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C. K. McCoy  
Vice President, Nuclear  
Vogtle Project



Georgia Power  
the southern electric system

October 31, 1995

LCV-0683-A

Docket No. 50-424


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-95-5  
ESF CHILLER'S INOPERABILITY LEADS TO  
UNIT OPERATION PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3**

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report for an event which occurred on October 2, 1995.

Sincerely,

  
C. K. McCoy

CKM/TEW/AFS


Enclosure: LER 1-95-05

cc: Georgia Power Company  
Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.  
Mr. M. Sheibani  
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator  
Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR  
Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REQUIRED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

5 0 0 0 4 2 4

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

ESF CHILLERS' INOPERABILITY LEADS TO UNIT OPERATION PER TECH. SPEC. 3.0.3

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
1	0	2 9 5	9 5	0 0 5	0 0	1 0	3 1	9 5		0 5 0 0 0	
										0 5 0 0 0	

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)				
1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2033(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2033(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	or in NRC Form 366A	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance	7 0 6 8 2 6 - 3 2 0 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 2, 1995, personnel were preparing to perform surveillance testing on Train B of the essential chilled water system. Train A was in standby and, at 0005 EDT, its handswitch was placed in stop (per procedure) to prevent it from automatically starting during the Train B surveillance test. At 0009 EDT, the Train B essential chiller tripped on instantaneous overcurrent upon receiving a start signal. As a result, Unit 1 was operating under Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 because there is no action statement for both essential chillers being out of service during mode 1 operation. Personnel returned the Train A essential chiller to standby service at 0012 EDT, whereupon it began to operate because a start signal was present as a result of the surveillance conditions. Based on the continued troubleshooting of the Train B chiller, it was determined prudent to return the Train A chiller to standby status. At 1742 EDT, the Train A essential chiller was taken to stop, which again represented unit operation per TS 3.0.3 because neither essential chiller was available for service. At 1750 EDT, the Train A essential chiller was placed in standby service.

Although extensive troubleshooting could not conclusively identify the cause of the overcurrent trip, it is believed to be the result of a low trip setpoint. To provide additional margin to trip, the instantaneous overcurrent relays' trip setpoints were increased from 600 amperes to 800 amperes.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   4   2   4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 9   5	SEQUENTIAL YEAR -   0   0   5	REVISION NUMBER -   0   0			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 365A)(17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) when more than one engineered safety feature (ESF) chiller of the essential chilled water system was inoperable, requiring entry into TS 3.0.3.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 2, 1995, personnel were preparing to perform surveillance testing on Train B of the essential chilled water system per procedure 14400-1, "Control Room Emergency Filtration Actuation Logic Test". Train A was in standby and, at 0005 EDT, its handswitch was placed in stop (per procedure) to prevent it from automatically starting during the Train B surveillance test. At 0009 EDT, the Train B essential chiller tripped on instantaneous overcurrent upon receiving a start signal. As a result, Unit 1 was operating under TS 3.0.3 because there is no action statement for both essential chillers being out of service during mode 1 operation. Per a caution in the procedure to place the other chiller in service, personnel returned the Train A essential chiller to standby service at 0012 EDT, whereupon it began to operate because a start signal was present as a result of the surveillance conditions.

Based on the continued troubleshooting of the Train B chiller, it was determined prudent to return the Train A chiller to standby status, although it was understood that this would entail another TS 3.0.3 entry. At 1742 EDT, the Train A essential chiller was taken to stop, which again represented unit operation per TS 3.0.3 because neither essential chiller was available for service. At 1750 EDT, the Train A essential chiller was again placed in standby service. Following troubleshooting and testing, the Train B essential chiller was returned to standby service on October 3, 1995, at 2050 EDT.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   4   2   4	L <sup>R</sup> NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 9   5	SEQUENTIAL YEAR -   0   0   5	REVISION NUMBER -   0   0	3	OF	3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

Although extensive troubleshooting could not conclusively identify the cause of the overcurrent trip, it is believed to be the result of a low trip setpoint. This conclusion was based on the fact that the nameplate data was different than the as-found starting current. The normal method of determining relay operation is to use the "Locked Rotor Amps", as shown on the nameplate, and set the overcurrent trip device at 2 times the nameplate value. Relays were tested and time domain reflectometry was performed on the motor but no other cause for the trip could be found and the trip could not be repeated. After testing, the overcurrent relays were reset from 600 amperes to 2.4 times the "as measured" value, which is 800 amperes.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The essential chilled water system is utilized for cooling various equipment rooms. However, the times that no essential chiller was available for automatic actuation represented a minimal at-risk period. Furthermore, the normal chilled water system remained available throughout the event. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse affect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) To provide additional margin to trip, the essential chiller instantaneous overcurrent relays' trip setpoints in both units were reset from 600 amperes to 800 amperes.
- 2) The improved TS will provide for the necessary test configuration and preclude the need to enter TS 3.0.3 should a failure occur in the train being tested. In the interim, an evaluation is being performed to determine if other procedural methods/guidance is needed to avoid future, unnecessary TS 3.0.3 entries.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- 1) Failed Components:  
None
- 2) Previous Similar Events:  
None
- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:  
Essential Chilled Water System - KM