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PINER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 BT FRANCISVILLE LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 804 635-8094 346-8651

January 4 , 1991 RBG- 34266 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

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River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-046 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H.

Manager-Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group

WPDD glassect or TAE/PDG/CAB/JCM/CLB/PG

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

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Mr. C. R. Oberg Public Utility Commission of Texas 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757

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INC FORM 386					U.S. NU	JCLEAR R	EQULATO	TY COMMIS			-	-				
IG-091 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION							APPROVED DM8 ND 2150/0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92									
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							EATHES #30.92 ED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS TION COLLECTION REDUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD IS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS DRTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PS30). US NUCLEAR ORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20555. AND TO ERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE ERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104).									
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LICENSEE EVEN TEXT CONT	APPROVED OME NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED SURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.630) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON DC 20565. AND TO 1HE FAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503.								
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REPORTED CONDITION

At 0330 on 12/05/90 with the unit at 78 percent power in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when a spurious trip signal was received from the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) equipment room high differential temperature instrumentation. This caused the RCIC turbine main steam supply line inboard containment isolation valve (*ISV*), 1E51*MOVF063, to stroke closed.

This condition is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since isolation of the RCIC turbine steam supply line constitutes an ESF actuation.

INVESTIGATION

At the time of the event, the RCIC system (*BN*)was being tested in order to troubleshoot the RCIC turbine governor control system per maintenance work order R056717 and maintenance procedure MCP-4195, "Calibration of the RCIC Turbine Speed Controls."

At 0330 on 12/05/90 a Division II isolation trip signal was received, causing the RCIC turbine main steam supply line inboard isolation valve, 1E51*MOVF063, to stroke closed. The RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch, 1E31*N603B, was in an alarm condition with a delta temperature reading of 12 degrees F. However, the setpoint for the isolation is 96 degrees F. The Division II isolation signal was reset and maintenance work order MWO 145788 was initiated to find the cause of the spurious trip.

A calibration check of the RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch (*TS*), 1E31*N603B, which caused the isolation to occur, was indeterminate. The switch was tested satisfactorily in accordance with the applicable surveillance test procedure, (STP) 207-4243. However, as a precaution, temperature switch 1E31*N603B was replaced.

A review of previous River Bend Station LERs found no similar events.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The RCIC equipment room differential temperature switch, 1E31*N603B, was removed and will be returned to the vendor, General Electric Company, for repair or replacement. A new temperature switch was installed, calibrated and satisfactorily tested in accordance with STP-207-4243. The RCIC system has been returned to operation in accordance with the RCIC pump operability test, STP-209-3302.

NRC FORM 366A (6-R9) -	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92										
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20565, AND TO THE FAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (J150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.										
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The safety implications of the described event are insignificant due to two factors. First, the RCIC system was not being relied upon as it was administratively inoperable and in compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.3. Second, redundant safety systems required by Technical Specifications were available. The high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is a sufficient source of makeup at high pressure. Assuming HPCS failure, the operator could initiate the automatic depressurization system (ADS) or manually operate safety relief valves to reduce the system pressure in order to use the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system or the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system to mitigate the transient. Therefore, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).