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 HATCH-UNIT 2

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP (a)</u>	<u>ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
A. <u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
6. Containment Spray Isolation Valves		
2E11-F016 A ^(b) and B ^(b)	*	10
2E11-F028 A ^(b) and B ^(b)	*	24
7. RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Isolation Valves		
2E11-F011 A and B	*	20
2E11-F026 A and B	*	20
8. Drywell-to-Torus Differential Pressure System Isolation Valves		
2T48-F209	12	5
2T48-F210	12	5
2T48-F211	12	5
2T48-F212	12	5
9. HPCI Steam Line Isolation Valves		
2E41-F002	3	50
2E41-F003	3	50

(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valve group

(b) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control

*Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a Low Low Low (Level 1) signal from 2B21-N691A,B,C,D. Refer to item 2.b of Table 3.3.3-1.

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TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

<u>PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES</u>			<u>ISOLATION TIME</u> <u>(Seconds)</u>
<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP (a)</u>		
A. <u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>			
21. Core Spray System Flow Test Line Isolation Valves			
2E21-F015 A	*		50
2E21-F015 B	*		50
22. Suppression Pool Vent and Purge System Isolation Valves			
2T48-F338	10		5
2T48-F339	10		5
2T48-F318	10		5
2T48-F326	10		5
23. RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valves			
2E11-F008	11		24
24. RPV Head Spray Isolation Valve			
2E11-F023	11		20

(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each valve group
 *Closes upon actuation of Core Spray via a Low Low Low (Level 1) signal from 2B21-N691A,B,C,D. Refer to item 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1.

REQUEST TO CHANGE ISOLATION ACTUATION SETPOINT
IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR SIX VALVES

Containment isolation valves listed in Table 1 (Attachment 1 to this letter) are associated with the RHR and Core Spray systems. These valves are normally closed, and are designed to go closed on receipt of an isolation signal. The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specification isolation setpoint for each of the valves of Table 1 to make the setpoint consistent with the original design of the plant.

The present isolation value derived from the Technical Specifications is Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level 3. RPV level 3 is one of two isolation signals which is associated with Group 2 isolation. The existing Technical Specification for the subject valves erroneously states that the valves go closed on a Group 2 isolation. The original design drawings for the plant, however, state that the valves in question should go closed on a RPV level 1 signal.

The proposed change would replace " 'Group' 2" with an asterisk and a footnote which reads "Closes upon actuation of the LPCI mode of RHR via a Low Low Low (level 1) signal from 2B21-N691A, B, C, D. Refer to item 2.b of Table 3.3.3-1" for the RHR system valves, and "Closes upon actuation of Core Spray via a Low Low Low (Level 1) signal from 2B21-N691 A, B, C,D. Refer to item 1.a of Table 3.3.3-1" for the Core Spray system valves.

BASIS:

This change is to make the Technical Specifications consistent with the original design basis, as identified by vendor drawings and instrument data sheets, and with the licensing basis provided in the FSAR. The design actuation point of each of the subject valves is consistent with the design actuation point of its system. The accident analyses, as reported in the FSAR, assumes that the Core Spray and RHR systems would be actuated at a RPV level 1 trip point. Therefore, the actuation of the subject valves at RPV level 1 is consistent with the original design of the plant as reported in the FSAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased above those evaluated in the FSAR due to this change, because the original accident analysis, as presented in the FSAR, assumes that the subject valves would receive their actuation signals at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR does not result from this change, because the design is consistent with the design considered in the original accident analysis. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not reduced due to this change in that the safety analysis was based on the original design, which assumed that the subject valves closed at the RPV level 1 trip setpoint. We conclude, therefore, that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant hazards consideration.