


GLENN L. KOESTER

August 6, 1984

Mr. D.R. Hunter, Chief Reactor Project Branch 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011



KMLNRC 84-134

Re: Docket No. STN 50-482

Ref: 1) Letter KMLNRC 82-234 dated 8/11/82 from GLKoester, KG&E, to WCSeidle, NRC

- Letter KMLNRC 82-247 dated 10/20/82 from GLKoester, KG&E, to WCSeidle, NRC
- 3) Letter KMLNRC 83-013 dated 1/31/83 from GLKoester, KG&E, to WCSeidle, NRC
- 4) Letter KMLNRC 83-049 dated 4/25/83 from GLKoester, KG&E, to WCSeidle, NRC
- Letter KMLNRC 83-114 dated 8/26/83 from GLKoester, KGAE, to WCSeidle, NRC
- 6) Letter KMLNRC 83-157 from GLKoester, KG&E, to JEGagliardo, NRC

Subj: Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report - Compromised Welding Inspector - Examinations

Dear Mr. Hunter:

This letter is the final report submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning compromised Level II Welding Inspector Examinations. This matter was initially reported by Kansas Gas and Electric Company on July 12, 1982 and interim status reports were provided in the References.

The concern, as documented in Reference 1), was that a copy of the Level II Welding Inspector Examination was found in the field. Therefore, the possibility existed that any inspector who had taken this examination as part of his qualifications could have had access to the test questions prior to the examination.

Corrective action as described in References 1) and 2) was immediately initiated to provide better security for examination material and to determine whether or not the qualifications of any inspector who had taken the compromised examination were now in question. A retest was administered to the inspectors who had taken the compromised examination as part of their

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Mr. D.R. Hunter KMLNRC 84-134 -2-August 6, 1984 qualification process. Any inspector failing to pass or take this retest was identified and the welds accepted by these individuals were considered "suspect" until a sampling of welds could be reinspected. As stated in Reference 2), remedial actions were completed for the inspectors remaining on the project who failed the retest. Based upon the reinspections, all but one inspector were removed from the "suspect" list. The rejection rate for the one individual was considered excessive and therefore reinspection of welds accepted by him will continue. In order to facilitate this reinspection process a Generic Resolution has been issued. By this means, document review personnel have been notified to add this inspector's previous work to their review process. Any welds identified as being accepted by this individual will be flagged for reinspection. Please contact me or Mr. Ctto Maynard of my staff if you have any questions concerning this subject. Yours very truly, Glenn L. Koester, Vice President - Nuclear GLK:bb xc: RCDeYoung PO'Connor HBundy