

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 2
--	--	------------------------

TITLE (4)  
SPURIOUS TOXIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEM (TGIS) ACTUATIONS

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 6	2 7	8 4	8 4	0 3 7	0 0 0	7 2 7	8 4		SONGS UNIT 3		0 5 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 2

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 4 4 9 1 2 1 - 7 1 7 0 1 0
---------------------------------------	---

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)       NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 27, 1984, at 0545, with Units 2 and 3 in Mode 5, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, additional spurious actuations occurred on June 30, July 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) actuated on each TGIS. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026 and 032 (Docket No. 50-361).

The spurious TGIS actuations are the result of overly conservative alarm setpoints. In addition, one or more of the following conditions also contribute to spurious TGIS actuations: electrical noise; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation. Corrective actions have been implemented and are continuing in order to eliminate these conditions. A proposed Technical Specification amendment was submitted April 27, 1984, requesting more appropriate TGIS setpoints. In addition, a request for exemption from reporting spurious actuations of the TGIS under 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 is being prepared.

IE 22  
11

8408080489 840727  
PDR ADOCK 05000361  
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		- 0 3 7	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

On June 27, 1984, at 0545, with Units 2 and 3 in Mode 5, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) (EIS System Identifier JF) actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, additional spurious actuations occurred on June 30, July 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) (EIS System Identifier VI) actuated on each TGIS. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. No plant systems or components failed as a result of these events. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026 and 032 (Docket No. 50-361).


The spurious TGIS actuations are the result of overly conservative alarm setpoints. In addition, one or more of the following conditions also contribute to spurious TGIS actuations: electrical noise levels; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation.

Several corrective actions were implemented in 1983 that have been effective in reducing, but not eliminating, the spurious TGIS actuations. These actions include: sealing the door in the corridor housing the TGIS, which has reduced rapid temperature and pressure changes and dust accumulation; banning radios in the area; and reducing calibration and surveillance intervals on the TGIS analyzers. Additionally, the system has been instrumented with recorders in order to determine which of the analyzers are causing the trips.

A proposed Technical Specification amendment was submitted April 27, 1984, requesting more appropriate TGIS setpoints. In addition, a request for exemption from reporting spurious actuations of the TGIS under 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 is being prepared. In the interim, corrective actions are continuing in order to eliminate the spurious TGIS actuations.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these occurrences. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

*Southern California Edison Company*



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES  
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE  
(714) 492-7700

July 27, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-037  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for thirteen occurrences involving the actuation of the Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). Since these events involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by these events.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 84-037

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

IE22  
11