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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Termination of Unescorted Site Access In A Timely Manner

Gentlemen:

We have reviewed the concerns identified in your August 28, 1995 letter regarding termination of unescorted site access in a timely manner (Reference 4). It is our desire to be objective and responsive to identified concerns or issues which may enhance safety or security program performance at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO). The subject of your concerns and our actions were discussed at the end of the June 15, 1995 access control enforcement conference (Reference 2). While site access termination is the responsibility of the Security department, the site access termination process at ANO requires input from other departments to make the process effective. Several enhancements were previously implemented to assist individuals when implementing the termination portion of the access control program and increase their awareness of termination criteria at ANO. Some of the enhancements are:

- The requirements for favorable and for-cause terminations were communicated to supervisors, contract managers and responsible individuals.
- A clarification was initiated to the definition of "termination".
- The employee checkout forms were revised to include human factors considerations, and training for contract managers concerning granting and terminating unescorted access authorization.
- ANO's quality assurance (QA) group began a surveillance of the termination of unescorted access process and procedures. To date, no discrepancies have been identified and the audit will be completed following the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R11) due to QA individuals assisting in the outage.
- Other Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) sites were briefed on this event.

Following the completion of the above enhancements, further initiatives have been taken. It is the intent of these efforts to take a second look at the process changes already made to verify their

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effectiveness and determine if further changes are needed to meet our internal standards in the affected areas. The additional initiatives are:


- ANO has organized a task force to perform a broad review of the current security related control processes and interfaces to assure they are timely and efficient. Any enhancements recommended by the task force will be evaluated and implemented as appropriate.
- ANO has completed an assessment of the Security, Fitness For Duty, and Access Authorization areas. This assessment was performed by independent specialists from other utilities and was led by the Entergy Corporate Assessment Group. Once the results from the assessment have been received, the results will be evaluated and appropriate actions will be implemented.

It is ANO's intent to remove the security badge from the badge rack and the security computer when a determination is made that an employee no longer requires unescorted access. Also, a non-Entergy employee's badge that has not been used to enter the protected area within a 30 day period, will be terminated and removed from the badge rack. Additionally, ANO verifies the continuing need for unescorted access for currently badged employees during a monthly verification process. This further ensures that badges for individuals who have been favorably terminated are reviewed for removal from the badge rack and security computer on a monthly basis.

The enhancements taken have increased the awareness of termination criteria at ANO. Our internal assessments have verified this and the inspectors comments during the most recent security inspection 95-25 exit meeting indicated that no discrepancies were identified from their review of 75 terminations. We recognize that further enhancements can be achieved and that we must strive to be self-critical and responsive in identifying initiatives that improve site security commensurate with the cost involved in implementing such an improvement. EOI continues to be committed to high standards of excellence while achieving top industry performance.

The above information is intended to provide you with a status of ongoing efforts to set high standards of performance at ANO in security related programs and perform in a manner that results in achieving those standards. As such, the information is not considered to constitute any commitment other than that already present in prior correspondence. Should you have questions or comments please call me at 501-858-4601.

Very truly yours



Dwight C. Mims
Director, Nuclear Safety

DCM/BWS

- References:
1. Letter, Mr. Samuel J. Collins, to Mr. J. W. Yelverton, Dated May 12, 1995, (NRC Inspection Report 95-16)
 2. Letter, Mr. Ross A. Scarano to Mr. J. W. Yelverton, Dated June 20, 1995, (Arkansas Nuclear One Enforcement Conference Presentation)
 3. Memorandum, Mr. LeMoine J. Cunningham to Mr. Blaine Murray, Dated August 18, 1995 (Evaluation Memorandum RE Arkansas Nuclear One)
 4. Letter, Mr. Ross A. Scarano to Mr. J. W. Yelverton, Dated August 28, 1995, (Termination of Unescorted Site Access in a Timely Manner)

cc: Mr. Leonard J. Callan
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