TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VE F	UNCTION AND NUMBER	VALVE GROUP(a)	ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)			
6.	Containment Spray Isolation Valves		
	2E11-F016 $A(b)$ and $B(b)$ 2E11-F028 $A(b)$ and $B(b)$:	10 24
7.	RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Isolation Valves		
	2E11-F011 A and B 2E11-F026 A and B	*	20 20
8.	Drywell-to-Torus Differential Pressure System Isolation Valves		
	2T48-F209 2T48-F210 2T48-F211 2T48-F212	12 12 12 12	5 5 5 5
9.	HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valves		
	2E41-F002 2E41-F003	3 3	50 50
	<u>Aut</u> 6. 7.	 Containment Spray Isolation Valves 2E11-F016 A(b) and B(b) 2E11-F028 A(b) and B(b) RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Isolation Valves 	Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued) 6. Containment Spray Isolation Valves 2E11-F016 A(b) and B(b) 2E11-F028 A(b) and B(b) 7. RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Isolation Valves 2E11-F011 A and B 2E11-F026 A and B 8. Drywell-to-Torus Differential Pressure System Isolation Valves 2T48-F209 2T48-F210 2T48-F212 9. HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valves

(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valve group
 (b) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control
 *Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a Low Low Low (Level 1) signal from

2B21-N691A, B, C, D. Refer to item 2.b of Table 3.3.3-1.

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
TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER		INCTION AND NUMBER	VALVE GROUP (a)	ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
Α.	Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)			
	21.	Core Spray System Flow Test Line Isolation Valves		
		2E21-F015 A 2E21-F015 B	* *	50 50
	22.	Suppression Pool Vent and Purge System Isolation Valves		
		2T48-F338 2T48-F339 2T48-F318 2T48-F326	10 10 10 10	5 5 5 5
	23.	RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Values		
		2E11-F008	11	24
	24.	RPV Head Spray Isolation Valve		
		2E11-F023	11	20

(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valve group
 *Closes upon actuation of Core Spray via a Low Low Low (Level 1) signal from
 2B21-N691A, B, C, D. Refer to item 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1.

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ATTACHMENT 3 NRC DOCKET NUMBER 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 REQUEST TO CHANCE ISOLATION ACTUATION SETPOINT IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SIX VALVES

Containment isolation values listed in Table 1 (Attachment 1 to this letter) are associated with the RHR and Core Spray systems. These values are normally closed, and are designed to go closed on receipt of an isolation signal. The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specification isolation setpoint for each of the values of Table 1 to make the setpoint consistent with the original design of the plant.

The present isolation value derived from the Technical Specifications is Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level 3. RPV level 3 is one of two isolation signals which is associated with Group 2 isolation. The existing Technical Specification for the subject valves erroneously states that the valves go closed on a Group 2 isolation. The original design drawings for the plant, however, state that the valves in question should go closed on a RPV level 1 signal.

The proposed change would replace " 'Group' 2" with an asterisk and a footnote which reads "Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a Low Low (level 1) signal from 2B21-N691A, B, C, D. Refer to item 2.b of Table 3.3.3-1" for the RHR system valves, and "Closes upon actuation of Core Spray via a Low Low (Level 1) signal from 2B21-N691 A, B, C,D. Refer to item 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1" for the Core Spray system valves.

BASIS:

This change is to make the Technical Specifications consistent with the original design basis, as identified by vendor drawings and instrument data sheets, and with the licensing basis provided in the FSAR. The design actuation point of each of the subject valves is consistent with the design actuation point of its system. The accident analyses, as reported in the FSAR, assumes that the Core Spray and RHR systems would be actuated at a RPV level 1 trip point. Therefore, the actuation of the subject valves at RPV level 1 is consistent with the original design of the plant as reported in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased above those evaluated in the FSAR due to this change, because the original accident analysis, as presented in the FSAR, assumes that the subject valves would receive their actuation signals at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR does not result from this change, because the design is consistent with the design considered in the original accident analysis. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not reduced due to this change in that the safety analysis was based on the original design, which assumed that the subject valves closed at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. We conclude, therefore, that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant hazards consideration.