NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	1 OF 2

TITLE (4)
Primary Containment Isolation System Initiation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	1 8	8 4	8 4	0 2 3	0 1	0 7	2 7	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 6 4	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
David L. Smith	AREA CODE 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 0 8 6 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During replacement of failed relay 16AK20, an adjacent internal panel wire which supplies power to numerous primary containment isolation (PCIS) valves came loose giving intermittent PCIS signals, including isolation of the drywell sumps and continuous air monitor. The wire had been incorrectly terminated on the GE CR 120A type relay (3 wires on one terminal during a modification that was completed in August, 1981) causing it to come loose. The wire was re-terminated and the event ended in two hours. PCIS panels in units 1, 2, and 3 auxiliary instrument rooms were checked for similar wiring problems.

Panel 9-42 in unit 3 was found to have two similar problems where 3 wires were terminated on a single terminal. A design change will be necessary to correct the wiring. No other problems were found in units 1, 2, 3 PCIS panels. Unit 3 is currently in a refueling outage and corrections are expected by the end of the outage. These are considered to be isolated events and no further corrective action is required.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During normal operation, unit 1 was operating at 63 percent, Unit 2 at 59 percent, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. Unit 1 was the only unit affected.

Concurrent with maintenance work on relay 16AK20 (RLY) replacement, the licensed unit operator received numerous primary containment isolations on May 18, 1984, at 1700 hours. These were group 2 and 6 isolation valves. Electricians working on the relay identified a loose wire near adjacent relay 16AK57. The wire supplies power to numerous primary isolation valves (JM), and was the cause of the problem. The intermittent isolations resulted as the plant electricians bumped the wire during replacement of the adjacent relay. By the time relay replacement was finished the loose wire had become completely disconnected from its terminal. The wire was located and the termination point (relay 16AK57) of the wire was found to be incorrect. Although this point performed the same electrical function, it placed three wires on a two wire terminal. The wire was properly reterminated (relay 16AK61B (AD)) per approved drawings and the event terminated within two hours.

With the wire loose, the affected primary containment isolation valves all went closed, as designed. The wiring error was of no serious consequence since the circuit still performed the correct electrical function when the wire was connected. Therefore, it did not create any new safety problems. The person responsible for the wiring error is no longer working for TVA.

Other wiring in the unit 1, 2, and 3 PCIS panels was checked for similar wiring errors. Two terminals in unit 3 panel 9-42 were found with 3 wires connected. The extra wiring was determined to be the result of two field changes worked on two separate work plans associated with ECN P0291. These field changes accomplished essentially the same function and resulted in doubling wiring between the two terminals. The extra wire will be removed during the current unit 3 refueling outage under ECN P5135. No other problems were found in units 1, 2, or 3 PCIS panels.

Previous Similar Events : None

Responsible Plant Section : F.S.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

July 27, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/84023 R1

The enclosed updated report provides details which concern primary containment isolation system initiation. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. R. Pittman

for G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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