



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 73
License No. NPF-3


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated November 25, 1981, as modified February 22, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 73, are hereby incorporated in the license. Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George W. Rivenbark, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 25, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 73

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Relace and add the following pages to the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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INSTRUMENTATION

ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels of Table 3.3-15 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-15

ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-15

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.3 The Anticipatory Reactor Trip System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-15.

TABLE 3.3-15

ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u> | <u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u> | <u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u> | <u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u> | <u>APPLICABLE MODES</u> | <u>ACTION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| 1. Turbine Trip | 4 | 2 ^(a) | 3 | 1 ^(b) | 16 |
| 2. Trip of Both Main Feed Pump Turbines | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 17 |
| 3. Output Logic | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 18 |

(a) Trip automatically bypassed below 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER
 (b) Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER

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TABLE 3.3-15 (CONTINUED)

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 16 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or reduce reactor power to less than 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.
- ACTION 17 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:
- a) The control rod drive trip breaker associated with the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
 - b) The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional control rod drive trip breaker associated with another channel may be tripped for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.3, after reclosing the control rod drive trip breaker opened in a) above.

TABLE 4.3-15

ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

| <u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u> | <u>CHANNEL CHECK</u> | <u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u> | <u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u> | <u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1. Turbine Trip (a) | S | Not Applicable | M | 1 (b) |
| 2. Main Feed Pump Turbine Trip | S | Not Applicable | M | 1 |
| 3. Output Logic | Not Applicable | Not Applicable | M | 1 |

(a) Trip automatically bypassed below 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER
 (b) Applicable only above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such test demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device(s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources.

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip (above 25 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump turbines. This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the power operated relief valve. This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737.

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

3/4.3.3.2 INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the incore detectors ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. See Bases Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for examples of acceptable minimum incore detector arrangements.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event so that the response of those features important to safety may be evaluated. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 "Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of