

NRC FORM 368
(12-81)
10 CFR 50

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

APPROVED BY OMB
3150-0011

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[01] [A] [L] [B] [R] [F] [1] [2] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [3] [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] [4] [] [] [5]
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON T [01] REPORT SOURCE [L] [6] [0] [5] [0] [0] [0] [2] [5] [9] [7] [0] [3] [2] [5] [8] [3] [8] [0] [7] [2] [7] [8] [4] [9]
7 8 9 DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 65 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[02] During normal operation on units 1, 2, and 3, while performing SI 4.2.A-13,
[03] standby gas (SBGT) train "B" was found inoperable due to erratic flow switch
[04] FS-65-42A (T.S. 3.7.B.3 and T.S. Table 3.2.A). The SBGT system is common to
[05] all three units. There was no effect on public health or safety. T.S.3.7.B.3
[06] permits operation for 7 days with one train inoperable. SBGT train "A" and
[07] "C" were available and operable. SBGT train "B" was inoperable for about
[08] 12 hours.

[09] [S] [C] [11] [E] [12] [A] [13] [I] [N] [S] [T] [R] [U] [14] [S] [15] [Z] [16]
7 8 9 SYSTEM CODE 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 COMP. SUBCODE 14 VALVE SUBCODE
[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8] [3] [] [0] [1] [8] [] [0] [3] [L] [] [2]
21 22 23 24 25 27 28 29 OCCURRENCE CODE 30 REPORT TYPE 31 REVISION NO.
[C] [18] [C] [19] [Z] [20] [Z] [21] [0] [0] [0] [0] [Y] [23] [N] [24] [L] [25] [M] [1] [7] [0]
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 42 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 43 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 44 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[10] "B" SBGT train was inoperable due to erratic McDonnell and Miller flow switch,
[11] Model AF-1. The switch was replaced and SI 4.7.B-1 and SI 4.2.A-13 were
[12] successfully completed. The paddle-type switches are to be replaced
[13] with differential pressure switches per the BFNP NRC Integrated Commitment
[14] Schedule. Replacement is currently scheduled for December 1985.

[15] [E] [28] [0] [8] [7] [29] NA [B] [31] Surveillance tests
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS 10 % POWER 11 OTHER STATUS 12 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 13 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 14

[16] [Z] [33] [Z] [34] NA [] [] NA
7 8 9 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE 10 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 11 LOCATION OF RELEASE 12

[17] [0] [0] [0] [37] [Z] [38] NA
7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 10 TYPE 11 DESCRIPTION 12

[18] [0] [0] [0] [40] NA
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 10 DESCRIPTION 11

[19] [Z] [42] NA
7 8 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 10 DESCRIPTION 11

[20] [N] [44] NA
7 8 9 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 10

IE 22
11

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Stan Carter

PHONE (205) 729-0889

8408090020 840727
PDR ADOCK 05000259
S PDR

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259/83018 R2 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.B.3

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC 08/01/84

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 87 percent power, unit 2 was operating at 68 percent power, and unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power. All three units were affected by this event. The standby gas treatment system is common to units 1, 2, and 3. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.2.A-13, Calibration of Flow Switches for Standby Gas Treatment System Train A, B, and C Heaters, standby gas treatment train "B" was found inoperable due to erratic flow switch FS-65-42A (Technical Specification 4.7.B.3 and Technical Specification Table 3.2.A). There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 allows operation for 7 days with one train inoperable. Standby gas treatment trains "A" and "C" were available and operable. "B" train was inoperable for about 12 hours. The flow switch was replaced and SI 4.7.B-1, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test, and SI 4.2.A-13 were successfully completed.

The cause for the erratic operation of the flow switch could not be determined; however, the most probable cause for failure was a weak tension spring.

The paddle-type flow switches on trains "A" and "B" were expected to be replaced with differential pressure switches similar to those installed on "C" train by February 15, 1984.

Due to incomplete design information and material delays, this modification will be implemented in accordance with the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Integrated Commitment Schedule. It is currently scheduled to be performed during December, 1985.

This update report is also an update to LER 259/83029 R1.

* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

July 27, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-259/83018 R2

The enclosed updated report provides details concerning standby gas train
"B" found inoperable due to erratic flow switch. This report is submitted
in accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. R. Pittman

G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

IE22
1/1