by Wobus (Appendix 2.5B) indicates that the material from the two different fault zones, T-2 and T-3, is similar. He has classified the material in the zones as hydrothermally altered

exception of 1F. Table 2.5.3-3 lists the dates of samples previously tested at Millstone. These samples had a range of ages between 168 to 198 m.y.a. Excluding the date from Sample 1F, the average age of faulting from all tests performed on the clay gouge from the Millstone site is 176 m.y.a.

The date on Sample 1F is considerably lower than the other dates. Compared to the other samples taken at final grade, this sample had considerably smaller amounts of the illite fraction (Appendix 2.5C), and a higher ratio of smectite to illite. The smectite may have formed after the gouge material, due to weathering, hydration of the illite, or by hydrothermal alteration. The younger date may reflect the interference of the smectite portion of the sample. As mentioned in Section 2.5.3.2.1, hydrothermal alteration is quite prominent, and the fault zone has been influenced by weathering.

Five samples of gouge were taken from fault 1940 in the engineered safety features building and faults 2282 and 2339 in the Millstone 3 pumphouse. Dr. R. C. Reynolds of Dartmouth College analyzed the clay mineralogy of these samples. His reports are included as Appendix 2.5E.

Large amounts of smectite and little illite were present in the samples (B, C, and D) from fault 1940 which precluded K/Ar dating of the material. Samples P-1 and P-2, taken from faults 2282 and 2339, respectively, were composed mostly of kaolinite with a small percentage of montmorillonite (Appendix 2.5E). A trace of illite was noticed in sample P-2 but neither sample could be dated. |231.3

The form and quantity of the smectite present in the samples from fault 1940 does, however, indicate a probable hydrothermal origin for the material. The kaolinite from the faults in the pumphouse (P-1 and P-2) was found to have a crystalline structure, also indicative of a hydrothermal origin. The date of the last hydrothermal event, as indicated by the studies of faults, T-2 and T-3, is between 168 and 198 m.y.a.

Clay gouge samples from faults 2781 and 2819 (NNECo. 1982) in the discharge tunnel were also analyzed by Dr. R.C. Reynolds. His study indicated the material from fault 2781 was not suitable for age dating, as it comprised mostly original micas from the parent rock. The material from 2819 was found to contain sufficient authigenic illite and was suitable for age dating. It produced a K/Ar age date of 142 million ±6 million years. |231.3

2.5.3.2.3 Conclusions

The K/Ar age dating, petrographic analysis, x-ray diffraction studies, soils mapping, and the detailed mapping of the fault zones indicate that the faults at the Millstone site are incapable features. The petrographic analysis shows that the cataclasite has been silicified and hydrothermally altered, and that the fractures and cracks have been filled with chlorite. Prismatic quartz crystals, drusy quartz, and the silicified cataclasite found in the

Skehan, J. W. 19[illegible]. The Green Mountain Anticlinorium in the Vicinity of Wilmington and Woodford, Vermont. Vermont Development Department, Bull. No. 17, Montpelier, Vt.

Suter, R.; deLaguna, W.; and Perlmutter, N. M. 1949. Mapping of Geologic Formations and Aquifers of Long Island, New York. New York Dept. of Conservation, Water Power and Control, Conn. Bull. GW-18, p 212, Albany, NY.

Sutter, J.F. 1971. K-Ar Relationships in Mylonite Rocks (Abs). A.G.U. Trans., Vol. 52, p. 367-368.

Velde, B. 1965. Experimental Determination of Muscovite Polymorph Stabilities. Amer. Mineral., Vol. 50, p. 436-449.

Yoder, H.S. and Eugster, H.P. 1955. Synthetic and Natural Muscovites. Geochim et Cosmochim Acta, Vol. 8, p. 225-280.

TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Cont)

Fault	Attitude Strike	Attitude Dip	Sense of Displacement in the Horizontal Plane	Amount of Apparent Displacement (ft)	Calculated Displacement (ft)	Location	Remarks
81	N25W	70E				Turbine building, discharge tunnel area	Slightly sinuous, tight with very fine grained quartz (mylonite) displaces small granitic dike
400	N12E	86W	Left lateral	0.1 to 0.2		Containment structure	Linear, long, chlorite-coated stringers filling, smooth slightly weathered surfaces with slickensides, S-24.
461	N13W-N13E	60-78E	Left lateral	0.5		Containment structure	Related to joint 541 found in the auxiliary building. Extensive shear zone with very closely spaced joint planes. Fracture surfaces are smooth with some slickensides, S-33. Crystalline quartz also evident within the fault.
518	N01E	51W	Right lateral	0.2 to 0.3		Containment structure	Extensive, linear, smooth, chloritic clay coating with slickensides, S-37 and S-38.
633	N34W	23E	-	0.1 to 0.2		Containment structure	Sinuous, open with clay filling, smooth surfaces with chlorite coating and slickensides, S-55.
887	N31E	50E	Right lateral	0.3		Containment structure	Sinuous, tight, broken in places, slickensides, S-77.
1088	N09E	59W	Left lateral	0.5		Discharge tunnel	Linear, tight, smooth surfaces with chloritic coating and slickensides, S-80.
1182	N12W	90	Left lateral	0.3-0.6		Discharge tunnel	Small fault near I-3, iron oxide stained surfaces with some clay filling.
1219	N09W	67E	Right lateral	0.2		Discharge tunnel	Very sinuous, splays off of I-3 smooth, surfaces with 0.1-inch chloritic clay filling.

TABLE 2.5.3-1 (Cont)

Fault	Attitude Strike	Attitude Dip	Sense of Displacement in the Horizontal Plane	Amount of Apparent Displacement (ft)	Calculated Displacement (ft)	Location	Remarks
2286	N21E	85W	Right lateral	0.1 to 0.2		Pumphouse	Sinuous very closely spaced fractures zone is 1.5 feet wide. rough surface with crystalline quartz coating, occasional chlorite coating, some clay filling.
2295	N26E	90	Right lateral	0-0.5		Pumphouse	Splays from point 2282 and rejoins within limit of excavation. Similar filling as point 2282.
2349	N37E	83W	Left lateral	0.8 to 1.0		Pumphouse	Linear, very closely spaced fractures, tight to slightly open, partially recemented with siliceous filling that contains granite and gneiss fragments and some drusy quartz.
2424	N10E	85E	Right lateral	0.5 to 1.0		Pumphouse	Tight fault filled with broken and weathered rock and small amounts of clay. Displacement appears to die out at the southern extent.
2426	N20E	71W	Left lateral	0.2 to 0.3		Pumphouse	Linear, tight fault with silicified breccia zone varying from 0.25 to 1.0 inch.
2427	N30E	65W	Right lateral	0.25 to 0.4		Pumphouse	Sinuous tight fault splaying off of fault J-2424 with a 1 inch wide silicified zone. displacement dies out to the south.
2441	N06E	90	Right lateral	0 to 0.2		Pumphouse	Splays off of fault J-2339, linear, open with drusy quartz filling, rough surfaces.

TABLE 2.5.3-3

LIST OF K/AR AGE DETERMINATIONS OF FAULT GOUGE

From Final Excavation Grade Mapping

Sample Number	Fault	Age (m.y.a.)
1F	1541	109±5
7F	T-2	200±7
10F	T-3	182±7
13F	T-3	155±6
14F	T-2	165±6
15T	T-3	178±7
A	2819	142±6

From Previous Reports

7	T-2	178±7*
8	T-3	174±6*
C-1	18	168±9**
C-2	18	192±9**
C-3	18	198±9**
C-4	18	181±10**

Sources:

*NNECO. (1975)
**NNECO. (1976)



FIGURE 2.5.1-18
GENERALIZED LOCATION OF FAULTS
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
UNIT 3
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

ALLEGATION RECEIPT REPORT

Date/Time Received: May 2, 891 1515 THRU 1520

Allegation No. RI-89-A-0065 (leave blank)

Name: ANONYMOUS

Address:

Phone:

City/State/Zip:

Confidentiality Requested: Yes ___ No X Implied ___ Granted ___

Per Panel Mtg 5/12/89 Anonymous Allegor should be "No" for Confidentiality Request.

