

# PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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AUG 01 1984

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JOHN S. KEMPER  
VICE-PRESIDENT  
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Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket Nos.: 50-352  
50-353

Subject: Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2  
Information for Equipment Qualification  
Branch (EQB) Regarding SER Open Issue #6  
(Seismic/Dynamic Qualification of Equipment).

Reference: (1) "Trip Report for Seismic Qualification  
Review Team Plant Site Audit",  
R. E. Martin (NRC) to E. G. Bauer, Jr.,  
(PECO), dated May 31, 1984.

Attachment: (1) Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1:  
Justification for Interim Operation

File: GOVT 1-1 (NRC)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In response to the two follow-up actions requested by the Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) in reference (1), we are pleased to provide the following information.

- 1) Upgrading and modifications to the Limerick Unit 1 RCIC turbine assembly have been completed except for the installation of threaded taper pins which assist in maintaining alignment after pedestal bolting. The hold down bolts which attach the turbine pedestal to the baseplate have been installed. GE and the turbine assembly vendor require that taper pins be installed after final (hot) alignment of the turbine assembly. Hot alignment is scheduled after nuclear steam has been applied to the turbine assembly, approximately 6-12 weeks after fuel load, to bring it up to operating temperature and pressure. The schedule for taper pin installation on the Limerick Unit 1 HPCI turbine assembly is the same as described above.

Except for the installations of the threaded taper pins, the modified assembly is now similar to the turbine which was used for dynamic qualification testing, thereby achieving qualification of the Limerick Unit 1 RCIC turbine assembly. No additional maintenance tasks are required due to these modifications.


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- 2) Attachment (1) provides our justification for interim operation of Limerick Unit 1, until the first refueling outage, pending confirmation of the dynamic qualification of the residual heat removal service water process radiation monitor (RHRSW PRM) system for safety essential service as currently committed in the Limerick FSAR.

Should you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



JHA/gra/07108401

cc: See Attached Service List

cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/enclosure)  
Judge Richard F. Cole (w/enclosure)  
Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. (w/enclosure)  
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Martha W. Bush, Esq. (w/enclosure)  
Mr. James Wiggins (w/enclosure)  
Mr. Timothy R. S. Campbell (w/enclosure)  
Ms. Phyllis Zitzer (w/enclosure)  
Judge Peter A. Morris (w/enclosure)

LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1  
JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION

This is the justification for interim operation of the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1, pending confirmation of the dynamic qualification of the residual heat removal service water process radiation monitor (RHRSW PRM) for safety essential service as currently committed in the Limerick FSAR.

The RHRSW PRM detects high radiation levels in the cooling water effluent (RHRSW) from the RHR heat exchangers, in case of a heat exchanger tube leak of radioactive reactor coolant or suppression pool water to the RHRSW system. The effluent RHRSW is routed to the cooling towers (normal) or the spray pond (accident). A RHRSW PRM high radiation signal actuates an alarm and automatically closes the RHR SW isolation valves and, if sensed at the loop discharge header, shuts off the RHRSW pump.

The RHRSW PRM consists of a remote sampling station (liquid sample rack/scintillation detector) located in the area of the diesel generators and a log count rate meter (LCRM) located in the auxiliary control room, plus alarm and trip instrumentation. Dynamic qualification test records, applicable to Limerick, are available for all of this equipment except for the LCRM. There is strong evidence that the LCRM was qualified by test (seismic bracing was added to the Limerick model LCRM); however, the qualification test records are not readily available.

The justification for operating Unit 1 until the first refueling outage, with the qualification records of the LCRM incomplete, is as follows:

1. Since the RHRSW PRM is not required to be active safety essential (i.e., not required to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident) the only safety concern is the potential effect of a PRM component failure on either the Class 1E power circuits or on the operation of the safety essential RHRSW system.
2. All of the RHRSW PRM components are located in mild environment areas (auxiliary control room and diesel generator areas) where hydrodynamic loads are minor or nonexistent. All of the components have been qualified, except for the LCRM for which there is strong evidence of qualification. Consequently, PRM component failure is not likely.
3. All Class 1E power circuits are redundant and separated, hence a single PRM electrical component failure that causes a Class 1E power circuit failure is within the Limerick Design Basis (i.e. failure of a single, active, safety-related component).
4. There are two RHR heat exchangers, each with its own RHRSW supply system. Hence shutdown and isolation of one RHRSW supply system because of a PRM component failure is within the Limerick Design Basis (i.e. failure of a single, active, safety-related component).

5. If the shutdown and isolation of one RHRSW supply system results from a false high radiation level PRM trip signal, the operator can manually bypass the signal and reopen the RHRSW isolation valves and restart the RHRSW supply pump. The operator can determine if the trip is due to a false high radiation level trip signal because there are two PRMs on the RHRSW supply system for each RHR heat exchanger.
6. Because of the qualification level of the RHRSW PRM components, the occurrence of multiple failures has a very low probability.

In the event that previous test records do not become available, we will present an acceptable solution for implementation at the first refueling outage. It is believed that, for the reasons outlined above, the probability of a failure associated with the LCRM remains low enough to justify the safe interim operation of Limerick 1.

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