

December 23, 1991

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 91-008
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written licensee event report (LER) for an occurrence involving a missed firewatch. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



R. W. KRIEGER
STATION MANAGER

GRSanders

Enclosure: LER No. 91-008

cc: C. W. Caldwell (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) SAY BROOK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	Docket Number (2) 01 51 01 01 01 71 61 2	Page (3) 1 of 0 1
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MISSED FIREWATCH DUE TO COGNITIVE PERSONNEL ERROR

EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	FACILITY NAMES	Docket Number(s)	
11	219	911	911	01016	010	112	213	911	NONE	01 51 01 01 01 1 1	

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name R. W. Krigger, Station Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7114 316181 6121515
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Yes (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1603 on 11/29/91, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100% power, a firewatch supervisor (contractor, non-licensed) conducting an inspection discovered that the required hourly firewatch patrol for the two Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (DG) [DG, EK] (3G002 and 3G003) rooms had been missed between 1500 and 1600. The hourly firewatch patrol had been established as required by Technical Specifications 3.7.8.2, "Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems," and 3.3.3.7, "Fire Detection Instrumentation," for inoperable fire protection equipment [KP].

The cause of this event was cognitive personnel error by the firewatch (contractor, non-licensed) when he missed the DG rooms during his assigned patrol.

The firewatch involved in this event has received appropriate disciplinary action. This event has been reviewed by appropriate firewatch personnel. As additional corrective action, firewatch supervisors have increased their monitoring of roving firewatch personnel.

There was no safety significance associated with this event since: 1) three early warning smoke detectors located in each DG room were operable and would have alerted appropriate personnel of a fire, 2) manual fire fighting equipment was available in the DG rooms to extinguish a fire, and 3) a continuously manned fire station is maintained on-site to immediately respond to a fire. In addition, fire barriers between the two DG rooms ensure that no single fire would have resulted in a loss of redundant safe shutdown equipment.