Alleger's Employer: UNKNOWN

Position/Title: UNKNOWN

Facility: HADDAM NECK PLANT

Docket No.: 50-213

Allegation Summary (brief description of concern(s)): THAT A FORMER MENTAL PATIENT WAS EMPLOYED AT THE HADDAM NECK PLANT.

Number of Concerns: ONE

Employee Receiving Allegation: J. T. SHEDLOSKY (first two initials and last name)

Type of Regulated Activity:
(a) X Reactor
(b) ___ Vendor
(c) ___ Materials
(d) ___ Safeguards
(e) ___ Other: ___ (Specify)

Materials License No. (if applicable):

Functional Area(s):
___ (a) Operations
___ (b) Construction
X (c) Safeguards
___ (d) Transportation
___ (e) Emergency Preparedness
___ (f) Onsite Health and Safety
___ (g) Offsite Health and Safety
___ (h) Other:

Rec'd 5/19/89

NRC Region I Form 207
(Revised June 1984)

6/46

Allegation Receipt Report

Allegation No. [redacted]

Detailed Description of Allegation: CALLER INQUIRED IF A FORMER MENTAL PATIENT COULD BE EMPLOYED AT THE HADDAM NECK NUCLEAR PLANT.

I EXPLAINED THAT FOR PLANT ACCESS, A SECURITY INVESTIGATION HAD TO BE COMPLETED, & THAT PROCESS INCLUDED PSYCHOLOGICAL SCREENING ADMINISTERED BY A PHYSICIAN OR PSYCHOLOGIST. ADDITIONALLY IF ACCESS TO PLANT SECURITY AREAS WAS NOT NEEDED THIS PROCESS WAS NOT NEEDED.

THE WOMAN CALLER THEN EXPLAINED THAT SHE HEARD THAT A PERSON RECENTLY RELEASED FROM A PRIVATE HOSPITAL WAS WORKING AS A FIRE WATCH FOR NSS (NUCLEAR SUPPORT SERVICES).

(I DID NOT COMPLAIN THAT NSS FIRE WATCHES ARE GIVEN UN-ESCORTED VITAL AREA ACCESS, AS THAT IS WHERE THEIR CRITICAL DUTIES TAKE THEM).

AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION AS TO THE INAPPROPRIATENESS THAT A PHYSICIAN OR THE PROPER PERSON TO CONCUR OR DENY SECURITY ACCESS FOR REASONS OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE WOMAN GAVE US THE NAME OF THE PERSON OF CONCERN. SHE DID NOT IDENTIFY HERSELF WHEN I OFFERED TO GET BACK TO HER.

SHE/HE CHOSE WAS CALLED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CALL.

I THEN DISCUSSED, IN GENERAL TERMS, THE SCREENING AND INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR UN-ESCORTED PROTECTED & VITAL AREA ACCESS WITH THE ASSISTANT SECURITY SUPERVISOR, [redacted] MA [redacted] WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE ALLEGATION

NRC Region I Form 207
(Revised June 1984)

Allegation Receipt

Allegation No.: RI-94-A-0205

Detailed Description of Allegation: Faxed on May 4 I received computer records of VITA's Protected Area Authorizations. I did not find the person named by the Anonymous Caller for 1989. I will check Authorizations in the future.

(The person named may have been terminated or employment or may have started with the Security Investigation Process).

NRC Region I Form 207
(Revised June 1984)